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I
Abstract
E-conunerce now constitutes a significant part of all conunercial activity; however the
increase in transactions is also leading to more disputes. These disputes are becoming
more frequent, more technologically complicated and more difficult in terms of
traceability .
This thesis focuses specifically on dispute problems related to soft products, i.e. those
that are intangible and therefore requiring no physical delivery. With the growing
demand for these types of products, e.g. downloadable films, music, software, and
prepaid calling time, the prevention of fraudulent transactions is becoming increasingly
important. Reasons for the rise in the number of fraudulent transactions include
merchants being unable to see the customer to verify an ID or signature and E-conunerce
enabling soft-products and services to be acquired via soft delivery methods: email,
download or logging in.
The introductory section provides a critique of current e-conunerce fraud detection and
prevention techniques and shows that not all are suitable for e-commerce, especially soft-
products, and therefore unable to provide complete protection against fraud. The future
relating to the detection and prevention of e-conunerce fraud is then discussed, leading to
suggestions regarding the improvement of the current state-of-the-art technique, the
Address Verification Service (AVS), which is used to accommodate the introduction of
soft-products.
Apart from the exchange process problems, i.e. those involving money and goods,
attention is also paid to other important factors such as timing and quality that are usually
neglected in these detection and prevention techniques. Dispute scenarios from many
different perspectives have been analysed, viz. computer science, business, legal and that
of the participants themselves. From the analyses, all possible dispute cases have been
formally listed using the 'Truth Table' approach. This analysis has then led to the design
of a comprehensive taxonomy framework for dispute in e-conunerce.
II
The term Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), is the online technology applied to
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which is resolving disputes other than via
litigation in the courts. Current ODR systems and their suitability for the e-commercial
world have been examined, concluding that not all are appropriate for e-commerce
situations (since most still involve a human element and often make the resolution
process more costly than the actual item under dispute).
The proposed solution to the problem is by automating the online dispute resolution
process. The total solution is described in two parts (i) an E-commerce Transaction
Protocol (ETP) forming the infrastructure where the transaction will take place and be
able to accommodate any new improvements in the future, and (ii) an Automated Online
Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which should automatically resolve any dispute
occurring within the proposed e-commerce model. In order for the AODR to resolve any
dispute, a product/payment specific plug-in (add-on) has been incorporated into the
system. For illustration purposes, credit cards as a payment method has been selected and
the appropriate plug-in specification for soft products and credit cards created.
The concept of providing every soft product with a quality certificate has also been
discussed. A concluding case study of e-commerce in Saudi Arabia has been used to test
the viability of both the e-commerce dispute taxonomy and the proposed model. The case
study shows the suitability of using ETP with AODR in order to resolve soft-product
disputes automatically. Limitations of the work and further research possibilities have
then been identified.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1 Electronic Commerce
The worldwide Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) market is the only one that is still
doubling in size year on year and yet at the same time has still not reached its peak.
Many business analysts believe that it still has a long way to go before it reaches even
this point.
E-commerce was facilitated with the invention of the Internet; technological development
has since made it easily accessible and at the same time provides a wide diversity of
products and locations, ease in navigation and search, and 2417 availability.
However, one of the major obstacles facing growth within the industry is that of security,
potential customers are not confident about the degree of transaction security when
buying or selling online. Even where goods online are cheaper than the same items
available in-store or by other physical means, many customers still prefer the second
alternative, claiming that their identity and payment details will be more protected outside
of the digital world. However this problem is slowly being resolved due to the efforts of
researchers and businesses in an attempt to make e-commerce more secure and also to
educate users. At the same time many people are now being forced to buy online because
of the new products being offered exclusively via the Internet.
1.2 E-commerce Products
The huge potential of the e-commerce market is encouraging many companies to offer
new products that are capable of being delivered digitally, for example live music. E-
commerce products are mainly divided into two categories: hard, i.e. tangible products,
requiring shipment to the buyer. This category covers all traditional products that the
consumer will be familiar with such as clothes, toys, computers etc. The second category
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is defined as soft, i.e. intangible products those available for consumption without
physical shipment. Examples here include software, music and calling time [16].
Soft products may also comprise services such as subscriptions to online newspapers or
ISP, the ability to watch a real-time film etc. Some of the more traditional hard products
are now converting to soft products due to ease of production and the possibility of
making them much more widely available and therefore improving market reach. Such
products include books and music CDs.
1.3 E-commerce Fraud and Fraud Prevention
Since the invention of the computer network, 'crackers' have been misusing it. For some
it is merely a form of entertainment, for others it provides a source of revenue. However
this makes any e-commerce site or server vulnerable to more attacks than a normal site
where all information is easily accessible to the Internet public.
In order to commit fraud, a person does not need to be a computer 'expert'. Any Internet
user can make a fraudulent purchase, especially in the case of soft products. Those
committing fraud do not fear the law since there are no laws governing the entire Internet
and it is almost impossible to trace any fraudulent activity back. Low cost and diverse
delivery and payment methods of most soft-products make it even harder for merchants
to try to get their money or the products back since tracing may cost more than the cost of
the product itself [17].
Because of the severe damage some of these fraud cases can cause to the merchants and
the payment companies, many fraud detection and prevention systems are now in use.
Each of these systems is designed to handle a specific fraud scenario. Currently the most
widely used are data mining and neural networks, surrogate card numbers, Verified By
VISA, Card Verification Value (CVV2), and Address Verification Service (AVS) [17,
16, 139].
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which is resolving disputes other than via
litigation in the courts, has been used for long time. ADR has proved to be more efficient
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than going to court since it is cheaper, faster and is able to provide more satisfactory
resolution outcomes. However, most disputes resolved using ADR are concerned with
hard-products. Therefore an alternative system for soft-products should be available.
1.4 Fair Exchange and Non-Repudiation
One major feature of e-commerce soft-products and services is the difficulty encountered
when trying to revoke or invalidate the transaction. If the buyer receives the product then
the merchant has no effective means to force the person to return it. This is particularly
true if the merchant and the customer live in different countries with differing laws and
regulations.
Usually, the transaction of exchanging the money with the goods must happen at the
same time to ensure that both customer and merchant get what they want, but this is
almost impossible to do in the electronic world since all transactions need time to travel
and will pass through many servers before they reach the final destination. Link speed
and congestion are not controlled. Therefore this limitation could allow some fraudulent
user to stop or interrupt the transmission before it reaches the other end, giving him an
advantage over the other partner.
For this reason many fair exchange protocols have been proposed in the past in an
attempt to ensure that neither of the two exchangers will gain any advantage over the
other, either the transaction is completed successfully or interrupted.
Non-repudiation services prevent entities from denying that they have sent or received
certain information. They must ensure that when PartyX sends some information to
PartyY over a network, neither of them can deny having participated in a part or the
whole of this communication [89]. Therefore a non-repudiation protocol has to generate
non-repudiation evidence [78]. Many applications such as e-cornmerce, fair exchange,
certified electronic mail, etc. are related to non-repudiation.
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1.5 Example Scenario
The example illustrated below shows a simple e-commerce transaction that will be
continually referred to in the rest of the thesis.
PartyX is the merchant and anything ending with 'X' means it belongs to PartyX;
PartyY is the buyer and any thing ending with 'Y' means it belongs to PartyY.
PartyY needs to buy a piece of software from PartyX. PartyX negotiates the product with
PartyY. PartyY agrees and sends to PartyX the payment information. PartyX checks the
validity of the payment received using any of the address verification services available.
PartyX receives a positive response from the verification service that the address of
PartyY is correct and corresponds to the payment method used. PartyX charges PartyY
the agreed amount and then sends the software using any soft delivery method such as
Email or download. PartyY checks his address and downloads the software from there.
From the above example, many problems clearly exist. The verification method used is
not performing the expected verification since it was mainly built to handle hard-products
where there is a physical shipping address to verify. However with e-commerce soft-
products this verification is not helpful at all. The main problem is that anyone who
steals PartyY's payment method and knows his physical address can purchase any soft-
products he wants and receive it at any designated point.
PartyX has no way to prove the delivery of the goods and has no signed receipt from
PartyY to use in any future dispute. Furthermore, ifPartyY receives the software and then
claims not to have done so or even goes as far as stating that the order was not even
placed in the first instance, Party X once again has no evidence of participation or
delivery.
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1.6 Scope
The ideal situation would be one that enables a buyer to purchase soft-products online
and pay for them by any e-payment method. After both parties receive what they want
correctly through a soft-delivery method like an email or download, neither the buyer nor
the merchant should be able to deny receiving what they expected or participating in the
transaction.
In order to achieve this ideal situation, enough evidence should be available to challenge
any fraudulent transaction on the Internet using standard Internet applications that all the
Internet users know. This thesis will try to solve the fraud in soft-products by a technical
solution rather than laws and regulation, since laws and regulation if not enforced by the
system, have no authority in the Internet due to its global nature.
1.7 The Proposed Solution
Much of the work that has been done to resolve disputes online is still in progress and
many different approaches and solutions have been suggested. However, despite the
massive amount of research that has been published and implemented in the past, the aim
of resolving disputes efficiently has still not been satisfactorily achieved.
The thesis discusses in detail the fact that previously proposed solutions still suffer from
serious flaws that make them unsuitable for certain products or payment methods. The
common, and weakest aspect of all the approaches suggested so far is the continued need
for human involvement in the dispute process, ultimately leading to higher redress costs.
Apart from the exchange process problems, i.e. those involving money and goods,
attention is also paid to other important factors such as timing and quality that are usually
neglected in these detection and prevention techniques. Dispute scenarios from many
different perspectives will be analysed, viz. computer science, business, legal and that of
the participants themselves. From the analyses, all possible dispute cases will be formally
listed using the 'Truth Table' approach. This analysis then will led to the design of a
comprehensive taxonomy framework for dispute in e-commerce.
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The term Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), which is the online technology applied to
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), has been used when looking at systems for
resolving disputes other than via litigation in the courts, and for those using online
technology in particular. Current ODR systems and their suitability for the e-commercial
world will be examined and will conclude that not all are appropriate for e-commerce
situations (since most still involve a human element and often make the resolution
process more costly than the actual item under dispute).
The proposed solution to the problem is by automating the online dispute resolution
process. The total solution will be described in two parts (i) an E-commerce Transaction
Protocol (ETP) forming the infrastructure where the transaction will take place and be
able to accommodate any new improvements in the future, and (ii) an Automated Online
Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which should automatically resolve any dispute
occurring within the proposed e-commerce model. In order for the AODR to resolve any
dispute, a product/payment specific plug-in (add-on) will be incorporated into the system.
For illustration purposes, credit cards as a payment method will be selected and the
appropriate plug-in specification for soft products and credit cards will be created.
1.8 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis proposes an automated dispute resolution system designed to lower the cost
and time of redress. It also explores the possibility of directions for future research and
presents these possibilities within the body of the work.
Chapter 2 discusses the nature and development of e-commerce as a form of conducting
commercial exchange. The most popular types of e-commerce products are described,
together with the most common terminologies for e-commerce transactions. The future
potential of e-commerce is then considered. Issues such as trust and security in the
transaction process are implicit in the chapter.
The chapter then goes on to describe traditional forms of money as a medium of
exchange and how more sophisticated and secure systems of exchange have developed.
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Established practices will then form the basis for describing new, emerging electronic
methods of payment.
Chapter 3 describes the nature of non-repudiation services and will explore some of the
issues regarding evidence such as types, elements and validity and their life cycles. The
role of the trusted third party (TTP) will also be considered and will include an
examination of the nature and emphasis being placed on their involvement in non-
repudiation protocols.
Chapter 4 will provide a critique of current e-commerce fraud prevention and detection
techniques. Ultimately it will suggest that not all are suitable for e-commerce and
therefore able to provide complete protection against fraud. Emphasis will be placed on
analysing the techniques that are used most frequently by identifying their drawbacks and
providing suggestions for their improvement. It will conclude by discussing the future of
preventing and detecting e-commerce fraud. As a result it proposes certain improvements
on current state-of-the-art techniques by focusing on one of the most frequently used
fraud prevention methods.
Chapter 5 is intended to present a taxonomy of all possible dispute scenarios in the field
of e-commerce. It will analyse scenarios from many different perspectives: computer
science, business, legal and also the transaction participants' point of view.
Dispute cases will be studied in general and will not specifically be concerned with any
specific goods, payment or exchange methods. All possible dispute cases will be formally
listed using the 'Truth Table' approach, and a comprehensive taxonomy framework for
dispute in e-commerce will be derived from these possibilities. This taxonomy should
provide an adequate basis for ODR system designers and others dealing with dispute
resolutions in order to better understand the nature of the online environment.
Chapter 6 will study current Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems and their
suitability for the e-commercial world in more detail. It will conclude by suggesting that
not all methods are suitable for e-commerce transactions with soft products, since in most
situations there will be a human element involved in the resolution process, automatically
adding more cost.
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Chapter 7 will talk about the proposed solution and how in order to solve the current
problems in e-commerce dispute resolution a complete solution must be offered. The
solution will comprise two parts (i) an E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) that is
reasonable and expandable to accommodate any new improvements in the future, and (ii)
an Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which should automatically
resolve any dispute happening within the proposed e-commerce model.
This chapter will discuss the e-commerce transaction protocol in general, its components
and how it works. The terminology used is already well-known, the intention is not to
create a new technology, rather its intention is to build upon existing knowledge by
modifying and suggesting improvements to better satisfy technical needs. It will also
demonstrate the new idea of assigning a quality certificate to every soft-product and the
beneficial advantages of that.
Chapter 8 will discuss the existence of an effective Automated Online Dispute Resolution
(AODR) system, its dependence on an effective ETP, and how the system itself actually
functions. For illustration proposes and since the focus of this thesis is about disputes
regarding soft products, this chapter selected one of the most common payment methods
used in e-commerce, that of using credit cards to create the appropriate plug-in
specification for soft products and credit cards.
Chapter 9 will talk about e-commerce in Saudi Arabia and discuss current and future
developments. It will then describe a case study that has been conducted in the dispute
resolution department on one of the major banks in Saudi Arabia. The case study
analyzed more than 500 dispute cases in order to test the viability of both the e-commerce
dispute taxonomy and the proposed model. It demonstrated the suitability of using ETP
with AODR in order to resolve soft-product disputes automatically.
Chapter 10 concludes by summarizing its original objectives, subsequent research and
findings that led to proposals for a new solution, contributions to the current field of
academic study and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER Two
Electronic Commerce and Payments
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CHAPTER TWO
Electronic Commerce and Payments
2.1 Introduction
Over the last five to ten years the growth of Electronic commercial transactions over the
Internet, or "e-commerce," as it has come to be known has been so fast and unexpected
that many experts continue to underestimate its growth and expansion. The rate of e-
commerce growth continues so rapidly that most of the time projections are outdated as
quickly as they are published. E-commerce with all its categories including business-to-
customer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) transactions is now a significant part of
commercial transactions worldwide. Subsequently, policymakers and developers are
likely to face more and more complex issues of security, privacy, taxation, fraud,
infrastructure development and other issues in the coming years.
This chapter will discuss the nature and development of e-commerce as a form of
conducting commercial exchange. The most popular types of e-commerce products are
described, together with the most common terminologies for e-commerce transactions.
The future potential of e-commerce is then considered. Issues such as trust and security
in the transaction process are implicit in the chapter.
The chapter then goes on to describe traditional forms of money as a medium of
exchange and how more sophisticated and secure systems of exchange have developed
(which in turn have resulted in greater consumer confidence and improved economic
growth). Established practices will then form the basis for describing new, emerging
electronic methods of payment.
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2.2 E-Commerce Definition
E-business and e-commerce are concepts often used in conjunction with the use of
Internet technology by businesses and end-consumers. There is a fine but important
difference between e-commerce and e-business.
E-business is a means of enabling and supporting businesses to be more efficient and
flexible in their internal operations, to work more directly with their suppliers, and to be
more reactive to the needs and expectations of their customers. It allows businesses to
select the best suppliers regardless of their geographical location and to sell to a global
market.
One special case of e-business is e-commerce, in which a merchant provides goods or
services to a customer in return for payment. A special case of e-commerce is B2C e-
commerce where the customer is an ordinary buyer rather than another business.
However, while these special cases are of significant economic importance, they are just
particular examples of the more general case of any form of business operation or
transaction conducted via electronic media.
Hartman, [14] offers the following definitions which outline the differences:
An e-business initiative is any Internet initiative - tactical or strategic - that transforms
business relationships, whether those relationships are business-to-consumer, business-to-
business, intra-business, or consumer-to-consumer. An e-commerce initiative is a
particular type of e-business initiative that is focused around individual business
transactions that use the Internet as medium of exchange, including business-to-business
as well as business-to-consumer. Similar defmitions exist, e.g. Turban [15]
These definitions differ mainly in scope: e-business is about supporting and enabling
business relationships in general, while e-commerce is about business transactions
between different companies and/or end-consumers. Another possible defmition of
electronic commerce would be: any form of business transaction in which the parties
interact electronically rather than by physical exchanges or direct physical contact.
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2.3 History of E-commerce
The history of e-commerce mainly depends on howe-commerce is defined. An argument
could possibly be made that the first transaction completed on the telephone or via a fax
was the first e-commerce transaction. But according to the definition of e-commerce in
the previous section, in 1969 America's Department of Defense commissioned a project
called the ARPANET for researching networking and this became the Internet. However,
it was used purely as a research tool for more than 20 years. Subsequently, Tim Berners-
Lee at CERN developed the World Wide Web which was officially released in 1991
where also the America's National Science Foundation discontinued its restrictions on the
commercial use of the Internet. At this time the first Internet business started. The
Internet was essentially a world of text only. In 1993, the first graphic web browser,
Mosaic, was introduced. The mixture of a World Wide Web, pictures, graphical web
browsers, and no commercial restrictions on the Internet, initiated Internet e-commerce.
2.4 E-commerce Products
E-commerce products cover all the current normal products and services and more. A
distinction should be made between physical (tangible) goods and electronic goods that
can be delivered directly through the Internet (audio, video, images, text, software ...).
It is possible to classify e-commerce products into two main categories: Hard-Products
and Soft-Products:
Hard-Products: Includes all tangible products that require delivery to a physical address
if purchased. Clear examples are laptops, printers, house-wares, clothes ...etc. E-
commerce represents an evolution of the current method of trading for physical products.
It benefits from the new potential offered by technology to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness in terms of lower costs, expanding market potential and better meeting
customers' needs respectively. E-commerce also improves product and service
innovation, especially through the easy interaction between the merchant and customer.
Trading for physical goods online is expected to have an enormous impact on
competitiveness and quality of services but limited impact on employment.
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Soft-Products: This includes all intangible products that can be shipped electronically.
The trading of electronic goods (multimedia works, games, etc.) represent a revolutionary
new way of trading, since the full e-comrnercial transaction can be conducted at once
online. It could create totally new markets and develop some new industries (such as
digital publishing). This highly pioneering form of e-comrnerce is expected to have an
important impact on competitiveness and create "new" employment opportunities.
Before further classifying soft products it is important to define some terms: Has-cost
and Has-No-Cost. Has-Cost means that this product is either expensive or very
expensive. For example a pre-paid calling card can be described as being very expensive
where as a piece of music can be considered inexpensive (has-No-Cost) because it can be
recopied many times over and the cost of copying will be comparably low to its price.
Another term to define is traceability. This means a fraud purchase can be Traceable if it
can be traced for example to a phone number or an official IP address, or Non-Traceable
if otherwise.
1- Has-Cost- Traceable: The loss in this category is not very high. Often times the cost
of tracing is higher than the cost of the product itself as illustrated in the following two
examples. Customer service for a laptop company: when the machine is not covered by
the warranty, the company usually charges per minute for customer service by asking for
a credit card or a bank account. If a fraud happened in this case then the cost was the time
of the customer service representative who answered the call, which is quite high some
times, depending on the type of customer service he is providing. The cost of tracing this
fraud is low since they have information about the original purchaser and, if not, they can
add a note in the system to mark this machine as a stolen machine so that the next time
someone calls for a service under the same serial number the company will try to get the
machine since it is noted as stolen (there are many ways to trace this item, but this is
beyond the scope of this thesis). In contrast, if a prepaid calling card is purchased online
then the loss is the price of minutes in the prepaid card itself, which costs many
merchants 70%-80% of the actual street price of the card. Here the tracing of the fraud is
very high since one has to go and see the log for the calls, and if this card has not expired
-which is a rare case, since the merchant will not know about the fraud until the real
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owner of the card reports it, which is typically one month from the time of purchase _
then they find out from where that thief was making his call and subsequently knock on
his door and catch him. Let's imagine however that he was using a pay phone or any
public phone, in this case there is no way to trace him unless one tries to call the same
number he was calling and finds out who called them and where he lives. Inmany cases
this is not possible since most fraud cases involve international calls and also there is no
single database to search the called number and identify every person calling it in the
immediate area of that pay phone and try to trace them. It is clear in this case that the cost
of tracing is high, but an additional condition in tracing is that unless a certain amount of
money is stolen the FBI or the authorities will not provide assistance, and that amount is
around $50,000, which means if one has a fraud of less than $50,000, one has to deal with
it through his own lawyer which is quite expensive since the cost of many soft products is
on the average of $20 to $100 maximum.
2- Has-Cost-Non- Traceable: These are almost the same products mentioned above but
the delivery method makes it Non-Traceable. For example, a Calling card pin number is
sent to a free email and opened from an Internet cafe, or from an international location, in
such case there is absolutely no way to trace it.
3- Has-No-Cost- Traceable: The loss in this kind of fraud is extremely low and there is
no need to waste more money in tracing the thief. One example of this is downloading a
piece of music or software. This piece of music or software costs money to generate, but
the cost of tracing the fraud is much higher since one has to find the IP address of the
thief who downloaded it and trace it. In most cases this thief can be in an Internet Cafe or
in a different country where the cost of one more copy is only the size of the downloaded
file divided by the cost of the bandwidth, and this cost almost equals zero.
4- Has-No-Cost-Non- Traceable: The loss in this case is almost the same as in the
previous one, but given that it is impossible to trace the thief which is even if it was
possible it will not be done. A simple example of this is delivering a picture some one
ordered to his email, not by download, in this case with this many free email services and
the ease of getting one it is almost non-traceable.
15
2.S Categories of E-commerce
In every E-commerce transaction there is a minimum of two parties involved. The
maximum number of parties involved could be unlimited but in this thesis the focus is on
the two main players in any e-commerce transaction: seller and buyer.
There exists many categories of sellers and buyers but for simplicity will only cover the
most important three: consumers, businesses and governments. The seller and the buyer
can be from the same or different categories, and this is how the e-commerce categories
are defined. In this section each possible permutation of these three categories will be
discussed in details.
Consumer to Consumer (C2C): It means consumers selling to other consumers; this
form of transaction exists in the real world but it is rare since (i) it will be difficult to find
someone who wants what you, the seller, has to offer and (ii) as a result, it is therefore
very time consuming. The reality is that usually the only consumers you are likely to
encounter in this situation will be friends, family, or flea market traffic. However, this
category of e-cornmerce is now expanding due to the ease of searching on the Internet.
These days, you could be in Canada and buy a used laptop or MP3 player from someone
in Russia in two minutes. Online auction sites allow the seller to be another consumer.
Ebay [58] is one example of the great successful C2C e-commerce sites.
C2C in most cases require a trusted third party to be in the middle of the transaction since
it is difficult, technically and economically, for the normal consumer to setup a site to sell
or buy items in small quantities. Transferring money from the buyer to the seller is
another reason to have the trusted third party involved to complete the transaction.
Consumer to Business (C2B) or Business to Consumer (B2C): The possibility is that
in the future this situation could exist: C2B i.e., consumers selling to businesses.
B2C obviously means businesses selling to consumers, usually in the form of online
shops or auction sites where the seller is a business rather than another customer. The
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B2C category is primarily associated with electronic retailing. This category has
expanded greatly with the advent of the World Wide Web. Now shopping malls exist all
over the Internet offering all kinds of consumer goods, from food and clothes to
computers and motor vehicles.
In the B2C transaction, the seller or merchant usually require the buyer or customer to
authenticate his identity and his form of payment. Most of the time the customer's
information is not stored with the merchant for security and privacy reasons. Moreover,
usually it is a one-time-only transaction, meaning the buyer will never repeat the order, so
there is no need to store this information.
Business to Business (B2B): This means just what it says it means: businesses selling to
other businesses: factories selling to wholesalers; wholesalers selling to retailers; office
suppliers selling to offices; farmers selling to markets, etc. Any transaction between two
businesses online is a B2B e-commerce transaction. In B2B companies use the Internet
for ordering from its suppliers, receiving invoices and making payments. This category of
electronic commerce has been well established for several years using networks and in
particular uses Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
B2B is one of the fastest growing sectors of e-commerce transactions. Business-to-
business transactions between small and medium-sized businesses and their suppliers is
rapidly growing, as many of these firms begin to use Internet connections for supply
chain management, after-sales support, and payments. Most B2B transactions do not
require a trusted third party since both businesses have an e-system or at least one of
them does. Authentication is also less complicated than with C2C or B2C since most of
the time repeat orders are being placed, and trust between businesses plays a vital role in
the approval of orders.
Business to Government (B2G) or Government to Business (G2B): The B2G category
covers all transactions between companies and governmental organizations. Interestingly,
B2G business to governmental marketplaces will presumably be more successful than
B2B business-to-business marketplaces. This is because businesses generally prefer to
purchase from suppliers with whom they already have a relationship as mentioned above.
17
Definitely, when businesses need to cut costs, they generally don't look for cheaper
suppliers. They demand, request, or work with existing suppliers to cut costs.
Governments, in contrast, are usually not supposed to have relationships with suppliers.
Such relationships would be alleged at best as bias, and at worst as dishonesty.
Governmental purchases need to be based on the merits of the deal - and this is perfectly
fitting to on-line marketplaces.
An example of B2G will be publishing the details of approaching governmental
procurements over the Internet where businesses can respond electronically. Currently
this category is in its infancy, but it could expand quite rapidly as governments use their
own operations to promote awareness and growth of electronic commerce.
The G2B (government-to-business) category covers all transactions between
governments and businesses. In contrast to B2G, G2B will be less successful since
businesses usually hire private companies or individuals to deal with government issues.
In addition, G2B is less promising than G2C for the same reason and it is known fact that
businesses' needs from government are less complicated and time- consuming than for
most citizens who lack sufficient time to leave their work to attend to their needs. Clear
examples of G2B will be VAT returns and the payment of corporate taxes.
Government to Government (G2G): The G2G category covers all transactions between
governmental organizations. This category is the least important category since
governmental organizations usually do not have financial transactions between each
other. With the growth of interest in e-government by some countries, G2G e-comrnerce
will certainly be a field that will be given more weight in the future.
Consumer to Government (C2G) or Government to Consumer (G2C): The C2G
category is developing. Following the increase of both the business-to-consumer and
business-to government categories, governments may extend electronic interaction to
such areas as welfare payments and self-assessed tax returns. As a beginning the
Governments is already offering the general public the chance to assess their own tax
credit worthiness [57].
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In commercial terms, G2C means consumers paying something to the govemment as a
return for a service or document. One good example will be applying for a passport or
driver license online. Paying one's income tax online is also considered G2C.
Government
Figure 2-1: Categories of Electronic Commerce
2.6 Future of E-commerce
The way in which e-commerce will develop in the future is uncertain. However two
possible major developments seem a possibility.
Wireless Internet, i.e., accessing the Internet and performing transactions over mobile
telephones and other highly portable, wireless devices.
Ubiquitous Internet or the disappearance of computers. In other words, an environment
where motor vehicles, household appliances, furniture, clothing, office equipment are all
connected to the Internet and communicating. A car, for instance, might 'notice' that it is
Iowan oil and book an appointment with the nearest oil changing station and also pay for
it.
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2.7 E-commerce Security
There are a variety of protection and security concerns that affect e-commerce growth
and development. These concerns focus upon detection and prevention of fraud,
protection of user privacy and securing transaction information. The most important of
these are described below:
Encryption is the encoding of the transaction messages which transfer important
information and data. Keys are needed to encode and decode the message. Encryption is
an important element of e-commerce security, but the issue of whom and how to holds
the keys is still at the heart of the question. In September 1999, the United States allowed
the export of unlimited key length encryption products, with some exceptions, in a plan to
further relax its encryption export policy. In September 2000 the Bureau of Export
Administration in the Department of Commerce issued the rules for implementing this
policy. However, the events of September 11, 2001 have caused many in industry and
government to review this policy-and the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 has given
legislators greater authority to gain access to electronic financial transactions data to stop
illegal transactions such as illegal money laundering. Concerned about this development,
consumers and civil liberties activists will monitor this law closely [92].
Electronic signatures are a means of verifying the identity of a user of a computer
system to control access to, or to authorize, a transaction. The key benefit in electronic
signatures is enabling electronic signatures to carry legal weight in place of written
signatures.
2.8 Trust in E-commerce
Merchants must actively promote trust in e-commerce. The three main ways to achieve
this are as follows:
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1. Transparency - the merchant should not try to hide anything from the customer. The
company name, location, contractual terms, who to contact if there is a problem, use of
personal data, etc, should all be made clear on the web site.
2. Providing reassurance and guidance - merchants need to remember that many
customers have little experience buying on the web and so may not understand how
things work. It is up to the merchant to describe every step of the buying and delivery
process. For example, since many customers are hesitant to give credit card information
online, the merchant should explain why it is safe to do so and explain alternative
methods of payment for consumers who are not convinced.
3. Simplicity - Complicated procedures, unnecessary visual effects, Java-scripting which
only work on the latest browsers, web pages which require plug-ins to work (e.g.
Shockwave, Real video), all make the buying process more confusing, particularly to the
beginner. If someone is confused about what the merchant is doing, he is also likely to be
suspicious. Worse, some of these effects can cause the browser to crash. If the consumer
is half-way through a transaction and his browser crashes, he is certain to become
suspicious of the merchant.
2.9 Payments Methods
2.9.1 Payment Characteristics
For any payment method many characteristics must exist to make it acceptable, some of
which are important and without them the payment method will be useless. Some are
additional features depending on the kind of payment used and the medium in which it is
used.
The following is the list of these characteristics and their meanings, a discussion of each
one will be given when the payment method is mentioned. In some situations their
characteristics may appear to be in conflict with each other, likewise some are only
applicable to certain payment methods. Each one will be defined and for simplicity Sam
is considered as a customer, Amy as a merchant or trader, and Tom as an outsider.
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Confidentiality/AnonymitylUntraceabilitylPrivacy: Means that Sam can buy
something from Amy without Tom knowing. Tom should neither know where Sam buys
his goods from nor who Amy's customers are. Even if Tom is a bank, he should not be
able to find out that Sam has made two payments or that this transaction was paid by
Sam's money [61, 72, 82].
Authenticity: Ensuring that all people and money used are valid. Amy should be able to
determine if the money is real money not counterfeit, and Tom as a bank or a mediator
should be able to make sure that Sam is the one who made the purchase so he can debit
his account and also that Amy is the correct merchant so he can credit her account [61,
63].
Integrity/SecuritylReassurance/Confidence: Ensuring that the amount of money in the
payment is not altered or modified to benefit anyone, either a party in the transaction or
an outsider. For example, Amy and her bank cannot change the amount in the invoice to
debit more money from Sam's account [61,63].
Non-repudiation: Denial of a purchase by the customer in order to get his money back.
Sam should not be able to buy something from Amy and after consuming, deny or
dispute the charge to get his money back [61, 63].
Confirmation: Both Sam and Amy should confirm the transaction and recerve a
confirmation notice stating the amount and goods. Sam will know that payment was
made and Amy will guarantee payment [122].
Settlement: If Sam's and Amy's banks are not the same, then the process of debiting
money from Sam's account and crediting Amy's account with it is called 'settlement'
[122].
Divisibility: is the ability to change money into smaller forms of currency. Sam should
be able to visit an exchange and change the money he has into smaller units. He should
then be able to pay Amy with some fractions of currency if necessary, for example $2.25
[44,61,82].
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Offline capability: is the ability to process a transaction without being connected or
without contacting the processor for each transaction for authentication. Sam should be
able to buy from Amy and pay her without Tom as a banker being involved all the time.
Offline also means being able to conduct the transaction without both parties needing to
be together in the same place or at the same time [61, 72, 82, 91].
Peer-to-peer/transferability: is the ability to make a transaction between two customers,
neither of whom is a merchant. For example, Sam can give his son his weekly allowance
without going to the bank or contacting Amy or Tom. Another example is sharing a bill
in a restaurant where someone pays the whole bill and the others pay him accordingly; in
other words it is where someone transfers money to another without buying anything [91]
[61,82].
Scalability: The money in use should satisfy small value transactions, high value
transactions and any future transaction amount [33].
Avoiding Forgery/ Counterfeiting! Double spending or Re-spending: is the ability to
avoid making a copy of money and spend it more than once and in different places [61,
103].
Ensuring Payment/Delivery of goods: is the ability to protect both the customer and the
merchant: protecting the customer from paying for something that might not be received,
and protecting the merchant from sending goods and not receiving his money [33].
Traceability: is the ability to track the money back to any period of time to help in
occasions where it has been used for criminal activity such as drug money or ransom.
Traceability can help reveal the identity of the criminals [67, 72, 82].
Detecting Fraud: is the ability to notice and stop fraud before it becomes too serious [67,
72,82].
User-friendly or simplicity: it should be easy to handle and understand. Both buyer and
seller should be able to use it smoothly and easily. One bad example is using heavy
money where it is too difficult to carry around [82].
23
Portability: it should not be linked to a specific location; buyer and seller should be able
to move money around and make transactions anywhere [61, 82].
Durability: is the ability to store money for a long time and not lose its value or expire.
The value should be maintained until it is lost or destroyed as opposed to merely being
devalued. It also should not be easily lost [72, 82].
Acceptability: the form of money should be accepted everywhere or at least in most
places to satisfy any size of purchase or transaction [72, 82].
No secret algorithms: the security of the system should not be accomplished by secrecy
of the algorithm; the security measures and properties should be freely verifiable [72, 82].
Unit of value freedom: the ability to issue money in any unit and assign a value to it
[82].
Online: centralizing the payment process, this requires both Sam and Amy to be
connected or be in the same place at the same time. Online sometimes requires Tom to be
present as a processor [72].
Transaction cost: is the cost of processing a payment. Most payment systems have no
direct costs to Sam, Amy, or Tom acting an intermediary. However, there are many
hidden costs. Processing time may also be considered a cost [67, 72].
2.9.2 Contradictions of Characteristics
Some of the above mentioned characteristics are contradictory in the sense that certain
conditions can not coexist and if they have to, they will lose some of their significance.
These are discussed below, with examples and recommendations for their solution.
Offline and multiple spending: offline spending allows the spender to use his money
without contacting a third party. This implies that the person receiving the money has no
assurance that it is not a forgery.
Double spending could easily happen in this situation since no one can check the validity
of the money until the receiver tries to deposit it or buy something online with it (given
that the actual money was already deposited in the bank). If both copies of the money are
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handled offline and not deposited then it is impossible to detect the double spending. The
worst case could happen when the forged copy of the money is deposited earlier, then it
will not be considered as a copy since no one would yet know that there were two copies
of the same money in existence. (Money discussed here covers all possible kinds of
money which would allow someone to make a copy of the real money and for it not to be
detected until both parties are present at the same time or place [61]). A clear example
of this is the use of smart cards. If someone was able to counterfeit a smart card then
they could buy whatever they wanted until there was a need for an online transaction, or
until the real owner detected the unusual charges from his account. In this case both cards
would have to be destroyed and a new card would be issued to the real owner.
Transferability and double spending and forgery: This is related to the previous
contradiction but is more complex. Since transferability allows anyone to transfer money
to another without a third party being involved, the person receiving the money could
also be the spender for another transaction without knowing that the money he has
received is forged. This is more complicated since it is hard to check when the forgery
happened in the transferability chain. With each transfer, the detection of multiple
spending or forgery will be delayed. Money laundering and tax evasion also will be hard
to detect since the money transactions are not recorded anywhere .[61). Current paper
money suffers from this problem since a normal person will most likely not be able to
detect forged money: he will spend it and then the receiver will spend it and so on. This
could continue until one person decides to deposit it, and then the bank will detect it. In
this case it is almost impossible to trace back through the whole chain, especially if the
forger was anonymous when he spent the original amount of forged money.
Online and anonymity: since online payment systems require both spender and receiver
to be available at the same time or location and since the spender's creditability has to be
checked, it is difficult to hide the identity of the spender from either the receiver or the
authorities. Therefore, the anonymity of the spender and sometimes the receiver is
completely unprotected .[61). Credit card transactions are clear examples.
Online and transferability: online and transferability technically contradict each other
since online requires communication with a third party to be involved in the transaction,
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and transferability means the ability to transfer money between spender and receiver with
no third party involved .[61]. Credit cards suffer from this problem since they cannot be
used by someone other than the named credit card holder. So, for example, using a credit
card someone can't give money to his wife for shopping or children for their lunch.
Online and Offline: These demonstrate a historical conflict between centralized and
decentralized systems. The online system needs to verify all transactions while the offline
needs to trust the other party and complete the transaction according to the trust. Offline
is a more convenient option for spenders and receivers to use, since it is fast there is no
third party involved and it protects anonymity. On the other hand, online systems are
more convenient for authorities and financial institutions since they prevent double
spending and forgery, and tracing a transaction is easier [72]..
Offline and Durability: The conflict here may happen with some types of money. In the
offline payment system if the money is lost or destroyed it is very difficult to recover.
This is a major durability problem since anyone can use it legally if it is lost and the real
owner should consider it as though it never existed [72]. Prepaid credit cards are one
example since if lost, anyone who finds them can use them because there is no billing
action. Paper money is a much more obvious example.
Anonymity and Traceability: The conflict here is the most complicated and discussed
conflict in many Financial and Human Rights Acts. Anonymity protects the privacy of
both the spender (not to know where the money is being spent), and the receiver (where
the person is receiving the money from). This anonymity is advantageous in certain
respects and most people want to have it. However, the negative side of it is the
difficulty of traceability. Many people and organizations use this anonymity indecently;
fraud is a major problem with anonymity. With no anonymity all customer privacy can be
lost since all transactions are recorded. Privacy is not only a luxury, many people ask for
it as a novelty but it is often a right and benefit to the individual. Many people have
problems because so much information about them is already out in the public domain.
The real problem is that these individuals do not know about this risk until they face it
and by then it is too late. Another problem with having information about people is the
difficulty in controlling who is able to access it. Also, if this is highly controlled then the
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individual might not know when his personal data are altered or outdated, causing more
problems. On the other hand, due to the high volume of fraudulent transactions and their
resultant severe losses it is very important to know who is spending what, where, and
when [82]. The most severe thefts and frauds have been conducted using cash since it is
highly anonymous and traceability is difficult.
2.9.3 Traditional Payment Methods
In the following section the cycles of the existing payment methods will be illustrated.
Their attributes will be compared with the above characteristics and will be discussed in
detail.
2.9.3.1 Cash
Cash payment, also known as paper-based payment, has been in existence for centuries
and is still used in most transactions today.
Cash transaction cycle
1- The customer takes money from his bank or finance house.
2- The customer buys goods or services from a merchant and pays the merchant.
3- The merchant deposits the money in his bank.
Figure 2-2: Cash Transaction Cycle
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Confidentiality and anonymity are preserved in this type of transaction since it is not
possible to know the identity of the customer from the cash being used and it is difficult
to trace the buyer or the merchant from the cash. Cash transactions have to be in real time
and both parties should be at the same place at the same time. This means that the
authenticity of the people is definite but the authenticity of the money is not since most
people are not able to distinguish between real money and fake money. Integrity, non-
repudiation, confirmation, settlement, ensuring payment/delivery of goods, and online are
all assured because of the real time behavior of cash (since both parties have to be in the
same place at the same time). Cash satisfies the optimum divisibility requirement
although some users would still claim that it is not perfect because they would not be able
to pay for something that would cost them $2.559. However $0.009 is such a small
amount that it does not make a big difference in most transactions. Offline capability is
very hard since sending the cash by post or leaving it somewhere implies a high risk of
losing it; in these situations recovery is almost impossible. Cash is one of the best
payment methods for peer-to-peer transferability and also for scaleability since it can
accommodate transactions of any size. However, it is not fully protected from forgery and
counterfeiting even though many new technologies have been deployed to try and
counteract this risk. The key issue is that the real security of paper money does not come
from anyone knowing the technologies; rather it comes from the difficulty involved in
trying to imitate it, which means no secret algorithm. Re-spending is therefore not
completely avoided, but the desirable feature here is that the original form of cash will
not be lost or damaged because of being counterfeited and it will keep its value.
Traceability is almost impossible unless the serial number of each note is recorded during
the transaction. Fraud is a serious problem with cash since detecting it requires an expert
eye before depositing it into a bank, by which time it would be too late.
Because of its long time in use, wide acceptability and portability, cash is considered the
easiest and the most user-friendly method of payment. Durability with cash is confusing,
since its ability to last is satisfied to some extent, not like gold but not too bad. However,
durability will become very weak since losing cash or damaging it is easy to do, and very
easy for anyone to spend when they find it.
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Cash can be printed in any currency and nowadays there are more than 100 in existence.
Its universal acceptance as a unit of value is guaranteed as long as people agree on its
form and value. Cash is still considered the best payment method from a transaction cost
perspective and it is usually the cheapest method available to consumers since it involves
no third party, processing time, or settlement fees.
2.9.3.2 Cheques
Cheques were probably first used in Italy in the 15th century, but only became the most
important medium of exchange in the 19th century. Statistics show that almost 90% of the
transactions in the United States used to be conducted by cheques [59].
Cheque transaction cycle
1-The customer deposits money in a bank.
2- The customer then receives a cheque book.
3- The customer buys goods or services from a merchant and then writes a cheque.
4- The merchant deposits the cheque in his bank.
5- The merchant's bank sends the cheque to the issuing bank (usually clearing houses
look at the bank that has issued the cheque book and return the cheque to it) for cashing.
6- The issuing bank verifies the signature, debits the customer and transfers the amount of
money to the merchant's bank to deposit in the merchant's account.
y
,x
Figure 2-3: Cheque Transaction Cycle
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Confidentiality and anonymity is completely lost with cheques since it states the name of
the buyer and this person has to insert the merchant's name on it. Therefore, anyone
looking at a customer's cheque book will know who was paid. At the same time anyone
looking at the merchant's cheques will know the name of the buyer, the amount paid, and
sometimes a description of what the amount has been paid for. Authenticity of both
buyer and merchant is fully satisfied since the cheque will contain the names of both the
buyer and the merchant. However, authenticity of the value of the cheque is not totally
secure since the cheque may bounce if there is not enough money in the buyer's account
to cover the cheque.
Cheques do not guarantee the integrity of the transaction SInce the merchant could
potentially change the amount in order to get more money from the buyer's account.
Without confirmation from the bank in terms of a statement, email or website it becomes
more complicated. Some safety measures can be taken when writing cheques, such as
writing the amount in numbers and letters, and also leaving no blank spaces before or
after the amount. Sometimes including two horizontal lines means that the cheque cannot
be cashed directly and should be deposited into the merchant's bank. The length of
settlement time may vary if the merchant's bank differs from the customer's bank it can
take up to two to three days within the same country, or months if they are in different
countries.
Divisibility here is a tricky characteristic since although cheques are considered a good
divisible payment method (because you can write numbers and it means money so you
can write the smallest amount possible), some people think it is not divisible in the same
way as cash since it is not possible to go to an exchanger and give him a cheque for $100
and ask him to write two cheques to the value of$25 and $75.
Cheques satisfy offline requirements since they are much safer to send by post or by
courier to merchants than the actual cash. Only the merchant can cash the cheque so it is
of no consequence if any outsider knows that the envelope contains a cheque.
A peer-to-peer transaction or transferability is also another tricky characteristic SInce
anyone can pay someone else with a cheque. However, in reality this should not work
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since no one else would be able to buy something with the cheque even if it was given to
them. Endorsement is what makes using a cheque tricky since you can endorse a cheque
to someone else, so for example if Sam wrote a cheque to Amy for $100 and Amy
wanted to pay Tom $100 she could merely write on the back of the cheque "Pay to
Tom" and then sign it. Tom could then deposit the cheque in his account. Many fraudlant
transactions happen in this way because in view of the endorsement Tom's bank will
contact Sam's to transfer the money from his account to Tom's account. However, no
one will check to see if Amy's signature is correct since the only one who knows her real
signature is her own bank (which has not been involved in the settlement process).
All sizes of transactions can usually be handled by cheque since there is no limit to the
amount a person can write a cheque for except the balance in his bank. Some security
measures can be taken in printing the cheques themselves such as printing them on tinted
paper, using ink in the printing process, punching a series of numbers out of the paper or
embossing them and sometimes using magnetically active ink.
With all of the above counterfeiting possibilities, imitating a cheque is not a difficult job.
There are many private printing companies in existence that will print cheques for a small
charge if the customer does not want to buy them from a bank. Usually these printing
companies ask for an old cheque and a statement (which anyone could easily get from a
mail box or rubbish bin). The other step is to be able to copy the signature of the real
owner - a much easier possibility than the first example since the person could purchase
anything and merely sign the cheque. The buyer can ensure delivery of goods if he asks
the merchant to deposit the cheque in his account and not cash it directly, since if he did
not receive the goods he can prove that he has paid for it. On the other hand, the merchant
can take the risk and send the goods before clearing the cheque to satisfy his customer or
he can wait until he clears the check to ensure receiving the payment. Traceability and
detecting fraud are usually easy if the owner of the cheque is the one who commits the
fraud, but if the cheque is counterfeited or was endorsed many times then valid money
which was paid to buy something legal can be 'dirty' by being used to pay for something
illegal many times and then cleaned again by buying something legal and finally
deposited. Cheques are easy to use because of their simplicity and also they have been
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around for many years. Cheques can be carried with people any where regardless of the
amount of the cheques or the remaining balance in the bank; so cheques are a portable
payment method and the customer does not have to carry cash with him all the time, and
meanwhile has full access to the total amount in his account. Cheques are not durable in
the sense that the account owner may withdraw the amount and keep his account with no
money or close his account, so you can't keep a cheque with you for long time. Losing a
cheque is much easier and more durable since it can be canceled easily and get another
cheque instead of it. Nowadays many stores accept cheques and some banks even
guarantee cheques for some limit written in the back of the debit card of the customer,
which guarantees payment to the merchant even if the customer account has no money to
cover the whole cheque amount. Some websites and shops accept cheques over the phone
or the Internet which makes it not necessary for buyer and merchant to be at the same
place and many utility companies use this method for payment and they just ask for a
cheque number which you never use. This may show some risk but since most of these
compames are well-known companies and usually the money will be deposited in
someone's account, it can easily be traced back and recovered from any fraudulent
transaction of this kind. Cheques cost a lot more than cash since the transaction time is
longer in terms of paying, depositing, and clearing. The cheque book also costs extra
money which does not exist with cash transactions.
2.9.3.3 Credit Cards
Credit cards can be issued by many companies; certain retailers issue their own cards to
make it easier for customers to purchase and pay on installment. There are two types of
credit cards. One type allows customers to pay their bill in monthly installments with
minimum interest such as Visa and Master Card. The second type requires the customer
to pay the full amount of their purchases at the end of every month, such as American
Express.
Diners Club was the first credit card ever to be used. When it was issued in 1950 it
allowed its members to be charged for meals at a New York Restaurant. The Bank of
America issued the first bank credit card and called it BankAmerica; it is now known as
Visa.
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In total, the number of credit card holders has increased from around 5 million in 1965 to
almost 1.5 billion cards in 2000 and the annual goods charged by credit card reached
almost $ltrillion [59].
Credit Card transaction cycle:
1- The credit card is issued by an issuing bank to a customer with a fixed spending limit.
2- The customer uses the credit card for purchasing a good or service.
3- The merchant asks the issuing bank to authorize the transaction online.
4- The merchant submits receipts of approved transactions to his bank.
5- The merchant bank forwards receipts to the issuing bank.
6- The issuing bank transfers money to the merchant's account.
7- The issuing bank periodically sends a bill to the customer.
8- The customer pays the bill to the issuing bank .
.A
Figure 2-4: Credit Card Transaction Cycle
Confidentiality and anonymity of the customer is completely lost with no pnvacy
whatsoever since each credit card is linked to a person or an organization; even if it is a
group card, each card has the name of the holder. This is one of the major problems with
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credit cards since by reviewing the buyer's statement all merchants can be identified, and
by reviewing the merchant's statement, all customers are also identified.
Credit cards have two main methods of use, either face-to-face as in retail outlets,
garages, etc., or remotely as with Mail, Telephone, and Internet Orders (MTIO) which is
called Card-Not-Present. Authenticity of both the merchant and customer in the face-to-
face system is guaranteed since the customer knows who the merchant is and the
merchant can ask for as many 'proof of identities' as needed to make sure that the buyer
is the card owner. In remote uses the authenticity is completely lost since there is no way
to tell if the caller or Internet user is the real owner of the card or not. Many merchants
ask for some information to compare it with the existing information of the buyer in his
file with the issuer. Most of the time they will accept the transaction, if it does not seem
suspicious, particularly if the goods are to be delivered to a physical address. Integrity of
a credit card transaction is guaranteed for both the customer and the merchant if it is face-
to-face since both will get a copy of the receipt signed by the customer. In this situation,
if there was any error in the amount deposited then both the affected parties can show
receipts to solve the problem. However, if the transaction is remote then there is no
signed receipt and the customer cannot ensure that he will be charged the correct amount
until he receives his monthly statement. Only then can he review it and dispute the
charge if is not correct. Denying a purchase when it has been made will not hold any
validity since the credit card issuer is not likely to accept this allegation if the transaction
was made face-to-face and has the purchaser's signature. The real problem with
repudiation arises when it is a remote purchase, particularly if no goods are to be
delivered to the physical address as, for example, in the case of purchasing a piece of
soft-product (since the merchant cannot provide proof of delivery).
Settlement of the transaction usually takes place as in Figure 2-4 and it takes around
twenty four hours for the merchant to get the money transferred into his account. Issuers
bill their customers once every month and the customer has to pay the full amount in the
statement within thirty days in most credit cards. Credit cards are not divisible since a
customer can not take a credit card with a preset limit of $1000 and ask the exchanger for
two cards to the value of $500 each. But it can satisfy some of the divisibility
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characteristics since it is possible to specify the amount to be paid to the lowest
denomination of currency available.
Offline capability is not available with a credit card since a third party must exist to
verify the transaction and that the funds required are available on the card. Some
companies are prepared to take a risk, ask the customer for information for verification
and check it at a later time. Debit cards do almost the same job as credit cards but the
difference is that the funds will be taken directly from the customer's checking account.
Smart cards are a new extension of the debit card and allow offline transactions by
recording some of the important data on a small chip embedded in the card itself.
The merchant swipes the card and asks the customer to key in his password to verify his
identity. The merchant can then verify the fund and charge the card; at a later stage the
card has to go online to be updated. Peer-to-peer transactions and transfer of funds are not
available with credit cards since it is not possible to transfer funds from one person's card
to another or pay someone else if they do not have a merchant account. Since most credit
cards have a preset limit and the transaction fees are high, it is not really a scaleable
payment method. Another problem with scalability is the limited ability to charge huge
purchases with it and also it is not worth it to use it for micro payments since the user will
be paying fees more than the transaction itself.
Some exceptions for huge purchases exist but these are limited to a special category of
person. For example, American Express limits may reach $3 million if the customer has
a favorable credit profile. Credit card fraud is costing merchants, and sometimes
customers, hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Fraud can happen for many reasons:
first, stolen cards, which represent almost 25% of the total credit card fraud; second,
counterfeit cards, where criminals acquire the technology that enables them to "skim" the
data contained in the magnetic strip of the card and then manufacture a fake card. This
constitutes almost 24% of the total credit card fraud. Third, MTIO, which is the fastest
increasing fraud although it only represents 21% of the total fraud so far. Fourth, lost
cards constitute 15%. The remaining 15% is distributed to the rest of credit card fraud
[16]. As discussed before, the merchant will ensure payment only if he has a signed
receipt or delivery notice, otherwise customers can easily dispute the transaction and get
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money back from the merchant. In the case of soft products, no proof tends to exist so
the merchant can not ensure payment until the dispute period for the customer is reached.
Dispute periods usually last 3 months (from the day the credit card holder receives his
statement) and sometimes longer. The merchant has to wait from four to eight months to
make sure that the transaction is not disputed. On the other hand, the customer is ensured
delivery and no liability whatsoever for a purchase that was not made or for goods that
were not delivered. Most of the time the customer is liable for transactions even ifhe did
not make them if his card was stolen and he did not stop it by calling the issuer
immediately.
Traceability is high since most credit card transactions can be traced back to the correct
parties because there is no transferability or anonymity with them. Detecting a fraud and
recoverability is easy if it has been committed by a credit card owner (because of the
traceability feature). If a fraud comes from an outside user who uses someone else's card
some methods can be used to detect it before it happens or stop it from recurring.
For example, if the issuing company has previous knowledge of the credit card owner's
behavior in terms of spending patterns, any suspicious transaction can be stopped. If the
typical profile involves the owner spending between only $50-100 a week and then tries
to buy an item for $1000 the transaction can be denied until the issuer confirms validity
or otherwise.
Another way to detect fraud is the geographical location of the transaction. It is not
possible to buy something from Moscow at 9 am and something else from Los Angeles at
10pm.
Credit cards are becoming more user-friendly daily because of the ease with which a
person can acquire one. Since the credit card itself is not worth more than 20 cents but
can allow the customer to use the preset limit on the card, losing a card means losing a
plastic card which can be replaced with minimal or no cost. So it is portable but it can
not be considered as money.
Nowadays credit cards are widely used and almost all medium-sized shops accept them:
more businesses are joining every day. The Internet has opened up a new future for the
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credit card since it is now the most popular way of payment and is preferred by both
merchant and customer alike. Working online and having the ability to verify and identity
are the most popular reasons. On the other hand, one major problem with credit cards are
the charges for the merchant, often having to pay between 2-4% of the total transaction
amount to the system provider or the gateway, plus certain fixed charges per transaction.
These costs limit the use of credit cards for small value transactions.
2.10 E-Payment Methods
The modem developments and technologies have changed the way people pay for their
goods and the normal classification of payments, i.e. pay now, later, and before, is not
suitable for this era.
Electronic payments can be classified into eight main classes and each class could have a
subclass. Some new payment methods may fit into more than one class.
2.10.1 Payment Cards
Payment cards can be divided into credit and debit cards. Credit cards do not draw
directly from a bank account, but from a mediator payment account, usually the credit
card issuer. On the contrary, debit cards draw directly from a bank account. Debit cards
are not widely used on the Internet since the fraud risk is higher than credit cards, but are
widely used in Europe for payments made in stores.
Some initiatives are underway to make debit cards available for use on the Internet. Some
debit cards are more or less similar to credit cards. Switch [127] is an example of a debit
card system that works like a credit card system. Like a credit card, Switch using the
magnetic stripe allows for payment with the card present, but also allows transactions
using a telephone or the Internet. The only difference in the system with respect to credit
cards is that the payment is drawn immediately from a payment account. Because of this
similarity, both debit and credit cards can be treated as credit cards when conducting an
e-commerce transaction. Someone will notice the difference only when a fraud arises and
a dispute is needed.
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2.10.2 E-Direct Debit
Direct debit transfers are very popular in Europe: they made up 25.8% in 1999 and 27.3%
in 2000 of all non-cash Euro area payments see table 13 of [34]. Typical areas of
application include subscriptions and utility bills. In a direct debit transfer, the payer
authorises the payee to draw money from his account, usually by putting a signature on
an authorisation form. The payee itself initiates the transfer by sending a request to the
bank. The bank simply executes the order.
Direct debit authorizations are available in two forms: single and permanent. The single
authorizes the payee to draw a specific amount of money from the bank account only
once. The permanent is used for recurring charges such as subscriptions, utility and
telephone bills.
The vast recognition of the direct debit system has led to this method being applied on the
Internet. To do this, a few different methods have been developed:
• Accepting a single mandate for direct debit through the Internet: this method is tricky
on the Internet, as no real signature is placed. In order to do it properly, electronic
signatures are needed. However, the infrastructure to put electronic signatures is not yet
mature .
• Accepting a permanent authorization (with a real signature) offline, and giving the
customer a user name/password to pay online: This method is more secure, because a real
signature is used but the method isn't entirely Internet-based. The customer buys goods
using this user name and password, and then the merchant receives payment for the goods
by sending a payment request to the bank.
• Direct debit by a third party: this method is more sophisticated than the first two. The
first two methods are not fully electronic, but this one is new in the sense that an
additional party (the intermediary) is authorized once instead of authorizing each
merchant for direct debit separately. Merchants receive payments through this
intermediary. This model has two major advantages:
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• Only one authorization is necessary for all payments, which makes it less complex to
get an offline signature for the authorization.
• The model can easily include payments to private persons (Person-to-Person payment).
2.10.3 Electronic and Mobile Banking.
Bank transfers accounted for 35.7% of all non-cash Euro area payments in 1999 and for
36.2% in 200032, making it the most popular non-cash payment instrument available.
Offline bank transfers are also used frequently on the Internet, but have some drawbacks.
One of which is the long time (3 to 7 days) needed for bank transfers to be credited to the
beneficiary's account.
The popularity of bank transfers in combination with problems with using offline
transfers on the Internet, makes it a logical candidate for creating an online version.
Several methods have been developed, including:
• Electronic and mobile banking
• Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment (EBPP)
• Online bank-transfers
Electronic and mobile banking systems offer the possibility of performing banking
actions in an electronic format that traditionally require receiving or sending paper
documents, such as submitting a payment order, scheduled payments, buying stocks, etc.
A specific service similar to or part of electronic banking is electronic bill presentment
and payment (EBPP). In standard e-banking systems, the payer must enter all the
transaction details manually. With EBPP, the transaction details are automatically entered
from the electronic bill, and the payer only has to authorize the payment. Some examples
include Telecast [132] and Nordea Solo [99].
Very similar to e-banking is the online bank transfer. In an online bank transfer, the
account holder, using the Internet, will instruct the bank to transfer money to the
merchant's account, which is processed immediately (contrary to the offline bank
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transfer). A big advantage of this system is that the payee immediately receives the
money in his account. However, this is usually only possible if both the payer and the
payee have an account at the same bank. Examples of such systems are Betalen [114] and,
again, Nordea Solo.
There are various techniques through which these payment instruments operate; these
include:
Voice-telephony: This is the oldest method, but still in use. Account holders make an
ordinary telephone call with either the bank's computer, entering data using the telephone
keypad, or with an operator.
Direct dial up by modem: As PC's gained popularity, banks wrote e-banking
applications that ran on the account holder's computer and contacted the bank by making
a modem call. At the time, it was considered more secure and cheaper than having such a
system over the Internet, but currently, these systems are losing ground.
Internet: Since the modem system has many disadvantages such as client software,
access can only take place from a single PC, consumers connect to the Internet in
different methods rather than using traditional modems, etc., banks developed Internet
sites for e-banking to replace the client-side e-banking applications.
GSM/SMS: The arrival of GSM phones has made it unavoidable for banks to develop
mobile banking systems (M-banking), not only is it now possible to use GSM phones to
make voice-telephony calls to banks, but some additional possibilities like performing
authentication and using SMS to transfer information between the account holder and the
bank now exist.
I-mode and WAP: I-mode and WAP are mobile techniques that provide Internet-like
functionality on an advanced cellular phone. Banks are developing e-banking applications
for these techniques, but such applications aren't commonplace yet.
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2.10.4 Centralized Account Systems
All electronic payment systems involve transferring money to/from accounts. Accounts
are traditionally issued by banks and similar financial institutions, such as credit card
issuers. However, they may in principle be issued by any other organisation, as an
"account" is nothing but a representation of a financial claim that one party has to
another.
Transferring money from one account to another is easy if both accounts have been
issued by the same party. The reason is that in that case, money transfer is just an
administrative procedure, without any "real" money changing place. If the accounts have
been issued by two separate issuers, the situation becomes more complex. The same
amount must be transferred from one issuer to the other in "real" money. This process is
called clearing.
Centralized account systems try to offer a cost-effective and convenient way of paying
electronically by avoiding the clearing process. To do this, they make it very easy to open
an account and then if someone wants to transfer or receive money he or she is able to. In
this way, all transfers remain within the system itself and clearing is avoided. This
property makes Person-to-Person (P2P) payment possible in an easy and cost-effective
fashion; it also offers security and provides a trust advantage over credit card payments
since the customer only needs to trust the centralized account system itself.
However the market for this kind of systems is highly volatile: one of the most famous
and successful centralized account systems is Paypal [106]. It currently has
approximately 78 million registered users (July 2005), and is available in 56 countries ..
Banks are also entering this market with the additional advantage that the "virtual"
accounts can be linked to "real" accounts, facilitating deposits and withdrawals.
Examples are Western Union's www.moneyzap.com and Citibank's www.c2it.com.
Credit card issuers are also entering the market with systems similar to those of
centralized account systems, enabling payments between (existing) cardholders. Visa
offers its Visa Direct service [138] and MasterCard has formed an alliance with CertaPay
to offer P2P services.
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2.10.5 Telephony Account Systems
Telephony in general and GSM telephony in particular can be used as a means for
electronic payment both for Internet-related and other payments. GSM telephony has a
number of interesting properties for electronic payment:
• It can feasibly be used for small payments, whereas other payment types are generally
too expensive to use for transfers of less than € 2.
• It is widely available among consumers .
• It's considered to be far more secure than Internet payments.
A telephone can be used for payment in a variety of ways (direct debit, m-banking,
centralized accounts). However, in the usage of telephony previously discussed, the
telephone was merely a medium. The same holds for integrated solutions in which a
(WAP) telephone can be used to make various types of electronic payments. Telephony
can be the payment instrument by itself and the telephony account is the related to the
payment. There are various models for this and they can be grouped into two major
classes: the "premium rate" models and the "direct transfer" models.
Premium-rate models: The merchant has a contract with a telephony operator to provide
a phone number where consumer's account will be charged at a much higher rate than
when dialing ordinary numbers whenever a consumer accesses the number. Part of this
money goes to the mobile operator and the rest to the merchant. The same concept but
with some variation is the premium-rate SMS where the user has to send an SMS message
to a premium-rate number and these numbers cost a fixed amount per message. Premium-
rate dialup is also another variation with the same concept where consumers need to pay
to gain access to a website or a customer service manual. The user charged by the minute
for using the site.
Direct-transfer models: A newer model, different from the premium model, works by
directly charging the telephony account when a payment has been made. In this case, the
telephony account starts to act as a general-purpose payment account. To do this,
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payment software installed by the operator may be used to make payments directly from
the account rather than through a premium service. For example, a mobile user can buy
something and perform payment debited from his pre-paid credit with the operator.
Some examples of telephony payment systems are:
• The Coinlet system by Portalify [108], this system can use both premium-rate SMS,
premium-rate voice, or alternatively a 3rd party payment system.
• Mobile2Meter [97], this is a GSMIW AP payment system designed specifically to
replace parking meters.
2.10.6 Electronic Micropayment Accounts
Electronic payment accounts are mainly used to solve the problem of paying small
amounts of money on the Internet typically from a consumer to a merchant. This
distinguishes such systems from those mentioned earlier. This alternative works by
aggregating many micropayment transactions together and then paying them all at once
rather than paying for each individual transaction.
This method may be used by a single merchant, for example an online audio book store
where the audio book value is less than 50P. Hypothetically the merchant could offer this
by himself or it could be offered by a micropayment organisation that is trying to work
with as many merchants as possible. Examples of such providers of micropayments are
Cartio Micropayments [43] and Clickshare [47].
2.10.7 Electronic Prepaid Cheques or Coupons
Electronic prepaid cheques or coupons are similar to the systems above and they may
also be used for paying non-micro amounts of money. The most important reason for
employing such systems is that they offer the possibility of "prepaid payments" on the
Internet. One example of the many businesses that use this method is wwwbonso. This is
a scheme in which a user buys a "cheque" in a retail store. The cheque contains a secret
number, much like a prepaid GSM card. By entering the cheque number on the Internet
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site of the issuing organization, the user obtains credit that can be spent in a number of
Internet stores.
2.10.8 Electronic Cash and Cheques
All the systems described previously work by providing access to some kind of account.
This may be a credit card, bank account, a telephony account or a micropayment account.
A better technique could be to recreate the notion of nominal value on the Internet. In real
life, banknotes, coins and cheques written to the bearer can be used for payment by
handing them over physically to the payee who will acknowledge their nominal value. An
electronic equivalent to this could be called Electronic Money.
The forgery problems with such money can be solved over time, the two main e-cash
problems are issuing of new but forged money and copying/double spending of existing
money. The problem of issuing new forged money may be solved by either using a digital
signature or something similar, or by making it computationally extremely expensive to
create new money. The problem of copying and double spending may be solved by two
ways: (i) maintaining a list of money exchanged for real money or new electronic money
and verifying it every time a payment is made, or (ii) by exchanging electronic money for
new money after a payment has been received (where the payee can be sure that the
money is still good, and that the new money can only be spent by him).
Electronic money has the same great advantage of real money which is protecting the
privacy of the users by ensuring that its usage cannot be traced back.
2.11 Conclusion
The intention of the chapter was to discuss the nature and development of e-commerce, It
considered the most significant types of e-commerce products and categories and
discussed future potential for the emerging technology. Focus was also given to issues
such as trust and security in this new technical and commercial paradigm.
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In the process it described and identified some of the problems encountered in more
traditional methods of payment when conducting financial transactions. It then went on
to discuss how the solutions that had been developed to solve these types of problems
could be applied to new, emerging electronic forms of payment. These were seen as
important in order to avoid mistakes and problems encountered in the past.
Chapter 3 will discuss one of the most significant problems, i.e. that of repudiation, the
whole process of denial of involvement in a transaction and the ensuing consequences.
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CHAPTER THREE
Non-Repudiation
CHAPTER THREE
N00-Repudiation
3.1 Introduction
In E-commerce non-repudiation services must ensure that when Alice sells something to
Bob over a network, neither Alice nor Bob can deny having participated in a part or the
whole of this transaction. In order to be able to do this a non-repudiation protocol has to
be able to generate non-repudiation evidence.
This chapter will explore some of these issues regarding evidence such as types, elements
and validity and their life cycles. The role of the trusted third party (TTP) will also be
considered and will include an examination of the nature and emphasis being placed on
their involvement in non-repudiation protocols.
3.2 Non-repudiation Background
In case of a dispute (e.g. Alice claiming having sent goods or Bob denying having
received it) an arbitrator can evaluate the evidence and take a decision in favor of one of
the parties without any ambiguity. With the development of public-key cryptography
[140] and digital signatures, the hope of providing non-repudiation evidence was created.
Given that an adequate public key infrastructure was possible, undeniable evidence could
be based on digital signatures.
The most difficult part in non-repudiation protocols is to prevent one of the two parties
involved from cheating and gaining advantage over the other. For example, the merchant
getting the money without sending the goods or the customer receiving the goods and not
paying for it. A non-repudiation protocol must be fair which means at the end of the
protocol, either both entities will have received the expected evidence, or neither of them
will have anything that is of value.
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In e-commerce, merchants and customers exchange goods and money, this exchange is
analogous to computer science message exchange protocol. One of the first solutions
providing fairness in exchange protocols was based on a gradual exchange of the
expected information [l30, l31]. In this series of protocols every party sent a small part
of the item he or she wanted to exchange to the other and waited until they received a
similar sized part. These parts by themselves would not be useful for either party since
they would have to be able to combine all of the parts to read the message.
In order to perform satisfactorily, these protocols need an equivalent or related computing
power which in reality is not possible. Moreover, these protocols need a great amount of
transmissions.
A better solution is provided via probabilistic protocols [37]. This solution helped solve
the problems relating to computing power in the sense that they did not need to be
equivalent to or related to their partners, but there was no improvement in the problem of
transmission overhead.
A trusted third party (TTP) approach was a new, important and different approach to
resolve the problem of fair non-repudiation. The first solution was using inline TTP [48]
where the TTP acted as a delivery authority, intervening in each transmission. The
intense participation of the TTP created a communication and computation bottleneck.
The use of an online TTP was the first improvement to reduce the TTP involvement. The
online TTP was involved in each protocol run, but not in each transmission [142, 146].
Offline TTP was a constructive step towards more efficient solutions because in most
cases the participating entities were honest and the network functioned well.
In parallel, Micali & Asokan et al. [28, 93] designed an optimistic protocol in the context
of certified e-mail and fair exchange. Here the TTP only intervened in case of a cheating
entity or a network failure. This approach has also been applied to non-repudiation
protocols [83, 143, 144].
The latest improvement in this field has been the notion of a transparent TTP. By only
looking at the evidence at the end of the protocol, it is impossible to decide whether the
TTP did intervene or not if a transparent TTP is used. However this new development is a
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useful feature in e-commerce because it avoids bad publicity since the transparent TTP
may intervene due to a network failure, rather than a cheating entity.
3.3 Goals of Non-repudiation
Wrongful repudiations of a particular event or action are of fundamental importance,
especially in the commercial arena. Repudiation in communication is defined as "denial
by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of
the communication" [2]. At the same time, in e-commerce repudiation could be defined
as denial by one of the entities involved in an e-commerce transaction of having
participated in all or part of the transaction.
In non-repudiation services irrefutable evidence regarding a claimed event or action have
to be collected, maintained, made available, and validated in order to resolve disputes
about the occurrence or non-occurrence of that event or action [6]. Evidence about the
timing of the occurrence of an event or action is required by some non-repudiation
services.
In this thesis the events and actions related to an e-commerce transaction in which two
parties are usually involved is considered throughout. Those two parties are customers
and merchants or buyers and sellers. Most of the time a neutral third party will be
involved to make sure the transaction runs smoothly. Since in any e-commerce
transaction both parties will send and receive something electronically, i.e. the buyer will
send money and receive goods, the merchant will send goods and receives money, a new
classification of non-repudiation will be explored.
3.4 Non-repudiation Services
In an e-commerce transaction there are two possible ways of transferring the goods or the
money from one party to the other. See Figure 3-1
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Figure 3-1: Ways to Transfer Goods and Money between Customers and Merchants
The sender A sends to the receiver B directly.
The sender A submits to a delivery agent C which then delivers to the receiver B.
In e-commerce usually the sender and the receiver do not trust each other. This means
that in a direct delivery situation the following non-repudiation services will be required
as and when there is a need to establish responsibility for actions.
Non-repudiation of Origin (NRO) should prevent the sender, either a merchant or a
customer, falsely denying sending the goods or money. NRO evidence are usually
generated by the sender or a trusted third party if one is used, and kept by the receiver for
future dispute cases.
Non-repudiation of Receipt (NRR) should prevent the receiver, either a merchant or a
customer, falsely denying receiving the money or goods. NRR evidence are usually
generated by the receiver or a trusted third party, if one is used, and kept by the sender for
future dispute cases.
Even in the case of indirect delivery, the delivery agent who is involved in the transfer of
money or goods from the sender to the receiver could be a part of a dispute case. Some
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evidence is required to support the resolution of possible disputes between the sender and
the delivery agent or between the sender and the receiver. In these kinds of instances the
following non-repudiation services would be able to provide these:
Non-repudiation of Submission (NRS) should prevent the delivery agent falsely denying
receiving submission of money or goods from the sender. NRS evidence are usually
generated by the delivery agent and kept by the sender for future dispute cases.
Non-repudiation of Delivery (NRD) should prevent the receiver, either a merchant or a
customer, falsely denying receiving a delivery from the delivery agent. NRD evidence are
usually generated by the delivery agent and kept by the sender for future dispute cases.
3.5 Non-repudiation Evidence
Evidence is information that either by itself or when combined with other information is
used to establish proof about an event or action [8]. Non-repudiation evidence should
satisfy the following requirements [145]:
The origin of the evidence is verifiable by a third party;
The integrity of the evidence is verifiable by a third party;
The validity of the evidence is undeniable.
3.5.1 Types of Evidence
Two types of security mechanisms can represent the non-repudiation evidence. First,
'secure envelopes' which are generated by trusted third parties using symmetric
cryptographic techniques and formed by symmetric decipherment [90, 120] or by an
integrity mechanism [3, 135]. Second, 'digital signature' which is a function applied to
the data to be sent to produce a second set of data which will allow the receiver to verify
the origin and integrity of the original data [95, 120]. Valid signatures can only be
produced by the sender who can be a merchant or a customer, a delivery agent or a
trusted third party using asymmetric cryptographic techniques.
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3.5.2 Elements of Evidence
Non-repudiation evidence relating to the transfer of goods or money in e-commerce has
many elements, some mandatory and some optional which are application dependant.
Non-repudiation evidence in any e-commerce transaction usually provides information
about the execution of the transaction, the time of the transaction and the parties involved
in the transaction, either directly or indirectly. Seven elements of evidence should be
specified, (i) the type of non-repudiation service being provided, (ii) the sender and
receiver, (iii) who generated the evidence, (iv) any trusted third party involved, (v) the
item being purchased or sold, (vi) the timing of the transaction and (vii) the timing of the
evidence generation.
3.5.3 Validity of Evidence
The whole non-repudiation idea depends on the evidence gathered. If the evidence does
not reflect what has actually happened then the non-repudiation service will not make any
progress in resolving the disputes. Most of the pieces of evidence generated are secured
from modification or alteration by using private and secret keys. If these keys are broken,
revoking them and generating others is a necessity.
Sometimes these keys have a preset validity period after which they will expire. In order
for a judge to fairly resolve any dispute, it should be possible to tell whether the evidence
was generated when the keys were valid or when they were revoked or expired.
Trusted Time Stamping Parties are used to identify when the evidence was generated,
when the keys were revoked, and the expiry date of the key. Usually any evidence
generated before the revocation or the expiry of the key is considered valid if it is time
stamped by a trusted time stamping party. In [55, 70] many time-stamping services are
available.
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3.6 Roles of Trusted Third Parties
Trusted third parties play important roles in the provision of non-repudiation services. A
trusted third party with respect to security related activities is a security authority or its
agent, trusted by other entities [5]. The use of trusted third parties in security services like
authentication [4] and key management [7] are widely common. ISO/IEe TR 14516
standardized the use and management of trusted third parties [9, 10]. The extent of the
trusted third parties involvement can vary and will be explained more when non-
repudiation protocols are discussed.
3.7 Stages of Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation services go through many stages in order to be able to provide the
evidence necessary for dispute resolution. As mentioned above the whole non-
repudiation idea depends on the evidence, so evidence will go through these stages to be
acceptable.
3.7.1 Evidence Generation
Generating the evidence stage is a very important since it is the first stage and without it
no other stages will follow. The evidence can be generated by the sender or the receiver
using their private keys creating digital signatures. Trusted third parties may also generate
and provide supporting evidence if required by the non-repudiation service. In an e-
commerce transaction, if a trusted third party works as a delivery agent, then it is required
to generate non-repudiation evidence of submission and also non-repudiation evidence of
delivery when the goods or money were accepted and delivered. Every non-repudiation
service will decide the elements of non-repudiation evidence and the algorithms used for
evidence generation.
3.7.2 Evidence Transfer
Transferring the evidence is the most difficult stage in the provision of a non-repudiation
service. All the fair exchange problems exist in this stage, so fairness is usually an
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important requirement that is hard to get. Without transferring, the evidence has no
meaning, since the judge cannot verify it and most likely the fraudulent party will not
provide evidence that harm him. So every party in the transaction should have in his
possession the evidence he wants at the end of the transaction and no party is in an
advantageous position during a transaction. The communication channels reliability can
also strongly affect evidence transfer.
3.7.3 Evidence Verification
At any stage during the e-commerce transaction or after it, any party who is interested in
the evidence should be able to verify the validity of it as soon as it is generated to gain
confidence that the supplied evidence will be acceptable in the case of a dispute. To
protect the privacy of the parties involved, only the parties who have the verification key
available to them can verify evidence generated through a digital signature. The verifier
should check the validity of the evidence by making sure that at the time of evidence
generation, the signature key was valid and not revoked or expired. This timing should be
generated by a trusted time stamping agent or it will have no meaning in the verification.
3.7.4 Evidence Storage
After the verification of the evidence, the interested party should be able to store this
evidence in a secure place. Storing the evidence in a non secure place demolish all the
previous stages and may lead to negative results. Most of the times, this evidence will not
be used immediately, but it will be kept for future possible disputes. Some evidence will
lose its value after some time and it should be trashed. For example, a non repudiation of
origin in an e-commerce transaction conducted using a credit card will lose its value after
the grace period when the customer can file a dispute.
3.8 Requirements for Non-repudiation
Every entity involved in the non-repudiation service should have a clear picture about the
service provided and the way it works. Some requirements have to be fulfilled in order to
54
provide a complete non-repudiation service. The evidence generator must know the
policy used in verification and what evidence are required prior to generating the
evidence. Also, the methods for generating and verifying evidence must be available to
all the entities that might need it including a reliable clock to obtain accurate time
reference. Finally, a time-stamping agent must be available to the evidence generator to
obtain a trusted time stamp on the evidence.
3.9 Non-repudiation Protocols
3.9.1 Definitions, Assumptions and Notations
Some preliminary definitions, assumptions and notations regarding the non repudiation
protocols will be discussed before studying the protocols in details. It is assumed that
Alice and Bob are the two main entities involved in these protocols.
3.9.1.1 The Communication Channels
Three classes of communication channels are commonly used in the literature.
Unreliable channels: no assumptions made about its reliability, so data may be lost,
corrupted and never delivered.
Resilient or Asynchronous channels: deliveries are assured according to the data
provided, but will be against an unknown time scale.
Operational or Synchronous channels: deliveries are assured for the correct data after a
known, constant amount of time, but this is type is rather unrealistic in heterogeneous
networks.
3.9.1.2 Fairness
Fairness is an important factor in the non-repudiation protocols since it ensures that any
one party has any more advantage than any other. There exist many fairness levels, weak,
strong, true and probabilistic fairness.
Weak fairness ensures that if Alice does not obtain the evidence she wants, while Bob
did, then Alice will receive a proof of this fact.
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Strong fairness ensures that at the end of a protocol either Alice got the evidence she
wants and Bob got the evidence he wants, or neither of them got any valuable
information.
True fairness ensures that the generated evidence are the same whether the TTP did
intervene or not, so it is impossible to decide, by only looking at the generated evidence,
whether there was a dispute or not.
Probabilistic fairness ensures the fairness with a given probability and it is mostly used
when no TTP involved.
3.9.1.3 Timeliness
Timeliness ensures that the protocol will terminate after a finite time, so that no party will
wait forever running the protocol fearing losing fairness if it is stopped before the
protocol finishes. Timeliness is a practical property that most protocol should have.
3.9.1.4 Involvement of the TTP
TTP can be classified according to their involvement in the protocol.
Inline TTP will be involved in each message's transmission during the protocol.
Online TTP will be involved during each session of the protocol but not during each
message's transmission.
Offline TTP should not be involved in the protocol unless there is an incorrect behavior
of a dishonest entity or a network failure.
Transparent TTP is an offline TTP that produces evidence in a faulty case
indistinguishable from the evidence produced in a faultless case.
3.9.2 Non-repudiation Protocols without TTP
Gradual exchange first appearance was in the middle of the 1980s in order to achieve the
exchange of secrets. As mentioned above this approach has two problems, the
communicating entities should have the same or an equivalent computing power and the
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high transmission overhead. Syverson in 1998 proposed a new protocol [128] for
exchanging low value items or information that would lose its value after some time.
Information to be exchanged is ciphered and sent with a commitment of the key used to
cipher it. Commitments would be breakable after enough amount of time known on the
basis of a known computing power. These commitments are called temporally secret bit
commitments and could be implemented via a time-lock puzzle [118].
Han [71] proposed a protocol without TTP where Alice sends the item encrypted to Bob
and then posts the key in a publicly accessible place like a forum where any information
recorded is neither erasable nor modifiable. In the case of a dispute, the judge will check
the validity of the information recorded and make a decision. Famous non-repudiation
protocols without TTP will be studied next.
3.9.2.1 Markowitch and Roggeman Protocol
This iterative protocol [87] avoids the involvement of the TTP by accepting the weaker,
probabilistic version of fairness. In this protocol except at the last iteration, neither Alice
nor Bob is more privileged than the other. The protocol works by randomly dividing the
item to be sent into small pieces and sending them one by one in a random order. The
number which will determine the number of iterations of the protocol is kept secret by
Alice and can not be deduced by Bob during the protocol. These pieces do not have any
meaning if they are not combined, so the only way Bob can cheat will be by guessing the
number of iterations in the protocol which is almost impossible or with very low
probability. In this protocol Alice will not find it beneficial to stop the protocol before its
end. In the same way, if Bob stops the protocol before the last send he will not gain any
profit. The avoidance of the TTP resolves the communications bottleneck problem.
In the case of a dispute, if Alice claims to have sent successfully the item to Bob, she
shows to the judge the non-repudiation of receipt evidence for all the iterations. The
judge checks Bob's signatures on receipt evidence and also verifies that the whole item
was sent by Alice. If all these checks are correct Alice's dispute will be accepted.
If Bob claims to have received the item from Alice, he shows the judge the non-
repudiation of origin evidence of all the iterations. The judge checks the evidence of
57
origin from Alice and verifies that the whole item was received by Bob. If all these
checks were correct Bob's dispute will be accepted.
If the probability that Bob decides at the right time, when he receive all the pieces, to stop
the protocol equal 'p', the protocol will be p-fair. If an operational channel is used
between Alice and Bob, or deadlines are used, Alice and Bob will be able to decide
within a finite time if the protocol ended or not and the protocol will finish after an
expected number of iterations.
3.9.2.2 Mitsianis Protocol
Mitsianis in [96] proposed a similar protocol to that of Markowitch and Roggeman [87].
The protocol works by Alice sending to Bob the cipher C of the message M under a
secretly chosen session key K. If Bob acknowledges the receipt of this ciphered message,
Alice adds a padding W to the session key K to compose the key Kl. Alice now, as in the
previous protocol, splits the key into randomly different size parts and starts the exchange
with Bob. For every part Alice sends, Bob has to acknowledge. So Bob does not know
when the key will be completely sent. The same observation about previous protocol
regarding disputes, fairness and timeliness will be applicable to this protocol. A major
difference between the previous protocol and this one is that the value in determining the
number of protocol's rounds is static here and dynamic in the previous one.
3.9.3 Non-repudiation Protocols with Inline TTP
Protocols with inline TTP require the TTP to be heavily involved in every transmission.
Since all the transmissions go through the TTP, it collects the non-repudiation evidence
and then transmits them to Alice and Bob, so in reality it will act as a delivery agent too.
These protocols present several disadvantages, requiring the TTP to manage large
databases of centralized sensitive information which represent a significant security risk.
They also must maintain the messages they forward, as well as the time of each event.
The amount of information handled by the TTP is the maximum possible load leading to
a bottleneck and a single point of failure. In contrast, protocols with inline TTP can
include important information about the sending orland receiving time of a message into
the evidence. This information allows a judge to resolve disputes about late submission.
58
Certified email protocols [32] were the first places where inline TTP was used. Coffey
and Saidha [48] in 1996 proposed a non-repudiation protocol which gave a good
understanding and view for using an inline TTP and they also used the TTP as a non-
repudiation server.
3.9.3.1 Coffey and Saidha Protocol
In this protocol, the channel between Alice and Bob and the TTP is a resilient
communication channel. A time stamp authority participates in the protocol by producing
time-stamp for each communication without considering what the content of the received
message is. The time stamp authority time-stamps any message signed by the entity with
whom it communicates. Partial evidence which is part of the final non-repudiation
evidence is used in the protocol.
The protocol starts by Alice getting her non-repudiation of origin evidence time-stamped
and also prepares the partial non-repudiation of receipt evidence. Then, she asks the TTP
to initiate a non-repudiable communication session. Alice then sends the message with
the evidence to the TTP. After that, the TTP send the partial non-repudiation of receipt
evidence to Bob, where he should get it time-stamped to form the full non-repudiation of
receipt evidence. Bob sends the non-repudiation of receipt evidence to the TTP who will
verify it. If all the evidence are genuine the TTP send the non-repudiation of receipt
evidence to Alice and the message and non-repudiation of origin evidence to Bob.
The TTP produces and transmits to both Alice and Bob a randomly chosen value
associated to each session of the protocol to distinguish different protocol sessions. The
protocol ensures confidentiality of the message transmitted by Alice to Bob and also
ensures strong fairness, since Alice and Bob never communicate directly but the TTP
collects all information necessary and then forwards them.
3.9.4 Non-repudiation Protocols with Online TTP
Protocols with online TTP do not require the TTP to act anymore as a delivery authority,
but the TTP will get involved during each session of the protocol. Protocols using an
online TTP have been proposed in [54] and [51] but from related frameworks, i.e.
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certified emails and electronic payment. Three non-repudiation protocols will be studied
here to give an idea of how an online TTP can be utilized.
3.9.4.1 Rabin's Beacons Protocol
In 1983 Rabin [113] proposed the first exchange protocol making use of a TTP and called
it the 'Method by Beacons'. The TTP is used in an extremely different way from the
norm. In this protocol the TTP called the beacon broadcasts at regular and fixed intervals
of time a signed message containing a timestamp t, and a random number i in the range
O..n. Alice communicates directly with Bob and they have to finish a complete round
between two beacons broadcasts. The message is signed by the beacon so that its
authenticity may be verified. Alice and Bob, then commence the protocol by exchanging
signed messages.
Alice starts by sending "If Bob can produce a message (C, t, i) signed by me, and (t, i)
signed by the beacon, then I will be committed to CONTR as of time t" then Bob will
send "If Alice can produce a message (C, t, i) signed by me, and (t, i) signed by the
beacon, then I, will be committed to CONTR as of time t". They will continue doing that
by adding 1 to the i in every iteration. Intuitively, for any integer i between 1 and N , if
the last message in the exchange was from Bob, then Alice and Bob have an equal
probability of being committed after the beacon randomly choose and broadcast a
number.
If the number is less than or equal to i, then both parties are committed. If the number is
greater than i, then neither party is committed. If the last message in the exchange was
from Alice and the number broadcast by the beacon is less than i, then both parties are
committed. If it is greater than i, then neither is committed. But, if the number is exactly
equal to i, then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Therefore, the probability that the
protocol terminates in a state in which only one party is committed is lIN.
Synchronization between Alice and Bob is a very heavy constraint to realize. Therefore
the interval between two broadcastings by the beacon must be chosen so that the entity
having the lowest computing power can provide the necessary message within the
interval. This protocol is probabilistically fair as Alice can decide to stop the protocol
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when she receives the signed message from Bob and before sending her signed message.
Fairness is only broken if Bob and the beacon choose the same value. This situation can
happen with a probability equal to lin. This protocol does not respect the timeliness
property.
3.9.4.2 Zhang and Shi Protocol
Zhang and Shi [142] in 1996 proposed a protocol using an Online TTP. The protocol idea
works by the TTP at a specific time publishing in a publicly accessible place, for example
Internet forums, the deciphering keys for the message Alice sent to Bob.
In any dispute case the judge has to contact the TTP and get the information to resolve
the dispute. For this reason, the TTP should manage the database of all the keys used and
times it was published for all the protocol runs. Information stored in the database should
not be deleted too.
The protocol starts by Alice enciphering the message with a session key and with Bob's
Public key. Alice sends this message ciphered to Bob and also sends the hash of the same
message, but ciphered only with the session key, to the TTP. Since the message arriving
to Bob is ciphered using his Public key, he uses his Private Key to decipher it. Bob sends
a signed message, which will include the deadline for the TTP, to publish the session key
before it or he will not send the non-repudiation of receipt evidence.
Alice checks the deadline time and makes sure she can transmit the session key to the
TTP before it expires, otherwise she terminates the protocol, and in this case no one gets
any valuable information. If she can transmit the session key to the TTP before the
deadline, she signs it and forwards it to the TTP who will be backing-up the message, the
signature and the arrival time. The TTP checks Alice's signature and logs the time her
message arrived. If Alice's signature is correct and the session key arrives before the
deadline, the TTP publishes a message with the session key in to the public space. Then,
Bob accesses the public space and gets the session key. If the session key arrives from
Alice after the deadline, the TTP publishes a delay message.
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This protocol is strongly fair ifthe communication channel is resilient. Bob can't read the
message unless he reads the key from the public place and he can't repudiate his request,
also Alice will not get the evidence of receipt from Bob unless she publishes her key.
Since there is no set time for Bob to send the request, this protocol does not respect the
timeliness property unless a timeout period is introduced to the protocol with a resilient
channel.
A strong feature of this protocol is the confidentiality of the message. No one can read the
message even after the key has been published since the message has been ciphered by
Bob's public key and the TTP will only get the 'hash' of the message and not the actual
version.
3.9.4.3 Zhou and Gollmann Protocol
To minimize the involvements of the online TTP in the protocol, Zhou and Gollmann
presented a non-repudiation protocol with online TTP [146] that works as follow. Alice
sends the message ciphered, protocol session, time-out value, before which she will
submit the key to the TTP, and a signed non-repudiation of origin evidence to Bob. Bob
checks the incoming message and decides whether or not to accept it. If he accepts it, he
sends to Alice the signed non-repudiation of receipt evidence. When Alice receives Bob's
message, she sends the key signed to the TTP. This is the only message the TTP receives
in the protocol and the only thing to be done is to check the validity of the signature and
the time-out. The TTP posts everything to a read-only public directory under its
management. Alice and Bob will then fetch the key and the evidence for this key from the
directory. This evidence serves Bob as a non-repudiation of origin and to Alice as a non-
repudiation of receipt.
It is clear that the involvement of the TTP in the protocol is very minimal and the
protocol is strongly fair if the channels are resilient since neither Bob nor Alice will gain
any advantage over the other. Alice will not send the Key unless she receives the
evidence she wants, by which time Bob will get the evidence he wants too. Bob has to
reply to Alice very quickly so she can submit the key before the time-out and also Alice
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wants to submit before the time-out, this process confirms that if the channel is resilient
the timeliness property will be respected.
This protocol does not ensure confidentiality since the session key and the ciphered
message are accessible to any observer. A good improvement to this protocol would be
ciphering the first message from Alice to Bob using Bob's public key as Zhang and Shi
did in [142].
3.9.5 Non-repudiation Protocols with Offline TTP
The offline TTP will only be involved if a problem occurs, otherwise the two parties can
finish the exchange between themselves. Inaccurate behavior by a fraudulent entity or
even a network error could be considered as a problem. These types of protocols are also
called optimistic protocols since it assumes no problems will occur in most of the
protocol runs and rarely when a dispute has happened will the TTP be asked to get
involved and complete the protocol with a fair end.
Certified email protocol and fair exchange protocols with offline TTP started much
earlier than non-repudiation. Some of these first protocols were presented in [93], [28]
and [29].
Since network failures are not under the control of either party it is not fair to blame one
party and call him a fraudulent. For this reason a transparent TTP was introduced to
supply evidence in the case of a dispute similar to the evidence Alice or Bob would be
able to supply. This is very helpful in e-commerce since such disputes may count as bad
credit for either the merchant or the customer.
3.9.5.1 Zhou and Gollmann Protocol
Zhou and Gollmann [143] proposed the first fair non-repudiation protocol. The protocol
is split into two parts or sub-protocols. First part is the main protocol in which the TTP is
not involved. Second part is the recovery protocol, where it will be launched just in case a
problem arises. The protocol assumes that the communication channels between Alice
and the TTP and between Bob and the TTP are resilient, and there is no assumption about
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the communication channels between Alice and Bob (which means it could be
unreliable).
Main protocol: The main protocol consists of three messages. First, Alice sends the
cipher c and also the decryption key k ciphered with the TTP's public key. Second, Bob
sends the non-repudiation of receipt to Alice. Third, Alice sends k to Bob.
If all the messages in the run went smoothly then the protocol would finish after message
three and both parties would be happy. If Bob did not send the non-repudiation of receipt
in the second message then nothing would happen since he would still not get the key k.
Only if Alice did not send the third message would a problem happen since she has the
non-repudiation of receipt and Bob still does not have the key k, in which case Bob
would launch the recovery protocol.
Recovery protocol: the recovery protocol activated by Bob sending a recovery request to
the TTP. The TTP decipher by its private key the decryption key K received from Alice
and sent back to Bob with its non-repudiation of origin. Bob now has the key and Alice
has the non-repudiation of receipt. Bob can launch the recovery protocol just after the
first message in the main protocol and never send the second message with the non-
repudiation of receipt, in this case Bob will get the Key K and Alice will not get the non-
repudiation of receipt. For this reason, Bob has to send the non-repudiation of receipt
with the recovery request so the TTP will forward it to Alice during the recovery.
According to the definition of fairness, the protocol is fair since both Alice and Bob will
get what they want or get nothing valuable. A tricky problem could occur if Bob never
sent message two intentionally or because of a network failure to Alice. In this case Alice
will be in a position where she can't stop the protocol, since Bob can launch the recovery
and get the Key K, and she can't activate the recovery protocol since she is not allowed to
do that in this protocol. This is a serious problem for Alice and it could be unfair for her
since Bob has now an advantage over her.
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3.9.5.2 Kremer and Markowitch Protocol
Zhou proposed using a big enough timeout period to resolve the above problem in his
protocol, but what is the limit for "Big Enough". Kremer and Markowitch [83] proposed
a fair non-repudiation protocol, which respects both fairness and timeliness with channel
qualities similar to the previous protocol. The idea of the protocol is to have an abort
protocol in addition to the main and the recovery protocol.
Main protocol: The main protocol has four messages. In the first message, Alice sends
the cipher c, and the evidence of origin for the cipher. In the second message, Bob sends
the evidence of receipt for this cipher. The third message is sent by Alice and it consists
of the key k and the corresponding evidence of origin. The fourth message comes from
Bob and it has the evidence of receipt for the key k.
If Bob does not send the second message before a fixed timeout time, Alice will launch
the abort protocol.
Abort protocol: The abort protocol will be launched at any time by Alice. The TTP
makes sure that the protocol has not been aborted or recovered before. Ifnever aborted or
recovered, the TTP will inform both Alice and Bob that the protocol has been aborted and
abort the protocol. Since also a successful protocol never been aborted and recovered,
Alice could launch the aborted protocol even after the protocol completed. This does not
affect any party since the abort evidence does not mean that the exchange did not take
place, but it means that recovery will not be accepted any more by the TTP.
If either the third or fourth messages do not arrive, the affected party can launch the
recovery protocol.
Recovery protocol: The recovery protocol here is similar to the recovery protocol by
Zhou above but here it can be launched by either Alice or Bob while in Zhou's protocol
only Bob can. After the first message of the main protocol, Bob can launch the recovery
protocol since the TTP at this stage has the key K and the non-repudiation of origin
evidence from Alice. On the other hand, Alice can only launch the protocol after the
second message of the main protocol arrived. Before that, the TTP has no non-
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repudiation of receipt from Bob. The recovery protocol will provide evidence of non-
repudiation of receipt, origin for the cipher and the key k to Alice and Bob respectively.
Only one of the two protocols recovery or abort is allowed in a single run, this is called
mutual exclusivity and it is managed and guaranteed by the TTP since it is involved in
each of them. The fact that at any moment Alice and Bob can launch the abort protocol
and terminate the protocol run makes this protocol fair and respect timeliness.
3.9.6 Non-repudiation Protocols with Transparent TTP
Offline TTP gets involved in case a problem occurs during the communication between
Alice and Bob, this problem can be due to a fraudulent action from either Alice or Bob or
a network failure. In previous protocols the TTP digitally signs all the evidence sent by it
to Alice or Bob. In case of a dispute these evidence will be used in the resolution. Some
applications may suffer from this since a judge will have a negative view about one party
in the dispute thinking that he/she is a cheater. For example, in e-commerce if a customer
does not payor the merchant does not deliver the goods this is counted as a negative
point. This may affect his future reputation and his ability to do more e-commerce
transactions. For this reason, transparent TTP are used to generate evidence in case of a
problem completely similar to the evidence generated by both parties in case of a normal
run, so by only looking at the produced evidence, it is impossible to decide whether the
TTP was involved or not. If a dispute happens the judge cannot distinguish if the
evidence came from the TTP or the party itself. This way will make it hard for the judge
or anyone to blame Alice or Bob for cheating since they have no proof of that.
The use of Transparent TTP was first proposed by Micali [93] in the framework of
certified e-mails. Asokan et al. [27] and Bao et al. [36] proposed protocols in the
framework of fair exchange. Most proposed protocols were inefficient. Boyd and Foo
[40] broke one of Asokans et al protocols and proposed a fair exchange protocol for
electronic payment but it was also inefficient. Markowitch and Saaednia [88] came up
with the most efficient protocol for fair exchange with transparent TTP which was based
on a specific signature scheme (inspired by the Girault-Poupard-Stem signature scheme
[111]).
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Markowitch- Saaednia protocol [88] consist of four sub protocols, main, abort, recovery,
and error. All except error are similar to the sub protocols mentioned above. In the
recovery protocol the TTP send evidence similar to the evidence that were supposed to be
sent by the other party if it was a non anticipated failure. In the case of an anticipated
failure, the recover protocol moves to the error protocol which informs the fraudulent
party that this attempt to cheat has been detected and also warns the other party. This
protocol is almost similar to the above offline TTP protocols, so it is fair and in this
respect, timeliness. The characteristic of not being able to tell that the evidence are
actually coming from the TTP or from one of the parties makes the protocol not only fair
but provide strong and true fair.
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the issue of non-repudiation as a means of providing adequate
evidence in the case of arising disputes. In non-repudiation, evidence is the most critical
since it is the outcome. Therefore, aspects of this evidence such as elements, types and
life-cycle have been explored. Some of the most well known protocols have been
discussed and their ability to provide non-reputability, ensure fairness and respecting
timeliness examined.
E-commerce brings many challenges to these non-repudiation protocols. As a result new
fraud cases and dispute types may arise. The next chapter will talk about these e-
commerce frauds and the current strategies used to resolve disputes.
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CHAPTER FOUR
E-commerce Fraud
CHAPTER FOUR
E-commerce Fraud
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the main focus of the thesis is on soft products fraud.
With the growing demand for soft-products that can be delivered via the Internet, e.g.
downloadable movies, music, software, and prepaid phone cards, the prevention of
fraudulent transactions is becoming increasingly important.
There are many reasons for the rise in the number of fraudulent transactions, the most
obvious being that merchants cannot see the customer to verify an ID or signature. This
problem existed before the Internet in both mail order and telephone order systems
(MOTOs), where both were subject to the same types of problems that Internet orders
have today. In addition, however, E-commerce also allows customers to conduct
transactions without physical interaction, and the Internet facilitates soft-products and
services to be acquired via soft delivery methods: email, download or logging in.
Before eventually going on to discuss a proposed solution it is necessary to explain the
major assumption that underlies the text of the chapter. Since credit card use is the major
payment method on the Internet, accounting for 88% of all transactions, and since most
of the alternatives are still in the early stages of development, the rest of this thesis
assumes this is the main method being used when issues concerning payment are being
discussed [23].
This chapter will provide a critique of current e-commerce fraud prevention and detection
techniques. Ultimately it will suggest that not all are suitable for e-commerce and
therefore able to provide complete protection against fraud. Emphasis will be placed on
analysing the techniques that are used most frequently by identifying their drawbacks and
providing suggestions for their improvement.
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It will conclude by discussing the future of e-commerce fraud prevention and detection,
and propose certain improvements on current state-of-the-art techniques by focusing on
one of the most frequently used fraud prevention methods.
4.2 The Nature of Fraudulent Transactions
Fraud is costing merchants and sometimes customers hundreds of millions each year.
Credit card fraud can happen in many ways: stolen cards dominate and currently
represent almost 25% of the total credit card fraud. The second most popular method is
via the use of counterfeit cards: cards that, once the criminal has acquired the technology,
allow him to "skim" the data contained in the magnetic strip of the card and then
manufacture a fake card. This constitutes almost 24% of the total credit card fraud. A
third method is through the Mail Telephone and Internet Order (MTIO) system, this is the
fastest growing method, and currently represents 21% of total fraud. A fourth is via lost
cards, constituting 15%; and the fifth, accounting for the remaining 15%, is through
minor credit card issues [137].
4.3 The Fraud Process
The outcome of many credit card frauds is linked to the concept of 'charge back' i.e., a
"returned transaction resulting from the lack of adherence to the conditions of the sales
agreement, association regulations, or these operation procedures, that results in the
debiting of the merchant account [121]"
Charge back is usually a result of the cardholder disputing the charges in his statement,
and according to some statistics 90% of the disputes end in favour of the customers over
the merchants. This is because on many occasions the transaction might have had
suspicious elements, such as shipping to an address that differs from the billing address,
(which accounts for almost 45% ofMTIO credit card fraud cases) and when the dispute is
finally honored, the merchant has to be responsible for the charges. Whilst some
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investigation by the credit issuer then has to take place to find out who received the
merchandise, in many cases, specifically those concerning soft products, this type of
investigation will not result in a successful outcome since the products would not have
been physically shipped.
4.4 Fraud Consequences
E-commerce fraud techniques affect the e-commerce community in many ways, some are
directly related to the incident itself, some are indirect. The direct consequences of a
fraud include loss of the value of the actual item being purchased, e.g., a calling card
access number for £20. It could also include the charge back penalty, which most
merchants would have to pay when a dispute arose against them.
The cost of returning the money to the customer is another direct consequence, usually
costing the merchant more than the original value because the issuing bank inevitably
claims a higher rate for crediting a card than debiting it.
The number and types of indirect consequences are very difficult to estimate. However
some of the main factors are mentioned here. As a result of fraud, merchants have to
continually review orders. In spite of all efforts to successfully automate this procedure,
shortcomings still exist and as a consequence merchants still have to review them
manually. This in tum incurs additional employment costs, delays the whole process of
approval and ultimately results in reduced levels of customer satisfaction and profit. At
the same time the merchant will be required to pay for prevention and detection tools in
order to prevent further fraud, resulting in even higher costs.
Another major indirect effect is the concept of 'Valid Order Rejection', resulting in the
possible rejection of a transaction placed in good faith on the grounds of suspicion of
fraud. According to the 2005 Annual Fraud Report by Mindwave Research [115], 6% of
all orders were rejected by merchants, however some of these were valid transactions.
The bad publicity and reputation generated from fraudulent cases also affects merchants
indirectly.
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To stress the seriousness of the problem, Figure 4-1 taken from the Mindwave Research
Report presents a 'risk management pipeline' where, in practice, the process could be
even longer and have even greater ramifications than those described above.
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4.5 Fraud Techniques
E-commerce products were defined in chapter 2 as either Hard: those requiring delivery
to a physical address e.g. printers; or Soft: all intangible products that could be shipped
electronically.
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Has-cost-soft-products were high cost, e.g. pre-paid calling cards, whilst a piece of music
was a Has-No-Cost-soJt-product, since it could be recopied many times and the cost of
copying would be comparatively very low to its price. Traceability was the term used to
describe a situation where a fraud purchase could be traced e.g. to a phone number or an
official IP address, whereas Non-Traceability implied the opposite.
Although there are many kinds of credit card fraud, the emphasis of this thesis is on the
type of fraud that can occur with the first type of Soft-product, i.e. those defined as Has-
Cost and at the same time are Traceable.
The information needed to charge a credit card is only its number and the expiry date.
However merchants usually request more information to avoid fraud. For example, the
information required for some online systems to approve an order can be as follows: first
and last name, address, phone number, email address, credit card number, expiry date and
the customer service number of the credit card issuer.
Fraud cases can happen, for example, if someone already has your name, credit card
number, expiry date and billing address. In this situation the current online merchant
system will check two things: (1) if the credit card number is a valid number, and (2) if
both the first 5 digits of the street address and zip code match those in the issuer's
database.
This information is very easy to obtain, even from a home mailbox or any online
transaction that has been conducted before. Even if the fraudulent party does not have the
customer's name, the order can still be accepted if the address and zip code match up. In
this kind of situation the transaction might seem to be a non-fraudulent order, but to be
able to confirm this, the merchant then needs to call the phone number on the order.
In this situation the fraudulent party might have done one of 3 things:
• Used the real phone number connected with the card, in this case the merchant
would know it was a fraud if he then phoned it. However on trying to make
contact there might have been no answer or merely an answering machine, in
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which case the merchant would have to make a risky decision about whether to
approve the transaction or not;
• Used a fake number where the merchant will get no answer when calling, it is
then up to the merchant to cancel all the pending-approval transactions up to that
time;
• Used someone else's or a public telephone number giving instructions to call at a
certain time (since he will not be available at the home contact number). The
merchant then has to call in order to verify the information and approve the order.
To avoid any of these possible outcomes, the merchant will quite often ask the customer
at the time of ordering to quote the phone number he listed with the credit card company
when originally applying for the card. However, there is a tendency for many customers
to forget the number they originally used, in which case the merchant must ascertain this
information for himself. If the subsequent investigation discovers that the quoted number
does not match the customers, he must re-request the correct number from the customer.
The major problem with all of this is that banks are not inclined to give clues to
merchants as to customer phone numbers - not even the last 4 digits.
A further problem might be that whilst the merchant does have the correct number the
person answering the call to confirm the purchase order might turn out to be a different
member of the family e.g. teenage son, or even just someone visiting the family home.
'Friendly Fraud'[38] is a very simple concept. this happens when the real owner of the
card disputes the charge and claims that he did not order whereas in fact he has. In a
situation like this there is absolutely no way for the merchant to convince the credit card
issuer that the customer is not telling the truth. At this point the credit card issuer will ask
for signature on the receipt (which the merchant has not actually received or asked for
since it is soft delivery).
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4.6 Fraud Detection and Prevention
The problem of credit card fraud is an issue of great concern for business, the IT industry
as a whole, academia and regulatory authorities. Because of the severe damage some of
these fraud cases can cause to the merchants and the payment companies, many detection
and prevention systems are now in use. Each system was made to handle a specific fraud
scenario and target certain aspects of this multi-faceted problem.
This section provides an outline of each of these systems, whilst section 4.7 focuses more
specifically on those most commonly used at the moment.
4.6.1 Data Mining and Neural Networks
Data mining approaches [104] and neural networks [68, 112] are designed to gather
information pertaining to all of the credit card transactions of a particular customer in
order to build up a history of purchasing habits. This information then enables credit card
issuers to block any transaction that looks suspicious, whether in terms of the amount
being spent or the geographic address. However, this approach does not help Internet
based activity since it is diverse in location and at the same time, the value of most soft-
product transactions will not be high enough to trigger searches using such systems.
4.6.2 Surrogate Card Numbers
Microsoft, Orbiscom Inc, and Cyota [41] came up with a technology to prevent online
credit card fraud by replacing user real card numbers with 'surrogates'. The replacement
number can be used only for a given number of online transactions, after which it
becomes invalid. Microsoft surrogate card numbers are very complicated to use if the
allowed number of transactions are small and are likely to suffer the same types of fraud
problems described so far if the number is set to a higher limit.
A major shortcoming with both the Microsoft Surrogate Card and Verified By VISA
systems (see below), is that at the checking out stage a window automatically pops up
asking for confirmation of user name and password. This can easily be emulated by a
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fraudulent website which will be able to get all of the credit card information, the
usemame and password.
4.6.3 Verified By VISA
VISA claims that the 'Verified by Visa' system enhances existing card use with a
personal password. When shopping at participating online stores, the customer enters a
password in the same way a PIN would be entered at an ATM. The implication here is
that only this person can use the particular Visa Card online, thereby providing the same
assurances as when using the card in a physical store [139].
As a result, fraudsters are prevented from committing fraud at the checkout stage and
purchasers are prevented from committing "friendly fraud" by later denying their
transactions. In this case the responsibility will usually be transferred from the merchant
to the customer, since he/she should be the only person knows this password. However,
there is one important factor that has been overlooked: it is much easier to create a fake
website than a fake ATM.
4.6.4 Card Verification Value (CVV2)
Card Verification Value (CVV2) [31]is a unique three or four digit number on the credit
card; most credit cards are now required to have this number. It can be verified on real
time by almost all MTIO merchants and is supposed to help merchants verify that the
customer who is making this purchase actually has the card physically with him.
CVV2 can lose its purpose if it is used everywhere, since in almost all the cases where
fraud can happen, the fraudulent customer can acquire and continue to use the necessary
information [16]. CVV2 is like any other piece ofinfonnation that consumers provide on
the web: after some time it will be public in the same way as a credit card number and if
someone steals the credit card then the number is conveniently on the card.
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4.6.5 Address Verification Service (AVS)
Address Verification Service (AVS) is a real-time checking device where the cardholder
confirms the first 5 digits of the street address number and zip code to verify that the
billing address of the customer matches what is stored with the credit card issuer.
This ensures that the merchants will not risk the possibility of the customer ending up
disputing the transaction. It is the responsibility of the customer to ensure that the
merchandise is delivered to his billing address, even if he did not sign for it.
Whilst this is supposed to be the best method to fight credit card fraud, in the case of soft-
products it is clear that this is not really helpful since no shipping occurs at any time [17].
4.6.6 Merchant Authentication
Fraud can also occur as a result of hackers using the merchant payment system to charge
customers or credit some accounts. Various techniques are used to prevent such frauds:
Valid Referrer URLs, allowing the merchant to specify the URL(s) from which his
payment processor allows a transaction to take place. The processor will reject attempts
to process transactions from any other URL. Most of the time merchants are allowed to
set more than one URL [62].
MD5 Hash is additional verification tool where a unique signature or fingerprint is
created to authenticate every transaction that is processed [117].
Figure 4-2 below shows the extent and nature of increase in use of fraud tools between
the years 2003 and 2004.
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4.7 The Most Commonly Used Anti-Fraud Tools
4.7.1 CVV2/CVC2
Card Validation Code (known as CVV2 for Visa, CVC2 for MasterCard, and CID for
American Express) is a unique three or four digit security number on the credit card. It
appears in reverse italic at the top of the signature panel on the back of the card, or just
above the end of the credit card number on the front of the card. Most credit cards are
now required to have this number.
This number can be verified in a real time by almost all MTIO merchants and is designed
to help merchants verify that the customer who is making this purchase does have
physical possession of the card. As a deterrent, fraudsters must be capable of providing
both the credit card number as well as the card validation value in order to successfully
complete a transaction.
All MasterCard cards, both credit and debit, were required to contain CVC2 by January 1,
1997 and all Visa cards were required to contain CVV2 by January 1, 2001. For
simplicity, all will be referred to as CVV2 in the remainder of this section.
The CVV2 is designed to have different responses: transactions with a valid CVV2 code
will return a Match response; transactions with invalid CVV2 codes will return a No
Match response. If a transaction is flagged as a recurring billing, credit, authorization
only or capture of a previous authorization, the CVV2 field will be ignored and the
CVV2 response code returned will Not Be Processed.
However the CVV2 can lose its purpose if it is used everywhere, since in almost all the
cases where a fraud can happen, the fraudulent customer can have it. For example, if the
thief stole the card physically then he has the CVV2, also if he hacked into an online
system or sniffed a connection then he will also obtain the number. So this number will
only help for a certain period of time and it will then lose its value. Therefore use of the
CVV2 does not help with soft-products fraud very much.
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4.7.2 Address Verification Service AVS
In this service (see Figure 4-3), a real-time checking of the cardholder's first 5 digits of
the street address number and zip code is performed. This will verify that the billing
address of the customer matches that stored with the credit card issuer by returning a
response code. The AVS response code is sent to the merchant (match or no match), after
screening, the Merchant chooses to accept or reject the transaction accordingly.
This is to ensure that the merchant will not risk the possibility of the customer ending up
disputing the transaction. It is the responsibility of the customer to ensure that the
merchandise is delivered to his billing address, even if he did not sign for it. This is the
reason why many merchants require their customers to register their shipping address as
an alternative if different than their billing address. AVS only works in some countries so
it does not screen international transactions.
Figure 4-3: Current AVS
Customers fill out an online payment form on the Merchant's website with their credit
card information including the card billing address. The processing network (e.g., FDC,
Vital, Nova, GPS, Paymentech) compares the billing address supplied online with the
billing address on file at the credit card issuing bank.
From this comparison, the processing network sends an AVS response code to the
merchant. Depending upon the response, the merchant may wish to approve the
transaction, reject it, or follow other lines of logic. With so many possible reasons as to
why an address and zip code may not match, a merchant is not required to refuse a
transaction because the AVS response is a mismatch.
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The following is a list of possible AVS response codes, and their corresponding
meanings. Each code is unique; no AVS response code will ever overlap another in
meanmg:
A = Address (Street) matches, ZIP does not: This response code signifies a perfect
match between the street address entered by the customer and the billing address on file
with the card-issuing bank, and a mismatch between zip codes.
B = Address information not provided for AVS check: This response code signifies
that the transaction was submitted without address information, so the AVS check could
not be performed.
E = AVS error: This response code signifies that an error occurred on the processing
network while processing the AVS request, so AVS information is not available for this
transaction.
G = Non U.S. Card Issuing Bank: The credit card issuing bank is of non-U.S. origin,
and does not support the AVS system.
N = No Match on Address (Street) or ZIP: Neither the street address nor the zip code
provided by the customer matches the billing address and zip code on file with the card-
issuing bank.
P = AVS not applicable for this transaction: This response code is returned when
address information is not checked against the AVS system. Examples of this would be
credits, voids, prior authorisation capture transactions, capture only transactions, declines,
and other transactions that do not involve address checking.
R = Retry - System unavailable or timed out: VS was unavailable on the processing
network, or the processor did not respond.
S = Service not supported by issuer: The issuing bank does not support AVS.
U = Address information is unavailable: Address information is not available for the
customer's credit card at the processor.
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W = 9 digit ZIP matches, Address (Street) does not: The nine-digit zip code provided
matches the billing zip code on file with the issuing bank, and the street address provided
does not match.
x = Address (Street) and 9 digit ZIP match: The nine-digit zip code and street address
provided match the billing address on file with the issuing bank.
Y = Address (Street) and 5 digit ZIP match: The five-digit zip code and street address
provided match the billing address on file with the issuing bank.
Z = 5 digit ZIP matches, Address (Street) does not: The five-digit zip code provided
matches the billing zip code on file with the issuing bank, and the street address provided
does not match [123].
4.8 Full Address Verification Service FAVS
To re-iterate, fraud in soft-products is an emerging problem. The old solutions that were
used for hard-products may not be sufficient for this new type of problem.
Various new ways of detecting and preventing credit card frauds have been proposed,
most of these solutions are vendor specific solutions and/or require major modifications
on existing e-comrnerce sites. Often, these solutions are not universal, meaning they are
specific to certain credit cards (e.g. Visa, or American Express, but not both) or specific
to certain vendors (e.g. Tradecraft). These solutions require customers to download some
software (as in Master Card and Discover solutions) or require the bank and merchants to
modify their system or checkout procedure (as in Verified by Visa).
So for all soft products MTIO, which require no physical delivery, the merchant is taking
the risk by emailingthecustomertheproducts.Asexplainedbefore.this risk is even
greater than delivering to a non-billing address for a hard-product, since email tracking is
much more difficult comparing to tracking the person living at that address at the time of
delivery. Figure 4-4 shows the current situation.
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Figure 4-4: Current AVS with Soft Products
In this thesis, improvement of the AVS system is proposed by using the electronic
delivery address i.e. email address or mobile number as a verification method (in
connection with the billing address). This new system called Full Address Verification
System (FAVS)[16] , see Figure 4-5.
In this case, the email address of the customer is stored at his credit card issuer database.
When the customer makes an online order for something to be delivered via email the
system contacts the bank automatically and compares the two emails: the stored and the
supplied emails.This can be performed easily since an email address is not like a name
or a street address, which can be written in different way.
It is more effective than matching the billing address since there are no two different
emails one for shipping and one for billing. Even if others know the email address in
question it will be impossible to access the account (unless by hacking).
Email accounts are unique which makes them easy to be verified. In the case of where the
email does not match, the only thing the merchant has to do is to email the customer to
send his "trusted" email address or cancel his order.
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Figure 4-5: Proposed New AVS (FAVS)
4.9 Case Examples: The Problems with Existing Solutions
For the purpose of this thesis two case studies have been conducted into businesses with
soft-product e-commerce sites, namely Card4Call [42] and 123CallingCards [1]. Both
sites sell prepaid calling cards pin numbers located on the back of normal calling cards.
These pin numbers are delivered to customers email addresses where they can use these
pin numbers to make international ca11s from their home telephones. At the same time,
interviews with both managing directors revealed that both sites had experienced quite a
number of fraudulent transactions and were actively applying automatic and manual fraud
prevention methods, such as verifying address, or calling the bank and customer. Table
4-1 and Figure 4-6 show the statistics of fraud transactions occurring with Card4Caii.
Likewise, Table 4-2 and Figure 4-7 show statistics for 123CallingCards.
Table 4-1: Card4Call Statistics for One Year
S_y_stemdetected frauds 65
Qperator detected frauds 104
Undetected frauds 7
Fraud _{sumof above) 169
Total Orders 2136
Fraud Percentage 7.9%
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Card4call Fraud Classification
123 Fraud Classification
II System detected frauds
• Operator detected frauds
o Undetected fraud
Figure 4-6: Card4Call Statistics for One Year
Table 4-2: 123CallingCards Statistics for One Year
System detected frauds 74
Operator detected frauds 136
Undetected frauds 8
Fraud (sum of above) 210
Total Orders 2124
Fraud Percentage Around 9.8%
III System detected frauds
• Operator detected frauds
oUndetected frauds
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Figure 4-7: 123Callingcards Statistics for One Year
Both Directors agreed that the levels of fraud percentage for their companies were
disturbingly high and were costing their businesses considerable amounts in terms of lost
turnover.
The detection techniques being used were very time consuming and there were other
concerns: pursuing fraudulent transactions invariably led to a trade-off between taking
such action and the consequences of processing delays and subsequent costs; from a
customer point of view there was also an implied trade-off: between information privacy
and shopping online.
The need for personnel within the organisations to call both bank and customer also led to
different sets of problems:
Calling banks - a lack of toll free numbers was costly, lack of 2417 availability was
costly, sometimes systems were not available, sometimes banks were not willing to verify
customer names and/or phone numbers;
Calling customers - costly again in terms of time and money, customers might not be
available and there might be no perfect time to call, the converse of this was that it was
often inconvenient for customers if they had to wait for merchant calls.
Significantly, a major concern expressed by both companies was that the types of
inconveniences identified and the increasing number of fraud cases were together
jeopardizing the mass acceptance of e-comrnerce, since many customers were becoming
increasingly reluctant to shop online.
During the course of the interviews the Company Directors were also asked for their
views on the proposed Full Address Verification Service (section 4.8). Their reaction to
such a scheme was very favourable and they agreed that if it were to be adopted instead
of AVS it would solve most of the fraud cases involving soft products. They
acknowledged that the only area in which this would not be effective was that of
'Friendly Fraud'. However since this constituted less than 5% of all fraud cases they felt
the shortcoming could be tolerated.
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4.10 Fraud Future
It is clear that this is a complicated problem and many soft-products companies are
suffering. The major consequence is costly by having to pay higher processing fees and
insurance as protection from fraud.
According to the 2004 Mindwave Research report referred to earlier, nme out of ten
merchants expected online payment fraud to be the same or worse in 2005, nearly half
expect it to be a more serious problem.
Figure 4-8 taken from the report shows the level of concern for merchants and their
opinion about the seriousness of the online fraud.
Level of Concern About
Online Payment Fraud
Reasons On line
Fraud Will Become
MORE Serious
Reasons Online
Fraud Will Become
LESS Serious
Figure 4-8: Level of Concern about Online Payment Fraud
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4.11 Conclusion
The continuing level and implications of fraud in soft products is having serious
ramifications for the industry's development. Existing merchants are wary about
expansion, and at the same time there is considerable reluctance on the part of potential
new entrants regarding start-ups. Unfortunately the current systems, rules and regulations
mean that merchants will always be responsible for any fraudulent transaction.
This chapter has provided a critique of current e-commerce fraud prevention and
detection techniques. The conclusion it reached was that not all were suitable for e-
commerce and therefore complete protection against fraud was not possible.
However, a proposal for improving current state-of-the-art techniques (FAVS) was
outlined and reaction from two soft products Company Directors sought. Their views
were very favourable although both acknowledged that the new development would not
be able to resolve 100% of cases. However since the residue, described by the industry
as 'Friendly Frauds' constituted such a small percentage within both the industry and
their own businesses, it was not deemed a major issue.
In conclusion, both agreed that if there was industry-wide acceptance of the new
proposal, and FAVS is used as a replacement for of AVS the level of fraudulent cases
would decrease considerably.
Therefore, having discussed problems associated with current detection and prevention
systems, the next chapter intended to present taxonomy of all possible dispute scenarios
in the field of e-commerce.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Taxonomy of E-commerce Disputes
5.1 Introduction
E-commerce now constitutes a significant part of all commercial activity. As a result,
there are now many more transactions leading to more disputes. Because of new
technology disputes are (i) more frequent, (ii) more technologically complicated and (iii)
more difficult in terms of traceability.
Most of the work in the literature has previously concentrated upon the exchange process
(involving money and goods), and as a result the focus has only been on problems
associated with the exchange process. The problem was one of making sure that the
exchange was fair, and concentrated on how to resolve the possibility that one party
might receive something but would not send what was promised in exchange. The
problem associated with the time of the delivery or the item delivered was rarely studied.
This chapter is intended to present a taxonomy of all possible dispute scenarios in the
field of e-commerce, It will analyse scenarios from many different perspectives:
computer science, business, legal and also the transaction participants' point of view.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the summary may be subject to improvement in the future,
at this moment in time it should provide an adequate basis for Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR) systems designers and others dealing with dispute resolutions in order to better
understand the nature of the online environment.
Better understanding of situations that might become problematic, how these situations
might result in disputes, and the resolution possibilities should provide a useful technical
base to achieve better design solutions. Since disputes do not occur in vacuums, and each
one arises in a setting or a context, a variety of factors can be affected. For example, the
expectations of the parties, the timing of settlement, the perceived urgency of resolution,
the consequences of and available alternatives to failure, the role of the third party, and
even the form of dispute resolution [19, 80].
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All disputes are about one of the three main elements of any transaction: product/service,
payment and the exchange of the two. Products and services are almost the same in e-
commerce, and these products could be delivered physically like a notebook computer,
electronically like a piece of audio or video, or over time such as an Internet or online
magazine subscription [19].
Payments in e-commerce are more complicated than normal commerce since in normal
commerce nearly all the transactions are conducted using either, cash, cheques, credit
cards, debit cards, or wire transfer. In e-commerce, whilst all the above are applicable
many other new payment systems, e.g. E-cash, E-coin, Paypal now exist. Complications
arise from the introduction of new payment systems, frequently making the new payment
systems take a long time to become established. In contrast the original five methods
cited are tried and tested.
Exchange of goods and payment in e-commerce is also a major contributor to the causes
of disputes since the exchange may take more than one form depending on the product
purchased and the payment method used.
In the following sections dispute cases will be studied in general and will not specifically
be concerned about any goods, payment or exchange method. Therefore, if the credit card
is not valid the dispute reason will only be described as "payment quality is not good"
and will not consider any other reason, e.g. whether it had expired, was not yet valid,
whether the expiry date did not match or it had been stolen.
The remainder of the chapter will then give a brief definition ofthe term 'dispute', list the
assumptions, notations and the transaction elements used to clarify the taxonomy of
dispute. All possible dispute cases will be formally listed using the 'Truth Table'
approach, and a comprehensive taxonomy framework for dispute in e-commerce will be
derived from these possibilities. The chapter will conclude by discussing possible
directions for future research in this area.
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5.2 Disputes
Disputes and complaints are two words that are frequently being used interchangeably
without providing any definition or context. However, there are various types of
damaging or injurious experiences that consumers may have. Commentators often refer
to a 'pyramid of injurious experience' or a 'dispute pyramid' see Figure 5-1 [66]. At the
base of the pyramid is unperceived injurious experience, moving up to perceived harms,
grievances and complaints. At the very top of the pyramid, forming the smallest category,
are disputes with a subset being disputes voiced to third parties and pursued through
formal dispute resolution that would include Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as
well as lawsuits.
Disputes
Complaints
Grievances
Perceived injurious experience
Unperceived injurious experience
Figure 5-1: The Dispute Pyramid
The layers of the dispute pyramid have been characterized in the following manner [11]:
Unperceived injurious experience: where consumers may experience a problem with a
transaction but never perceive it as injurious per se. For example, a consumer may lack
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the expertise to recognize a specific problem such as a product defect that makes a
product work inefficiently.
Perceived injurious experience: out of the larger mass of experience, some of it is
perceived by individuals as injurious. A consumer or customer, however, may blame him
or herself or feel that the injury is too vague or debatable to be susceptible to a remedy.
Thus, the experience may never develop into a grievance.
Grievances: it is a sense of violation of a right or entitlement that can be ascribed to a
specific person or entity. Grievances are usually not voiced, although they may make
customers decide not to return to a particular merchant or type of merchant or medium.
For example, a consumer who has a grievance arising out of an Internet transaction may
choose never to use the Internet for future purchases. When a grievance is not voiced the
consumer, in essence, absorbs the loss.
Complaints or claims (not legal claims or complaints): a complaint is a grievance that
is voiced to the perceived offending party. Most frequently, complaints are granted or
redressed. These would be referred to as "resolved" complaints. Reputable merchants,
who seek repeat business and value positive reputation among consumers will encourage
customers who perceive grievances to complain. A merchant who receives a complaint is
in a position to grant relief and to satisfy the customer. Granting relief builds trust and
confidence with the customer for future dealings.
Disputes: a dispute, as contrasted with a complaint, is a complaint that has been rejected
in whole or in part. Often, customers do nothing after a complaint has been rejected by a
merchant. This is another stage at which consumers may choose to absorb or internalize
the loss. This is often rational because the cost of pursuing relief may be more expensive
than the loss itself. The customer, however, may choose to avoid future dealing with the
merchant and can create negative feedback or word of mouth.
Disputes voiced to a third party. A small fraction of customers with disputes choose not
to give up but to seek the assistance of some third party. Third parties might include a
government agency, a merchant association or a lawyer ombudsman. Quite often, the
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third party will advise a consumer that it is not worth it to commence a formal proceeding
against a merchant.
Formal dispute resolution would include ADR or lawsuits. This is the top of the
pyramid and the smallest category on the dispute pyramid.
Since this thesis focuses on disputes in general the rest of this section will concentrate on
discussing the possible causes of disputes.
5.3 Assumptions, Notations, Transaction Elements
5.3.1 Assumptions
In this section some of the assumptions which will make it easier to give a clear and
general taxonomy for E-commerce disputes are as follows:
AI: a payment is a payment regardless of its form;
A2: a payment is actually a special item that a Party wants to exchange with another party
for another item - which might be payment too;
A3: disputes will only occur after one of the two parties involved in the transaction
delivers the item;
A4: if an item was delivered to the wrong address or could not be delivered because a
wrong address was supplied, it will be considered that the item had been delivered but
that the delivery address was incorrect (since the sender already attempted to send it).
AS: each transaction will have two different parties Px and PY, so X and Y can be used
interchangeably.
5.3.2 Notations
The notations used in this chapter and that will be used in any forthcoming chapters are
as follow:
Px: Party x who wants to exchange something with Party Pv.
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Ix: Item that Px wants to exchange.
Qx: Quality of the item Ix.
ex: Number ofItems Ix that Px wants to exchange in a single transaction.
Ax: Delivery Address ofPx.
Tx: Time interval where Px will expect Pv to deliver within.
Dx: Actual Delivery ofIx by Px to Pv
Sx: Satisfaction level Px promises Pv
Mx: Consumption of Ix by Pv
5.3.3 Transaction Elements
Each transaction has eighteen elements that constitute the contract:
(Px, Ix, Qx, Cx, Ax, Tx, Dx, Sx, Mx) and (PY, Iv, Qv, Cv, Ay, Tv, Dv, Sv, My)
Any E-commerce transaction will go through the following three steps
• Order and Negotiation
In this stage Px and Pv will negotiate and agree on the following:
(Px, Ix, Qx, Cx, Ax, Tx) and (PY, Iv, Qv, Cv, Ay, Tv)
• Actual Exchange
In this stage Dx and Dv will take place
• Post Transaction
In this stage both Px and Pv can generate (Sx, Mx) and (Sv, My) respectively.
5.4 Dispute Definition
As a result of the literature survey (which reviewed the nature and causes of disputes) and
problems that were specifically associated with e-commerce, it is important to give
further consideration to this overriding concept and its implications since it is central to
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the whole thesis. This section offers a senes of definitions which are progressively
refined as significant questions are posed that challenge each stage and culminates in
what is viewed as the optimum.
Def.l: The two parties involved in the transaction disagree on one of these elements after
that transaction is completed.
But what: if dispute happened before the transaction is completed for example when one
party sends his item but the other doesn't?
Def.2: The two parties involved in the transaction disagree on one of these elements after
at least one party delivers his item to the other.
But what: if dispute happened in more than one element?
Def3: The two parties involved in the transaction disagree on one or more of these
elements after at least one party delivers his item to the other.
But what: if one steals a payment method and uses it in a transaction; the disputant will
not be part of the transaction since they only use his payment method and mayor may not
consume the other item.
Def4: The two parties whose item is exchanged or will be exchanged in the transaction
disagree on one or more of these elements after at least one party delivers his item to the
other.
But what: does Disagree mean?
Def.5: One or both parties whose item is exchanged or will be exchanged 10 the
transaction do(es) not meet the agreed contract terms.
But what: if one of them does not meet the agreed terms but the other does not complain.
Def6: One or both parties whose item is exchanged or will be exchanged in the
transaction do( es) not meet the agreed contract terms and the affected party is
complaining.
This will be the definition of dispute which will be used for the rest of this thesis.
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5.5 Proof of Completeness
In order to make sure that all the possible dispute cases are covered, the Truth Table for it
should be generated and all the possibilities are studied.
Each party involved in the transaction has nine attributes (Px, Ix, Qx, ex, Ax, Tx, Dx, Sx,
Mx) and since the study is about transactions between two parties, eighteen attributes-
nine for each- will be used to generate the Table.
Each attribute will take the value of True or False if the desired action was completed
successfully or unsuccessfully respectively (e.g. Ix is true if the party involved in the
transaction Pv agrees that Ix is the item he ordered and it will be false if he claims that Ix
is not what he ordered) and so on for the rest of the attributes.
Eighteen features mean that the size of the table will be 218 = 262144 Tuples.
Since it is quite long and time consuming to generate the whole table, minimization as
much as possible without sacrificing any aspect of the truth table was performed.
The table will have all the eighteen features and a 'Success' result which is the 'AND' of
all the features. Sequence (ordering) of features in the table will not affect the result
since it is Anding.
'Success' means that the transaction will be completed with no disputes.
'?' means that at this stage it is not possible to decide if the transaction will end with no
dispute or not.
The start will be with the actual delivery D since it is a critical feature
1(12]$<1 Itfl!;i§) 11f~~.~ {.tIM ~~ 1~~1.'i1~~Bp\l~~W~&I[/~ ~lf\B2It&T~~.~:~ B.tit:>t-' r~~<MA rlY1B~1t\~~¢"C.i?s.sj
T T ?
T F NO
F T NO
F F YES
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From the table above if either of the two parties involved deliver and the other does not
(T F or F T) then the success will be "NO" meaning that there is no hope for this
transaction to be successful since one party will surely dispute. This means that 50% of
the possibilities are guaranteed disputes.
If both (DA and DB) are FALSE then success should be "NO" but as an exception and
according to assumption A3 it will be "YES" meaning that there could be no possible
disputes at all since no exchange has happened. This will eliminate 25% of the table
making only the remaining 25% unsure in terms of possible success.
131072 possibilities are disputes regardless of the others which means (DA or DB) and
65536 are successful transactions since (~DA and ~DB).
The table now has 262144 - 131072 - 65536 = 65536 possibilities to check
I.W& li'~B Ji'$J ,~§l JJ,\ _lIW 1i'!.I!Mi r~'B .~ i~B ~:, II~~Ilf'J~§! Tll'il" i~';':;t.; I~~m~~ IOM.sIrt$M!e€ess~.
T T T T ?
T T T F NO
T T F T NO
T T F F NO
Now if either of the two parties or both deny participating, it will result in a dispute. From
the 65536, 75% are disputes regardless of the rest which means (PA) or (PB) is FALSE
The table now has 65536- 49152=16384 possibilities to check
IQ~ lQ'if ~"!?"e.\ i.;:i7"1); Ilrlk' ,1'ElJ. ',~fA~I~~ If~f\Ji t;'1!i~T '¥$> I~m- Irw MI~ r..~ ~IXJ~I&lm h~$Welfs"S I
T T T T T T ?
T T T T T F NO
T T T T F T NO
T T T T F F NO
If either of the two parties or both claims that the item received is not what he agree with
the other, it will also result in a dispute. From the 16384, 12288 are disputes regardless
of the rest which means (Ix) or (IB) is FALSE.
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The table now has 16384 - 12288 = 4096 possibilities to check
'!,)A !J~' ~A FcI§ Til: rs -{(;lA I:;l§ 9 ,Y§ 1M h'!.Jl -If,; .I§ ~A\ ~! 1,!~1b j'1Y1§ $ueeess
T T T T T T T T ?
T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T F T NO
T T T T T T F F NO
From the 4096, also 75% are disputes regardless of the rest which means if (QA) or (QB)
is FALSE (i.e., either of the two parties or both claim that the quality of the item received
is not what both agreed on) it will result in a dispute.
The table now has 4096 - 3072 = 1024 possibilities to check
[J" _lYBl I"'i-. """~- II'< I'B 'Iic;J,A '~~ ~~ .}<~. ~ ,#@ IIA ,.1 § ii!!A .~ ~~~ [<W!"B lllt]ccess
T T T T T T T T T T ?
T T T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T T T F T , NO
T T T T T T T T F F NO
From the 1024, 768 are disputes regardless of the rest which means if (CA) or (CB) is
FALSE (i.e., either of the two parties or both claim that the quantity of items received is
not what they agreed on) it will result in a dispute.
The table now has 1024 - 768 = 256 more possibilities to check
IP.!OS ~~ '!f!f. !r.B 'I~'\' Il..t.!ll .~\ '~Br f'~'U~~~~ Io:~ C'li~. '1llll'. 1t,l:;;J~~lP-p$IW.,~~~ !:SI!J6'Ge'~§
T T T T T T T T T T T T ?
T T T T T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T T T T T F T NO
T T T T T T T T T T F F NO
From the 256, 192 are disputes regardless of the rest which means if (AA) or (AB) is
FALSE (i.e., either of the two parties or both claim that the delivery address of the other
party is not correct and that why the item was not delivered to him) it will result in
disputes
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The table now has 256 - 192 = 64 possibilities to check
IV.!>; !:d§ !rAl !r~ IlJ l:g r~"';1"1g§( i\94 '\;;ill' rffi' I~ -II"I~I~; ~ LM~~ ~~T T T T T T T T T T T T T T ?T T T T T T T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T F T NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T F F NO
Out of the 64, 48 are disputes regardless of the rest which means if (TA)or (TB) is FALSE
(i.e., either of the two parties or both claim that the item he expect does not arrive on the
time agreed) it will result in a dispute.
The table now has 64 - 48 = 16 possibilities to check
.g,it\' !;J~ i"'t' !.it§}: I~!r;..:! ~!lJ. ',I[; if;: ~(Q)'Ei l@'~ ;~llIl <'&lfJ I?&.:m: Ir'tll.\e: r.JI;i§)': G~.t\t~~, !~~.It~~ f~.\[@6essod t
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T ?
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F T NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F F NO
Out of the 16, 12 are found to be disputes regardless of the rest which means if (SA) or
(SB) is FALSE (either of the two parties or both claim that he is not satisfied with the
item received) it will result in a dispute.
The table now has only 4 possibilities to check
~ m§'l~~I!:JiN ~Imw 'L~iI)~I.i\JlB Io!'f.~~I~w,~~'!:~~I~~'tl~!.t:~Itt},l,~~•2") "SB~ MA' 'NIB, ,(SI!J,GG~S_~
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T Yes
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F T NO
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F F NO
Out of the 4, 3 are disputes regardless of the rest which means if (MA) or (MB) is FALSE
(i.e., either of the two parties or both claim that the other one consume his item more than
what they agreed on) it will result in a dispute.
So the table end up with 1 case with no dispute which is when all the values are True.
The success formula will be
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Success = {(-Dx & +Dv) or «Dx & Dv) & Px & Pv & Ix & Iv & Qx & Qv & Cx & Cv &
Ax & Ay & Tx & Tv & Sx & Sv & Mx & My)} where x and y belongs to { a, b} and x
not equal y
Dispute formula should be =success which means Dispute transaction will be:
DT={ (Dx xor Dv) or =Px or -.Py or =Ix or -.Jy or +Qx or =Qv or =Cx or -'Cy or -'Ax or
-'Ay or =Tx or +Tv or +Sx or -'Sy or +Mx or =Mv] where x and y belongs to {a, b}
and x not equal y
5.6 The Taxonomy
In this section all the possible dispute causes will be listed on the basis of the primary
research that has been analysed earlier in this chapter.
There are two important points to clarify: first, in any transaction there could be more
than one dispute case because one party will dispute and then the other will dispute the
dispute and so on, until a final dispute resolution is achieved. In this classification each
dispute is considered a case and treated separately.
Second, in any dispute case there could be more than one cause. In this classification the
concentration is on the causes, so each cause will be treated as a separate dispute case
[16,35,52,84, 124, 141].
The assumption here is that Party X wants to buy something from Party Y.
The following is the taxonomy that has been derived from the complete definition of the
Dispute Formula's elements.
(For ease of understanding and referring to dispute cases, it has been broken down into
three major headings. In turn each of these headings is then defined as a series of sub-
headings with appropriate descriptions of each element of the relevant dispute formula):
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1.Delivery: Here all dispute reasons that caused by a problem of delivery are gathered
a. Payment received but goods not delivered (Dx & =Dv)
This is a clear case and no need for more clarification.
b. Goods received but payment not delivered (Dr & =Dx)
This is also clear case and no need for more clarification.
c. Goods not delivered on time (r=Tx)
In this type a dispute may occur because the goods were not delivered on time. E-tickets
have no value after the flight time, so if an e-ticket received late then this is a good reason
to dispute the transaction.
d. Payment not delivered on time (-,TyJ
In this type a dispute may arise because the payment was not delivered on time. Late
payment may result in financial penalty on the merchant and he may have to pay an
interest in such cases, so if the payment is received late, this would be a good reason to
dispute the transaction.
e. Goods can not be delivered (r-Ax)
In this type the goods cannot be delivered for some reason that has been caused by the
customer, for example, a wrong address or and invalid email. If goods cannot be
delivered because of the merchant then this is Dispute{ I-a} above and the reason for non-
delivery is not important.
Disputes may arise from both sides, the customer could claim he never received the
goods and asked for a credit to what was paid. However this is not considered here
because it is the same dispute as Dispute{1-a}. The merchant might dispute because
crediting a customer could mean a chargeback for which he will have to pay a fee (and it
could also be considered as bad credit for his merchant account). So his dispute could
claim that the customer caused the mistake by providing the wrong delivery address, and
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if any was payable then it should be the customer's responsibility. In this case the
merchant would have good reason for the dispute.
f.Payment can not be delivered (:A y)
In this type the payment can not be delivered for reasons caused by the merchant e.g. a
wrong account number or revoked key. If payment cannot be delivered because of the
customer then this is Dispute{l-b} above. Dispute may be caused by both parties, the
merchant may claim he never received the payment and may ask for his goods to be
returned at the customer's expense or for the late payment penalty to be made by the
customer and not himself. However this is not considered here because it is the same
dispute as Dispute{ I-b}. The customer may file a dispute claiming that he should not be
held responsible for returning the goods or making the penalty payment since it would
constitute extra expense and the fault was the merchant's for providing a wrong account
number, therefore any fee should be paid by the merchant. In this case the customer
would have a good reason to create a dispute.
2. Order: This is a compilation of all of all dispute reasons connected with the order or
the transaction itself.
a. Customer claims never placing the order (r-Px)
In this type of dispute the customer is charged for a transaction and he claims that he
never placed it, whether the goods were delivered or not is not part of the issue, what
matters is whether or not the order was placed.
b. Merchant claims no order made (-'PY)
In this type of dispute the merchant is held responsible for a transaction but claims that he
never received it. Whether payment was or was not delivered is not the issue, what is of
concern is whether or not the merchant received the order. A possible scenario is a
customer who is buying an E-ticket, if the customer loses any money because of the
merchant not delivering the E-tickets and the customer subsequently wants compensation,
this could be part of Dispute {I-b }, then the merchant will dispute this saying that he
never received such an order.
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c. Order quantity is not correct (-'Cy)
In this type both the customer and the merchant may dispute things by claiming the
quantity ordered was respectively less or more than what was ordered.
d. Amount paid incorrect (=Cx)
In this type both the customer and the merchant may make a dispute by claiming that the
payment amount was respectively more or less than the value of what has been ordered.
3. Item: Here all dispute reasons that caused by a problem regarding the exchanged items
are gathered
a. Received goods not as purchased (r-Ir)
This is a common dispute reason where the customer ordered something and then
received something completely different. A straight forward example might be when a
customer ordered a video about the World War I and received a video about The World
Cup.
b. Received money not as sold (-.[x)
This usually happens when transactions are conducted between cross border parties, the
merchant approves an order worth of 200 Pounds and the customer transfers 200 US
Dollars. There should be a distinction here between this type and Dispute{2-d} because
here the customer is claiming that he is purchasing something worth 200 US Dollars
while in Dispute{2-d} there is no disagreement on the price but the customer is paying
less than what has agreed for whatever reason.
c. Quality of Received goods not as promised (-'Qy)
In this type the customer disputes a transaction because he claims that what he has been
promised has not been delivered. For example, if it is something physical it could be
damaged or if a video file, it could have bad picture or other quality problems.
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d. Money quality not proper (--'Qx)
In this type the merchant disputes a transaction because he claims that what he has been
promised as payment has not been delivered. It could be in the form of counterfeit
money, an expired credit card, or any other payment quality problem.
e. Received goods not as expected (--'Sy)
This type of dispute is considered one of the hardest to resolve since satisfaction cannot
be measured. The customer will claim that what he received was not what was expected
when placing the order.
f.Received money not as expected (--'Sx)
The merchant will claim that what he received as payment is not what was expected when
approving the order.
g. Multiple payment consumption (--'Mx)
This could happen because of using different payment methods at the same time, for
example, paying by a credit card and because it was not approved on time then another
payment method is used, for example a cheque. After the cheque has been processed,
approval for the credit card transaction might subsequently arrive. This type of situation
might also arise due to the use of a self approved payment method such as a credit card
where the merchant can charge a card without the approval of the customer, or e-cash is
used where the customer only signs the e-cash with his private key but there is nothing to
stop the merchant from submitting the e-cash more than once. Whilst there are other
possible reasons, the major concern here is on the multiple charging from the point of
view of the consumer.
h. Multiple Goods consumption (--'My)
This type of dispute is rare but still possible. One example is where a customer might
order one notebook but the merchant sends two notebooks against the same order but
only charges the customer once, also in pay-per-view movies a customer may watch the
movie twice and be charged only once.
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5.7 Conclusion
Using electronic means to do business can greatly improve the efficiency of the business
transactions. However it creates some problems that were not previously considered
important. One class of problems results from the behaviour of untrustworthy
participants; as a result of reasons such as dishonesty and network failure, disputes may
arise. Online alternative dispute resolutions (online-ADR or ODR) have been heavily
researched but none have tried to identify the reasons behind disputes to then be able to
provide a complete ODR solution
In this chapter, disputes were classified according to all the factors of the transaction in
which the disputes arose. The intention was to begin to provide software designers and
others involved in the dispute resolution process with an appropriate framework to begin
to work towards achieving optimum understanding and, eventually, solution.
To this end, it has been necessary to first of all classify these disputes according to their
causes and then go on to provide a formal method of proving the validity of the results
(via the Truth Table format).
This work has proposed the first taxonomy for dispute cases in e-commerce, The
taxonomy was created using actual case study evidence and personal experience in this
field. The intention was that the taxonomy generated would be general (in the sense that
it could apply to any payment method used or product purchased).
Whilst instances may be found where this taxonomy might not seem to apply because it
does not define their particular reason for dispute (e.g. where a customer might write a
cheque and not have enough in a bank account to cover the amount), closer analysis of
the taxonomy will reveal that the analysis is robust in every situation. In this particular
situation, category (3-d) Money quality not proper (-'Qx) could be used to explain it.
Due to time constraints this work has been limited by a number of assumptions (see
5.3.1). Future work should try to study each reason separately in order to minimize these
assumptions as much as possible. At the same time the intention has been to provide
more detailed proposals as to solutions for prevention or resolution of the conflict.
Next chapter will study current Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems and their
suitability for the e-comrnercial world in more detail and check if any can resolve all the
taxonomy disputes cases.
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Online Dispute Resolution
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CHAPTER SIX
Online Dispute Resolution
6.1 Introduction
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) can have several meanings, however in this thesis it is
defined as the online technology applied to alternative dispute resolution. The term
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) means dispute resolution other than litigation in
the courts, and includes arbitration. In the real world ADR systems are being used quite
successfully as effective, quick and efficient methods of dealing with consumer
complaints that are not resolved through simple contact with the other party [75].
However, with the growth of e-comrnerce and therefore an inherent growth in the number
of dispute cases, there is already evidence of an increasing number of successful online
dispute resolutions (ODRs), relating to business-to-consumer Internet transactions. In
these situations ODR can address consumer concerns fairly and appropriately, allowing
both parties to avoid the delays and the costs of appealing to either a government
administrative agency or the courts. Additionally, it lowers pressures on administrative
and judicial systems but at the same time manages to preserve the consumer rights to seek
legal redress should they be dissatisfied with the results of the ODR process.
One major advantage of ODR is the ability to find more flexible and creative solutions
that satisfy both parties, (whereas consumer protection agencies and/or courts may offer
only limited remedies in resolving disputes, particularly where they are prescribed by law
or regulations)[56]. Therefore ~DR's potential for managing e-commerce conflict
remains strong because of its fit with soft-products and its particular advantage over
traditional legal mechanisms [101].
A second important advantage relates to its cost-effectiveness: E-commerce by its very
nature has resulted in an increasing number of long distance (and cross-border)
interactions. Therefore, disputes can be between parties who are located far from each
other. Litigating and enforcing such disputes through the courts can be disproportionately
expensive for smaller and medium-size claims due to added costs (such as employing
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local lawyers, travel and translation costs). The implication here is that only redress for
very large claims can be obtained in this way.
However, the value of most e-commerce transactions undertaken by consumers at the
moment is very small, covering items such as books, music, software and other consumer
goods, although this may change in the future if consumers feel confident about buying
higher value goods such as cars or financial services over the Internet.
For the time being at least, the general cost of legal redress by litigation for e-commerce
disputes is therefore not proportionate to the value of the claim. As a result, for such
claims, cost-effective Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) schemes seem to be the only
viable means of redress. For all parties concerned it is essential that this system proves
trustworthy and effective in the long term since a lack of trust in this area of redress may
mean that consumers will not engage in e-commerce and will affect the growth of the
whole industry.
Another significant problem related to cross-border transactions is the difficulty of
determining the appropriate forum for resolution since there will be an inevitable conflict
between the forum of the claimant and the respondent. Being located in no particular
geographical area, ODR mechanisms can provide a forum equally convenient and
accessible to either party [73].
Choosing the "country of origin" as the applicable law alone may not be sufficient to
boost trust in online transactions, because consumers are unlikely to be able to reach
courts in other countries where merchants are resident for many obvious reasons.
Similarly, choosing the "country of destination" which is the country of the customer is
not the right choice either. Merchants will not be eager to conduct international
transactions that could lead them to a mixture of laws depending on where the customer
may live. In addition, even if customers agree to the law of the merchant's country or vice
versa, most of the time the cost of pursuing the case will be much more than the price of
the item in dispute because of the cross border expenses and the low value of most e-
commerce items.
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ODR can be offered in different approaches, the most widely known three are
"arbitration", "mediation" and "conciliation/negotiation". These three are often used
interchangeably and without much precision but the role of the dispute resolver in the
process and the degree of enforceability of the results make the distinction [56].
This chapter will study current ODR systems and their suitability for the e-commercial
world in more detail. It will conclude by suggesting that not all methods are suitable for
e-commerce transactions with soft products, since in most situations there will be a
human element involved in the resolution process, automatically adding more cost. (The
average cost of an e-commerce transaction is less than £20, most ODR providers ask for
more than this to resolve a dispute).
6.2 Necessity for ODR
The need for ODR is clear. Perritt in [107] claims that "three characteristics of the
Internet make traditional dispute resolution through administrative agency and judicial
procedure unsatisfactory for many controversies that arise in Internet-based commerce
and political interaction."
• "The Internet's low barrier to entry invites participation in commerce and politics
by small entities and individuals who cannot afford direct participation in many
traditional market and political arenas."
• "The geographic openness of electronic commerce makes stranger-to-stranger
transactions more likely."
• "the Internet is inherently global" .
In addition, since E-commerce is relatively new it may not yet be covered or described
well in law's various forms, e.g. cases, codes, and commentary [101]. Furthermore,
disputes in online transactions with cross-border participants and especially low value
transactions, are best resolved by ODR because of its convenience. Participants do not
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have to move while the dispute is in resolution stage since they can follow up using their
own PC's.
The choice of going to court in disputes resulting from international Internet transactions
is complicated by complex questions such as 'What is the applicable law?' and 'Who has
jurisdiction over such disputes?' Moreover, international court proceedings can be very
expensive, most of the time higher than the value of the goods or services in dispute. If
going to court was the only choice E-commerce customers had in order to resolve any
dispute regardless of its nature then consumer and merchant confidence would decline.
Customers and merchants would then restrict their choices to the scope of their
geographic area, which would not only limit competition and consumer choice, it would
also invalidate one of the main advantages of using the Internet.
For many reasons, most online disputes are resolved via informal methods such as direct
negotiation; however, some conflicts require more formal responses and ODR is also now
part of that formal response. It shares dispute resolution responsibilities with 'positive'
law, as well as filling gaps where the law is unable to help. As a mechanism that perfectly
fits online conflicts, ODR has become the default for managing certain forms where both
dispute and resolution are conducted online. ODR has many advantages over traditional
resolutions, for example, cost, the ability to deliver dispute resolution expertise at a
distance, and the ease of settling disputes from the comfort of a personal computer [101].
Businesses that show they have managed customer service and internal complaint
handling systems will provide a measure of assurance to consumers that they are abiding
by some acknowledged standard of service or reliability. These types of businesses would
therefore argue that providing this kind of customer service implies they are not likely to
have to be involved in any ODR case. In this way they can ensure a constant market share
in their business sphere, hopefully reducing the likelihood of costly, cross-border legal
battles. Investment in such systems should also improve customer perceptions of their
image and provide valuable feedback to help expand and improve their business activities
[102].
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In terms of consumer confidence, ODR can be initiated irrespective of whether the
business has offered it or not. Although consumers have the right to legal redress in their
own countries, more often than not ODR is perceived to be more attractive since the
expense, time, complexity and uncertainty of judicial processes can make court action
impractical for such small transaction amounts. Cross-border scenarios also compound
the problem with issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement difficulties
[102].
Finally, another factor making ODR in e-commerce disputes an important issue is the
unequal bargaining power of customers when compared to the merchant. A balancing of
unequal bargaining power is particularly necessary where the supplier relies on standard
terms and conditions and where, as is usually the case, suppliers need consumers to pay
in advance for the transaction. For this reason there are many instances where the
claimant will be the consumer who is not usually willing and may not have enough
finance to be able to go to court. To this extent ODR can provide an affordable and
effective dispute resolution mechanism and it may contribute to achieving the aim of
creating trust in e-commerce and practical redress for consumers [75].
6.3 Nature of ODR
To re-iterate, if an ADR process is implemented using web based information
management and communication and in some cases database applications, then it is
described as an ODR. ODR requires its users to access sites and submit or download
information from the Internet and due to the relatively rapid growth of networked
information technology it has the potential to dramatically increase access to conflict
management by many who would otherwise forego third party facilitation.
Whether litigation or ADR, there are physical variables to be addressed which ODR
transcends [79]. It can now reach into homes, offices, schools and Government
worldwide, making it more accessible and preferred by customers and merchants alike.
However, it does present other obstacles, most significantly the need for networked
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information technology. At the same time some Internet users may not be experienced
enough to make it work to maximum effectiveness.
ODR is sometimes described as a "Fourth Party," supplementing traditional ADR third
party facilitators or neutrals that in the past have been deemed critical to resolving
disputes outside of traditional litigation [80]. Its main application is with particular
resolution models such as mediation, arbitration, and negotiation.
There are two basic ODR approaches: Dispute Avoidance (DA) and Dispute Resolution
(DR). Dispute Avoidance is informal ODR, where IT is used to help prevent complicated
disputes from arising, minimizing the need for fonnal resolution or other DR approaches.
It benefits from the fact that online transactions, regardless of social setting or context,
are considerably less robust than offline transactions [101].
The main DA technologies include credit card 'chargebacks' and online money transfer,
or escrow services. These facilitate a wide range of online transactions from
marketplaces such as LLBean.com to auction sites such as eBay[58]. The chargeback
system allows credit card companies such as Visa and American Express to credit
customers with what has been debited from their account. This is likely to happen when
customers are not able to get satisfaction from merchants for a charge they are either
unwilling to accept or unable to recognize. More people prefer to use credit cards in e-
commerce transactions because of this facility since financial liability is largely removed
from them and is transferred to the merchant and as a result the benefit of the doubt is in
the consumer's favour [101].
New online payment systems are relatively simple and help reduce some of the costs
associated with previous systems such as waiting for money orders to arrive via snail
mail or transferring payment before delivery of the item. Online third party payment
systems, e.g. Paypal [106], maintain personal accounts similar to banking systems. Users
can add money to their accounts via credit cards, cheques, money orders or electronic
fund transfers.
However these new systems are not regulated or insured in the same way as banks. Users
do not use their accounts to conduct transactions directly, in the case of Paypal they will
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have to ask for payment for a transaction after being notified that it has been requested
and authorized. Paypal will then debit a credit card or a current account, authorize a
cheque or adjust an interest earning balance for a users accounts. In spite of the apparent
hurdles, these new online systems will still help the use of ODR in DA.
Feedback or Rating is another DA mechanism which will provide customers and
merchants with information profiles gathered from data about previous transaction related
behavior. These profiles provide a track record or reputation rating that can help both
customers and merchants when making decisions about whether or not to proceed with
the transaction. One good example of such a service is the eBay feedback rating system
where both buyers and sellers are ranked by those they do business with. E-Bay then
computes overall positive and negative ratings upon which decisions to trade in the future
may be tied.
Another important DA mechanism is the Trustrnark, also called Trustseal. This is a kind
of hallmark that acts as an indicator of good practice for the processes involved in online
commercial activity, the inherent need for privacy and trust in dispute resolution
procedures. Online services or enterprises pay for the mark or seal to appear on their site
to verify accreditation and achievement of pre-defined standards. If the seal appears in
their site this means that they adhere to the stipulated standards and are therefore
accredited by a trustmark or trustseal service provider, e.g. TrustE [134] and
Square Trade [126]. These signs of accreditation are important to the ODR process since
they help prevent disputes from arising in the first place and because they stipulate
recognized standards of dispute resolution [101].
6.4 Development of ODR from ADR
6.4.1 The Development of ADR
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) was established in the latter half of the 20th
Century [30]. Disputes are resolved outside the courts using professional practices and
theories. They are not usually binding and participation is largely voluntary, comprising
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direct or facilitated negotiation. Mediation is usually by a neutral third party and for each
case they will have different levels of power in terms of structuring the exchange and
finding a solution. Since litigation is time consuming and costly it acts as a powerful
disincentive to adversarial dispute resolution. These concerns led to ADR's development
and ultimate acceptance [65]. ADR established a remedy called win-win solutions, and
benefited from cost advantage.
Although for most of the time ADR is not a binding force, arbitration can be binding and
is recognized as law through statutes such as the V.S. Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS
1), The V.K. Chartered Institute of Arbitrators [26],and transnational conventions such as
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards [85, 101].
A major feature of ADR is the shift of control in dispute resolution from courts to the
parties who are directly involved in the dispute. In addition the outcome of the resolution
is usually satisfactory for both [all] participants.
"ADR has proven that moving justice away from the courthouse is often desirable and
that the arena of dispute resolution, once thought to be the exclusive domain of law and
courts, is markedly different from what it was several decades ago. Mediation
arbitration, and other forms of 'alternative' dispute resolution are now the most common
approaches to dealing with conflict"[80].
6.4.2 Subsequent Development of ODR
ODR systems did not emerge until the World Wide Web became ubiquitous in the mid
1990s. The Internet helped boost and encourage e-comrnerce, and as a result disputes
start to arise, leading many people to think that the only way to resolve online problems
would be to use online dispute resolution. The collapse of the "Dot Corns" in 2000-01
had a dramatic impact on ODR. As a result the impetus for developing ODR was
declining. Nevertheless certain areas were still active, in particular those involved in
resolving disputes relating to online auctions, insurance claims and domain names [101].
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The first experiments in extra-judicial ODR were made during 1996/1997 in the US and
Canada [76]. Having begun as university projects, they eventually evolved into
commercial ventures. By way of contrast, European Governments and most notably the
European Commission were strongly advocating the use of ODR systems for consumer
disputes around the same time [116]. By the early 2000s a considerable amount of
private entrepreneurial activity had developed: in 2002, 30 consumer ODR schemes were
recorded [75].
Before 1995 no universal online standard existed. With the development of faster and
more efficient Internet connection and other features such as HTML editors and
browsers, ODR very quickly gained mass acceptance. However, with its growth came
the consequence of more conflict. Virtual Magistrate online arbitration system was
established in the same year through which ISP disputes could be handled [109].
Virtual Magistrate, and later the Online Ombuds was developed at the University of
Massachusetts, along with the Family Mediation Project at the University of Maryland.
These were both implemented with support from the National Center for Automated
Information Research. Although the Initiator for all of this was a rise in the number of
disputes, the real aim was to refine the use of information technology in dispute
resolution as a whole.
ODR's second developmental period was dominated by two trends, the rapid
proliferation of online activity and technologies to support it, and the emergence of ODR
prototypes from academic institutions. Whilst around 1995 academic sponsored
prototypes dominated, by 1998 almost 50 private entrepreneurial offerings had been
developed [101].
As an important part of the process, businesses involved in ADR worked with those in
the Internet to produce online versions of offline ADR practices, since it was felt that IT
could be used to improve the provision of non-adversarial resolutions regardless of
context.
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6.5 ODR and E-commerce
The growth of e-cornmerce has produced disputes between businesses (B2B), businesses
and consumers (B2C), and between consumers (C2C). These disputes vary greatly in
terms of value, location, and rule structures. E-cornmerce disputes can happen for many
of the same reasons as offline commercial disputes, e.g. one side of a transaction might
not be satisfied with what has been purchased or the way the item has been delivered and
will be looking for some kind of compensation as a result [119].
In B2B both parties know each other well and usually the transactions are of a high
volume, repetitive nature, managed through private contracts. These contracts usually
bind the businesses together, defining roles and responsibilities, and provide for ready
made dispute resolution mechanisms. ODR is not yet a good dispute resolution method
in B2B online disputes:
"ODR is not used to any meaningful degree in the B2B market segment since the parties
have made other arrangements for the settlement of disputes between them and disputes
among them are rare in any case." [12].
With C2C e-cornmerce transactions the ground is more suitable for ODR than any other
type of transaction. C2C transactions are growing and online auction sites like eBay [58]
and uBid [136], are good examples of where C2C transactions can cause online disputes.
In auctions, usually the dispute arises when either the seller or the buyer feels cheated and
wants compensation or the item back. Most disputes are initiated by the buyer, where the
item received did not satisfy expectations. If the seller did not satisfy the buyer or the
two parties are unable to agree on some kind of compensation, direct negotiation and
facilitated mediation ODR may be employed. (Using ODR does not affect the right of
both parties to formal legal processes and remedies) [101].
6.6 ODR Conditions and Mechanisms
Since the use of ODR is mainly voluntary it must rely upon contextual fit, attractiveness,
ease of use, and effectiveness to encourage implementation. As a means of redress it is
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dependent upon the use of networked information technology and in its development has
been dependent on what are deemed to be three 'essential building blocks' or conditions:
trust, expertise, and convenience [80]. At the same time ODR can be offered via certain
mechanisms or schemes that will also create added value and further trust in the whole
process.
6.6.1 Building Blocks
Trust: Large scale online commerce is constrained by what has been described as a trust
gap. Individuals and organizations are disinclined to trade without certain interactions
and accountability. The extent of the gap is based on risk appraisal that will evaluate the
likelihood of being able to reverse an unsatisfactory transaction as well as assessing the
potential trading partners in question.
The law of contract has long been used to reduce risk by filling the trust gap with reliance
on third party adjudication and enforcement. Trust is an interpretation or perception of
the security this kind of mechanism implies, (i.e. the likelihood that object and
compensation will be exchanged smoothly).
Although in offline situations, the existence of courts and ADR systems encourages
individuals to have trust in what could be an unknown situation, in the online world this
kind of 'trust gap' between buyers and sellers acts as a barrier. However ODR tries to
remedy this situation by providing alternative ways to solve problems and alleviate
doubts about trading partners.
Trust in the ODR process, for existing and future participants in tenus of fairness and
security, is essential, as is the likelihood of a reasonable resolution outcome should the
need arise. In order to be seen to be fair the process should be neutral and open in its
treatment and both sides should be given the opportunity to be heard. Trust is also
paramount since security and the confidence that private financial or personal information
will not be made public or inappropriately disclosed is a major concern for all concerned
[101].
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Expertise: The issue of expertise is closely related to that of trust. Prospective ODR
users, and dispute resolution participants in general will be concerned with the quality of
the system and process being offered. They will require evidence of expertise in form of
third party ADR practice and fourth party ODR environment.
For any individual or business taking a claim to court, there will be an implied
expectation about the quality of professional expertise involved in the process. The ADR
'profession' has been built up over many years and now represents a comprehensive
knowledge base. This same kind of professional approach, in the form of technical
expertise, is being built into ODR software systems. This is taking the form of structured
communication and information management systems to facilitate use of direct
negotiating systems and the settlement algorithms that are now used in 'blind bidding'.
However in terms of building up its stock of experts and knowledge base ODR is still
relatively new and in the process of development. Although it is taking much from the
ADR example it still requires new skills and practices that are specific to the context of
online transactions [101].
Convenience: Convenience is ODR's major and most obvious advantage over formal
litigation because of the ease with which dispute resolution can be delivered by IT and
the obvious lack of physical costs. (Since online interaction can often occur between
parties who are considerable distances apart, when disputes arise it is clearly more
convenient to pursue resolution online than approaching a remote court to file a physical
claim) [101].
6.6.2 Schemes
The most important schemes or mechanisms related to ODR service provision are
described below:
(1) Universally Accessible Schemes
ODR services such as I-courthouse.com and Onlineresolution.com are available to any
claimant trying to find redress regardless of the nature of the dispute. The main advantage
of schemes such as these is the fact that they offer open access, although funding and
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enforcement present two major disadvantages. For many small consumer claims the
ODR service could prove too expensive since rather than being financed by membership
fees, users themselves have to pay.
With regard to enforcement, if the business does not have ODR scheme membership it
will prove much harder to implement decisions and settlements that have resulted from
the whole process. The net effect is that independent schemes are much considerably less
effective than those offering membership.
(2) Trustmark Schemes
The Trustmark scheme greatly enhances consumer confidence. As a result, vanous
consumer and trade associations, government and also the private sector have established
similar practices.
This approach enables the ODR provider to license the supplier with a logo or trustmark
on its website. This provides an indication that the supplier is willing to partake in any
dispute resolution scheme and that it will adhere to a prescribed Code of Conduct. This
Code for example will require that any supplier should disclose company and contact
details on their website and will guarantee to make delivery within an agreed time limit.
Therefore the trustmark should increase consumer confidence and give added value to the
suppliers 'brand'. In return the supplier will pay a membership fee to be able to belong to
the scheme and use the trustmark licence. The amount paid will also cover the cost of the
actual dispute resolution process, in effect making the service free or at least relatively
inexpensive to the consumer. If business members do not comply with the prerequisite
standards of good practice they risk losing membership and their right to use the
trustmark. Therefore the concept of the trustmark scheme is considered a very important
factor in helping the development of consumer ODR services.
(3) Marketplace Schemes
The Internet marketplace itself often provides dispute resolution services, most
commonly in the form of a site providing many suppliers of goods and services and in the
form of either portals, auctions or shopping malls.
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These types of marketplaces may also provide additional services such as dispute
prevention mechanisms. Yahoo and E-bay, for example, provide the facility for a rating
system on feedback about seller performance. This feedback can then be made available
to future buyers as a way of helping make reliable selections about levels of
trustworthiness and prevention of possible future disputes occurring. Some businesses
will employ ODR providers usually to mediate in disputes, for example E-bay using
SquareTrade.
Similar to trustmark schemes, suppliers who do not conform risk being excluded from the
marketplace. This creates pressure on the supplier to comply and co-operate in any
dispute resolution procedure [75].
6.7 ODR Requirements
Measures of effectiveness comprise only one of the criteria against which ODR is
measured. Equally important is that the procedure should be fair [75]. Significant factors
such as independence, impartiality and transparency are outlined below.
6.7.1 Independence and Impartiality:
In any ODR case, both ODR provider and the arbitrator/mediator must be considered to
be independent, impartial and free from any personal interest in the eventual outcome.
Since it is unavoidable that either the merchant or the customer will provide the funding
for the process this should be compensated for by assurances that independent third
parties will supervise the overall scheme and represent consumer interests in an impartial
manner. However this is an ideal situation: in reality these requirements are rarely
evident in existing schemes.
Individual arbitrators or mediators are also required to observe codes of professional
ethics requiring them to disclose personal interests in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
Evidence of this type of compliance should be made available to the user. Furthermore,
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allocation of arbitrators should be random and no one party should be allowed to make
the choice [75].
6.7.2 Publicity and Transparency
Secrecy and confidentiality are paramount in out-of-court situations and the same should
be expected in ODR proceedings. Nevertheless in order to further develop openness in
the ODR process wider public policy concerns may prove to be an overriding issue. For
example, where instances of widespread business malpractice in the mass consumer e-
commerce market have occurred, the public has a right to be made aware of these
situations. If ODR is to become the dominant form of e-commerce dispute resolution,
arbitration decisions that have been reached should be used to form a substantial body of
new law, helping to eliminate uncertainly in terms of the rights and obligations of e-
commerce parties. Indeed, e-commerce 'law' is not likely to develop any further and
become transparent if these types of decisions are not public, This complex issue of
transparency will become even more crucial if ODR develops as the predominant form of
dispute resolution for e-commerce in the future.
The ICANN dispute procedure established to resolve the registration of domain names
such as '.com' provides a good example. This 'Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Procedure' (or UDRP) is published on the ICANN website [100] and as a
result a body of case law in this area is developing.
If decisions are not published, a 'one-time only' user is not likely to be aware of what has
previously been established and become acceptable as law. On the other hand, regular
users (usually suppliers), are likely to have an unfair advantage by knowing what has
been established in the past. In addition, unless there is sufficient transparency through
the publication of results it will be impossible to check the quality and impartiality of
dispute resolution and therefore the integrity of the whole system [69].
Online published statistics are only likely to amount to the numbers and types of disputes
that have been resolved at present due to the informal nature of the process. However,
ideally, these decisions should be published but unfortunately there is no legal obligation
for ODR providers to do so at this moment in time [49]. To be truly transparent, ODR
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schemes should also be clear about rules, standards and aspects of the law that have been
employed as a basis for reaching some kind of settlement or decision [60].
6.7.3 Language Barriers
Most ODR providers do not give sufficient attention to the problem of cultural and
linguistic differences. Currently ODR services are offered in English and only very few
offer a bilingual or multilingual service[ 49].
6.7.4 The Right to a Fair Hearing, and Ability to Respond
Entitlement to a fair hearing implies that each party be given an opportunity to state their
case and hear and respond to the other party's submissions. Since ODR schemes usually
rely on written (web-based or email) submissions by the parties they should be allowed a
fair amount of time in which to respond.
6.8 Dispute Processes
Most dispute case would follow the flow of Figure 6-1:
Figure 6-1: Dispute Processes
Dispute Initiation: the affected party, whether individual or organization, approaches a
dispute resolution authority, files a claim for examination of the dispute (either online or
with a mixture of online and offline components) if he feels there is some entitlement to
redress.
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Dispute Investigation: the dispute resolution provider or any other party handling the
resolution will solicit participation from the non-complaining disputant through email,
phone, fax, or snail mail. Once there is agreement on both sides for participation the
provider will begin to examine the claim by collecting evidence and information about
the case.
Dispute Negotiation: having collected the necessary information the dispute resolution
provider will negotiate possible resolutions with both parties.
Making the decision: if the dispute resolution provider has the authority to require both
parties to follow the suggested course of action then a decision will be made regardless of
whether both sides are happy with the outcome. However, if no such power exists then
the agreement of both parties is necessary before a decision can be reached.
Decision Enforcement: the most difficult, but at the same time the most crucial, stage in
the whole process since all of the previous stages will have been pointless if enforcement
cannot be made. In most cases this stage will be conducted by a party other than the
dispute resolution provider.
If enforcement cannot be instigated, at the very least a negative 'mark' should be
assigned to the refusing party of making any future participants wary of entering into any
transaction with him.
6.9 ODR Approaches
There are many approaches to ODR, the most basic of which are negotiation, mediation
and arbitration; the remainder discussed in this section, i.e. evaluation, decision support
systems and virtual courts, are some of the most widely used variations of these three
approaches.
More specific distinctions within the ADR concept, such as "arbitration", "mediation"
and "conciliation/negotiation", are often used interchangeably and without much
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precision. Such distinctions may, however, be of relevance with regard to the role of the
dispute resolver(s) in the process and the enforceability of the results [56].
6.9.1 Negotiation
Direct and automated are the two types of negotiation available in dispute resolutions. In
the case of direct, the ODR provider links two parties (or more) using conventional media
such as snail mail, phone or email to enable communication. Automated negotiation, on
the other hand, is a computerized process designed in the main to settle monetary
disputes.
SquareTrade [126] has established a direct negotiation ODR system for eBay. It now
handles 80% of its auction related disputes and has overseen the successful resolution of
over 66% of cases [81]: in only one day it has been known to have handled over 1000
complaints. Nevertheless, whilst this form of direct negotiation requires no human
facilitation by Square Trade, for other online disputes simply enhancing communication is
not enough to be able to settle conflicts [101].
As an example of automated negotiation, systems based on blind bidding such as those
offered by CyberSettle [53] and Clicknsettle [46], will apply 'Split The Difference'
algorithms, where secret bids must come within a pre-agreed range and participants never
get to know the exact demands or offers being made. The only knowledge they are given
is based on their bid. As a result they may be required to make a further submission or be
told that the resolution has been successful or unsuccessful [101].
Such systems are suitable for monetary claims where liability is not disputed and only the
amount of the compensation is at stake, as in the case of e.g., insurance claims. [76].
6.9.2 Mediation
The mediation process, whether described as 'assisted negotiation', 'facilitation' or
'conciliation', involves the use of a third party in order to facilitate resolution dialogue
without having to resort to intervention between the two parties that reaching a fair
compromise is their concern.
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However the use of the term mediation means that the neutral third party has to be
proactive in looking for solutions and as a result will talk separately to both parties. Only
when both parties agree upon a final mediation proposal can it be turned into a contract
and therefore be enforceable. If no compromise is reached, both parties are entitled to
resort to another dispute resolution method or take their case to court [56].
Mediation will take the form of a series of communication exchanges at the ODR
mediator's web site. The mediator in question will employ techniques similar to those of
their offline counterparts but without much of the informal information exchange evident
when there is close physical proximity, e.g. body language, tone of voice, eye contact.
Since many dispute cases follow a similar pattern, online mediators such as those in
SquareTrade will be able to develop a reliable knowledge base and set of practices in
order to manage situations such as auction related disputes effectively.
Mediation appears to be the main ODR method for small value disputes and in this
context has many advantages. The process is flexible, parties have a high degree of
control enabling them to feel at ease with the whole online procedure and encourage its
use. The mediator will basically use his skill to help the parties communicate and reach
their own solution.
Redress is not limited to monetary awards: parties can explore solutions based on future
interests and not just past rights. For example, an adequate response to a consumer
complaint could be a substantial discount from a future purchase or similar, ensuring that
both parties are satisfied with the outcome.
If successful, business relationships are also likely to remain intact since the types of
dispute arising from small value e-commerce transactions are usually more a matter of
customer service than that of conflicting rights.
When successful, mediation is also much faster and cheaper than arbitration and going to
court. On the other hand however, the disadvantage of the consensual nature of mediation
is that it is not always successful. The whole process could prove to be a waste of time
and money if it fails to reach a solution. The likelihood of success is further threatened
by its lack of authority since it is a non-binding procedure [102]. Also, the involvement
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of the human element as mediator within the online system may also prove too expensive
for small value claims since fees can normally range anywhere between US $20-200 [76].
For the majority of cases the success of mediation is purely dependent on the merchant's
desire to maintain good customer relations and so for that reason it is often argued that
the success of the whole process rests merely on the relationship between the two parties.
Where there is continuity in the business relationship more effort will be put into
resolving any dispute than those where transactions are only one-off occurrences.
6.9.3 Arbitration
Usually arbitration is a process where a neutral third party - an arbitrator - invites the
parties to submit the facts and their arguments (oral and/or written procedure) and finally
makes a decision based on the appropriate legal rules. The arbitrator's decision is
intended to be binding and thus usually may not fit easily to the non-jurisdictional world
of trans-border B2C transactions
Securing the agreement of the parties, usually the business, to binding arbitration after the
dispute has arisen is a difficult problem and the only time it is secured is when the
business subscribes to an arbitrator and publishes this in his website.
The Internet is very suitable medium to documents-only arbitration, but online consumer
arbitration, as opposed to online mediation and other methods of ODR is not very
common.
The fees for arbitration must be proportionate to the value of the claim. But arbitration
requires the involvement of a qualified and experienced human arbitrator also e-
commerce disputes are mostly of small value, so this may be difficult or impossible to
achieve. For this reason, and many others, arbitration is not the first choice for small and
medium value e-commerce disputes. However, under some schemes, online arbitration is
used as the last resort layer of a scaled approach to ODR. In such schemes the parties
start with negotiation and if this fails they move on to mediation and only if this fails will
they resort to arbitration [76].
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The main advantage with arbitration is that both parties are able to choose the arbitrator
and also which legal rules apply. Any final decision could also be enforced
internationally. In order for the process to work effectively, points concerning the
governing law, rules of arbitration (usually through the choice of a provider), the place of
arbitration (even if the process is to take place on line) and the number of arbitrators (the
lower the cheaper) need to be mutually agreed [102].
6.9.4 Evaluation
Evaluation is a special form of arbitration. Online evaluation involves a neutral third
party making a decision on the basis of written submissions and documentary evidence
provided by both sides. However the decision will only take the form of a non-binding
recommendation but this may make it easier to secure the participation of the other side
after a dispute has arisen [76].
6.9.5 Decision Support Systems
Decision support systems could also be described as a multi-variable negotiation systems.
They provide a special form of negotiation where third party facilitators take active roles
in assisting participants to identify, quantify, and adjust preferences in robust fourth party
environments. For example SmartSettle according to them, will aggressively leverage
computational information technology as much as information management and
communication in order to reach a satisfactory resolution. The system users break
disputes down into basic operative variables that are given discrete value ranges, and
represent a mix of interests that can be adjusted during negotiations. Users will adjust
variables as they wish, after that they view the resulting satisfaction index. If the
satisfaction index is not good enough they will propose a new combination [133].
6.9.6 Virtual Courts
As part of the ODR process, virtual courts, such as l-courthouse.com, emulate elements
of real courts and their processes. Cases can be originated either online or offline and
both parties to the dispute will be provided with the opportunity to present a narrative
claim with supporting evidence in this fourth party environment. All communications in
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the virtual courts take place VIa the Web, and usually maintain basic document
management. A jury of peers shares the same environment and acts as third parties who
may query disputants individually and then render non-binding decisions. Unless a
contractual agreement results, fmdings are usually not binding [76, 101].
6.10 Critique Of Current ODR Systems
From the above arguments it can be clearly observed that none of the current ODR
methods are completely automated, negotiation being the process that comes nearest.
However even negotiation lacks reliability, and only works for a small domain of
disputes where the major concern is usually the amount of money being contested.
Mediation is very costly if unsuccessful and the need for human involvement as part of
the process makes the cost even higher. Arbitration, on the other hand is not automated
due to the complexity involved in covering all cases and the difficulty in verifying
documents automatically online [21]. Therefore, in all of the current ODR methods, even
though the cost of redress may be lower than the normal cost of going to court, it is still
high compared to the value of the products which may sometimes be as little as £5 or
less.
An examination of three of the best known web sites involved in online dispute resolution
demonstrates that they are not particularly suitable for their purpose, rather they survive
by taking advantage of consumer ignorance where there is a lack of knowledge about
rights or on the other hand, exploiting the willingness of merchants to make small losses
on transactions in order to maintain levels of customer satisfaction.
Taking the example of SquareTrade [126], the official dispute resolution company that
handles eBay disputes, it offers two services: negotiation, which is free and mediation,
which will cost at least $20 as Figure 6-2 shows. Online direct negotiation systems such
as this one are web and email based, with claims and responses filed via a web interface.
Exchanges are subsequently facilitated through email message scheduling database and
routing software. As a result this form of direct negotiation requires no human facilitation
by SquareTrade.
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The party who requests a mediator the case Will be charged $20 (USD) to involve a
SquareTrade Mediator. All cases Involving feedback must go through mediation to try to
resolve feedback Withdrawal Issues.
~ is FREE to use the SquareTrade system to file a case, respond to a case, and for each
party to use the Direct Negotiation tool
Click here> to file a case.
~ I Sea! Program I Dispute Resolution I ~ I timQ I Partners I ~ I
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Figure 6-2: SquareTrade Mediation Fees(1)
Source: [126]
Negotiation offered by squareTrade merely involves completing an appropriate online
form that asks for a description of the problem. This is then forwarded to the other party
in the dispute. The company will then inform the dispute Initiator that contact will be
made again with the opposing party after a certain period of time if no response has been
forthcoming.
After three months if there is no evidence of any kind of response from the opponent the
case will be closed. Although this might result in a lack of profit for SquareTrade, the
reality is that it could result in even greater loss for the dispute Initiator since most of the
time after three months credit cards issuers will not accept any dispute regarding the
transaction [21].
Therefore a more appropriate way to resolve the situation might be for the dispute
Initiator to write to the other party directly and if no reply is received, to contact the
credit card issuer and dispute the charges immediately.
Mediation offered by Square Trade has a further major problem apart from the cost/profit
issue and this is that any result is not binding on the parties concerned. SquareTrade has
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a rrurumum charge of $20 for some of the better known marketplaces such as eBay.
However this could be deemed high since most of the e-commerce transactions it will be
dealing with will be around this kind of value and at the same time resolution is still not
guaranteed. For other merchants who do not subscribe to SquareTrade the minimum
charge is $40 as shown in Figure 6-3.
QHome @f1elp OLOC) In
Mediation Fees
The cost to involve a mediator in your case is as follows
iliE:;E~::..Il:i':::"5FO;~P.dbyP.rty~.: .. ,,". <h. medl ator) •• J
. ...J~p ..to.a_m_~.r:nurn?f$.2~gg.. . . . . __ I
It is FREE to use the SquareTrade system to file a case. respond to a case. and for
each party to use the Direct Negotiation tool
Click here> to file a case.
Figure 6-3: SquareTrade Mediation Fees (2)
Source: [126]
Only one company, SONY actually offers to pay the mediation charge instead of the
disputant as shown in Figure 6-4. However not all merchants are as big as SONY and
therefore able to offer such a service.
Mediation Fees
It is FREE for consumers to file a dispute and engage in online mediation with Sony
Electronics Inc. (Sony) using Square'Irade. Sony will be charged separatev.
Click here> to filll a case.
M! C'\r~I)::.·) ...:1(1);).,;':0(1:'!:».: ,':,(pI.,wrrAo
J 10 22(25)
Figure 6-4: SquareTrade Mediation Fees (3)
Source: [126]
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SmartSettle [125] works by making a preference analysis summarizing how parties in
each dispute reach some satisfactory outcome. On the basis of this information
SmartSettle can generate future proposed solutions that will maximize satisfaction for all
parties. The price of the lowest possible tool is $100. It is clear that such system is
expensive and for that reason it is not open to the public.
!()O%----
Beyond
WinlWin1l11
Achieve
Equity and Efficiency
in Satisfaction Space0-r----------------------J
Party B 100%
Parties often reach good solutions to complex negotiation problems. However, without computer
assistance, value is inevitably left on the table, even when parties are using interest-based
techniques. This is the conclusion of many researchers, including Erne:3t Thiessl?n PEng PhD,
on whose work SmartSettle is based.
o
Figure 6-5: SmartSettle Dispute Resolution Method
Source: [125]
Cybersettle [53] will try to use some algorithms to find a solution that will satisfy both
parties and claim that as a result they can reach resolution that will exceed the
expectations of both parties. However, the question 'Can non-represented claimants use
Cybersettle?' was answered in their FAQ page with a negative reply 'No, Only attorneys
and claims professionals are able to participate in the Cybersettle process'. Moreover, the
example given in their website, see Figure 6-6, is probably not very appropriate to
demonstrate this point since it assumes that both parties will be willing to give something
every time they are asked.
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Figure 6-6: Cybersettle Dispute Resolution Method
Source: [53)
6.11 Conclusion
Due to the increasing importance of dispute resolution and the continued demand for low
value e-commerce items, an automated online dispute resolution must be developed that
is able to receive complaints with supporting evidence and come up with a fair resolution
automatically (and promptly).
If such a system could be fully automated then the cost of dispute resolution would be
minimized and would be deemed appropriate for all low value disputes. Initially such a
system should be able to resolve even just a small domain of disputes fairly in order to
become established and gain credibility. In the future, as e-commerce and its customers
mature, increasing numbers of cases can be resolved using the same system with little or
no improvements being needed.
The following chapters will propose and appraise a new system intended to answer these
problems. Since the proposed new system will not be able to function fully in the current
e-commerce infrastructure, next chapter will propose an ideal or optimum infrastructure
to support the new system.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
E-commerce Transaction Protocol
7.1 Introduction
One of the major problems identified in current dispute resolution methods described so
far is the human element. This can result in major excessive expense, even where this
type of involvement is kept to a minimum. The problem is even more evident when
dealing with soft products such as E-books, audio tracks, software etc. because these are
goods which are intangible, require no physical shipping and are usually of very low
value in relation to the potential cost of the dispute resolution.
Research in this thesis has proven that the only really effective way to lower the cost of
resolution is to automate the entire process. Chapter 8 will describe this process in detail,
meanwhile this chapter will describe the E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) needed
to facilitate this new development. The ETP is needed due to the fact that the proposed
new system of automating the resolution process would not be able to function correctly
with the current e-commerce infrastructure. This need is caused by the lost of trust in the
Internet due to cross border transactions, the financial benefits that have been derived
from these fraudulent transactions and the introduction of new products and services such
as soft-products.
In order to solve this problem the thesis will offer a complete solution. The solution will
comprise two parts (i) an E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) that is practical and
expandable to accommodate any new improvements in the future, and (ii) an Automated
Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which should automatically resolve any
dispute happening within the proposed e-commerce model.
This chapter will discuss the e-commerce transaction protocol in general, its components
and how it works. The terminology used is already well-known, the intention is not to
create a new technology, rather its intention is to build upon existing knowledge by
modifying and suggesting improvements to better satisfy technical needs. This chapter
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will also demonstrate the proposed concept of assigning a quality certificate to every soft-
product.
7.2 E-commerce Transactions
E-commerce is now the most important and the fastest growing kind of transaction in all
parts of commercial activity. An e-commerce transaction is a means to perform particular
commercial activity using the global digital e-commerce infrastructure. Because of this
importance a huge number of people are investing in it. The main advantages of the e-
commerce are its global nature, its simplicity and low cost compared to normal face to
face business.
During the last ten years e-commerce has developed swiftly, and many improvements
have been made to try and reach the optimum E-commerce transaction. An optimum E-
commerce transaction would be one in which all of the transaction processes were done
automatically online with the minimal time, effort and cost.
As a general principle, each transaction will normally involve several processes, as
illustrated by Figure 7-l. Each of these processes and their current state-of-art in terms of
automation is listed below:
Figure 7-1: E-commerce Processes
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Searching for catalogues: with the huge improvement in search engines and search
methods (e.g. yahoo.com and Google.com), this aspect of the transaction is now
considered one of the easiest to undertake using the Internet. Therefore searching for
catalogues has probably already reached the optimum level and will be easy to
incorporate into any new developments.
Navigating the catalogues: each e-commerce site has developed its own route to enable
customers to navigate its catalogues. Much research has been conducted in order to
maximize this process and better align the routes being offered to customer thought
processes and patterns oflogic [45].
This issue is also reaching the optimum level since it relies purely on the effectiveness of
the technology and as a consequence the need for human interaction within the process is
eliminated. However some sites are still not as advanced as others and in consequence at
the moment there is still be a need to employ people to explain to customers how and
where they can find the products they are looking for.
Negotiation: item, price, delivery: all these negotiations can be done completely online
and with no human interaction since options will be offered at each stage in the decision
making process.
Merchant offers and promotions are also offered in this way to all customers without their
ever having to contact the site. If the merchants want to offer specific services to specific
customers they will offer a series of preferred membership classes where prices could
change according to a set of pre-determined criteria. Alternatively other promotional
codes might be programmed into the site in question.
Ordering: consumers in the past have been used to face to face interaction in this stage
of the transaction, technological development has now made this a very simple and
automated procedure. As a result many companies have now developed a one stop
ordering method, therefore this stage can also be considered to have reached the optimum
in terms of its automation.
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Payment: this is the most complicated stage in the e-commerce transaction process for
many reasons. First, the huge number of payment methods available makes the process of
total automation difficult. Second, the fear of fraud when using traditional payment
methods like credit cards and wire transfer make people reluctant to use these facilities
online. Even though such complications exist, businesses, especially those who accept
credit cards or e-payment methods, manage to make the payment process fully automated
and therefore are able to eliminate the need for human involvement. This stage of the
process could therefore be described as still being in the process of reaching the optimum
stage.
Delivery: this stage in the process is highly dependent on the nature of the item that has
been purchased since some items, e.g. laptops, cannot be delivered electronically. Due to
their physical nature, total automation at this stage will therefore be impossible.
However, in the case of soft products [16] businesses are able to deliver these items
automatically online and without any human involvement. Systems have now been
developed to deliver these items automatically once payment has been approved and are
therefore fast approaching optimum level [42].
After sales service: this includes the warranty, updates and support. With the help of new
technologies some businesses manage to automate all of these issues, for example
automatic update features in some software. Some sites also offer automated compliant
systems and maintenance like Sony.com. However research to date has not shown that
this stage is fully automated yet and further research is probably necessary in this area.
Dispute: this stage could also be considered as an after-sales service but since many
businesses choose not to offer this aspect or participate in it, it has been shown as a
separate stage in Figure 7-1 and as a result it leaves the customer with no opportunity for
redress. This particular stage is the least served in terms of automation, as chapter 6 has
shown.
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7.3 Protocol Requirements and Components
The e-commerce transaction protocol is generic and therefore should fit with any type of
product and payment method. Therefore money in any form can merely be treated as
another type of product that one party wants in exchange for the other party's product that
is being offered.
7.3.1 Protocol Requirements
Before deciding on the infrastructure needed to support the protocol, it is clear that in any
transaction there are at least two parties involved: seller and buyer or merchant and
customer.
Certain components are essential to support the infrastructure. Analysis of the research
that was undertaken to find these components involved an examination of every dispute
possibility. These are now summarized below and since money and goods have been
treated in the same way only one case of every possibility has been considered.
Iteml delivered but Item2 not delivered (Dx & =Dv): The above case requires proof of
delivery
Iteml not delivered on time (--'Ty): The above case requires the proof of delivery to be
time stamped and also a proof on the agreed delivery time
Iteml can not be delivered (--'Ax): The above case is more complicated than the
previous two and it requires proof of attempt to deliver or proof of failed delivery.
Partyl claims never agreeing in an exchange (--'Px) : This case requires proof of
identity showing that the other party agrees to participate in this transaction.
Iteml quantity is not correct (--'Cv) : This case requires proof of quantity, also a proof
on the agreed quantity.
Iteml received not as agreed (--'Iv): This case requires proof of delivery, of what was
being delivered and on the agreed item for delivery.
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Quality of item! received not as promised (--'Qy): Quality of items has to be known
and also delivery proof should include quality of the item delivered and proof of the
agreed quality
Item! received not as expected (--'Sx): Level of satisfaction should be agreed on before
the transaction. This can be anything on a scale of 0-1 where 0 = no satisfaction
guaranteed at all and 1 means satisfaction is fully guaranteed where the guarantor will
pay all expenses if satisfaction is not achieved. So a proof on the agreed satisfaction level
should be provided.
Item! consumed twice (--'My): This case requires proof of the number of times the item
was consumed.
From the above observations the requirements can be summarised as follows:
• Proof of delivery or attempted delivery showing time, item, quantity, delivery
result and result justification;
• Proof of agreed terms showing identity, item, quality, quantity, delivery period,
delivery address and satisfaction level. This can also be described as Contract
Terms;
• Proof of quality: proving the quality of the item delivered.
7.3.2 Protocol Components
From the above findings it can be concluded that the E-commerce transaction
infrastructure consists of two conventional players (the traditional customer and
merchant) and three trusted third party (TTP) servers. The three servers are as follows:
Quality server: a global trusted third party who will be issuing the quality certificate of
all soft products before the transaction. Each of the two parties should have the item
quality certified by a Quality server, and advertise that the quality of the item has been
certified by this server.
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Contract server: this server is the one who will certify that the contract has been made
between the two parties. In consequence both parties should trust this party. This third
party server situation is simple in the sense that it receives two inputs having the same
transaction ID from the customer and the merchant and then ensures that two inputs are
identical. As a result it will then be able to confirm both parties that their agreement is a
match and they can go ahead and start the exchange. This server should be able to
provide a certificate showing the inputs that correspond to the transaction ID.
Delivery server: each party should be able to choose a Delivery server that is trusted.
This server will receive all the items sent to the party and makes sure they are delivered
to the party in question in a correct time and form. Therefore total trust is placed in the
Delivery server and there is absolute confidence that the items ordered will be delivered
if the Delivery server receives it.
If the other party is not confident with the selected Delivery server, they can request a
change. This server is the place were all the items for specific parties will go first. The
Delivery server should be able to confirm any delivery by signing the information
received and append to it some delivery variables like time of delivery and sending it
back to the sender.
Having briefly explained the roles of each of the three TTPs, a complete description of
each will now be given, showing its internal processes and how it works.
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7.4 Contract Server
Contract Server
Contract Not Found
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Figure 7-2: Contract Server Architecture
(The numbers referred to in the diagram are described in the Services section below)
Messages
a) The Contract message is to be sent by both parties. It contains the Sender ID (X),
Transaction ID (T), and the Contract (Cxv-Cvx), the last two are encrypted by the
sender's private key: Contract(X, IT, Cxv-Cvxly )
b) The Confirmation message: this message is sent to both parties and it contains the
Contract server ID (CS), Transaction ID (T), Status of the contract (Stat) and the
agreed terms (Cxv-Cvx). Everything except the Contract server ID is encrypted by
the Contract server's private key. There are two types of confirmation [Match and
Mis-Match]. In the first case the two contracts will match and the status will be
designated [M] and the agreed terms will be sent. In the second case where it is a
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Mis-Match the status will be designated [MM] and the mis-matched terms will be
sent: Confirm( CS, [T, Stat, CXy-Cyx]cs)
c) Evidence Request: this message is sent by one of the two parties asking for a
confirmation of the contract to submit to the dispute resolver. The Contract server
could be "Locked" which means that only people who participated in the
transaction can ask for evidence. This involves sending an encrypted message by
the private key of one of the two parties. Alternatively it could be "Open" which
means that anyone who sends the evidence request message will get the reply. As
a privacy issue it is recommended that the default be Locked. The message
contains the requester ID (X) and the Transaction ID (T), the latter will be
encrypted by the requester's private key: EviReq(X, [T]x)
d) Evidence supply, this message will reply with the archived contract matching with
the Transaction ID received in the EviReq Message. This message will be
encrypted by the Contract server private key: EviSup(CS, [T, Stat, CXy-Cyx]cs)
Services
This server provides two services; one confirms the matching of contracts as follows:
(1) One party sends a contract to the server Contract(X, [T, Cxv-Cvx[y ).
(2) The server searches the temporary database of the contracts that have not yet been
confirmed for a transaction that has the same ID;
(3) If nothing has been found in the temporary database, then this contract is indexed
and stored in the temporary database;
(4) If a match is found, the server will compare the stored contract with the new one;
(5) If contracts match, confirmation will be sent to both parties Confirm( CS, [ T,
M, Cxy-Cyx]cs )and one copy will be saved in the archive database;
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(6) If the two contracts don't match, a negative confirmation will be sent to both
parties Confirm( CS, [T, MM, CXy-Cyx]cs ) telling them that a mismatch
happened in their contracts and the mismatched tenus will be included:,
(7) The two parties are free to revise their contract and send them again with a new
transaction ID or abort the transaction.
The second service supplies evidence of an agreement on a contract as follows:
(8) One party sends a request EviReq for evidence by encrypting the transaction ID
with the necessary private key.
(9) The server checks the archived database and if the contract is found and the
requester is recognized as being one of the parties participating in the contract, if
the server is locked, an EviSup message of the agreed contract will be sent to the
requester encrypted by the Contract server private key.
(10) Ifno match is found in the archive an EviSup message will be sent back to
the requester with the status 'Not found'.
Points to be considered
• There should be a way to generate ID for the transaction or contract so that no two
transactions can have the same ID.
• Every Contract server specifies a time limit, e.g. 48 hours, for the temporary
database so if no correspond order arrives within this limit it will remove it in
order to save space on the server.
• Every Contract server specifies a time limit for the archived database e.g. 4
months or the maximum dispute period, so it will remove it to save space on the
server.
• The time limits could be incorporated in the contract itself to give the two parties
the opportunity to choose the suitable limit.
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7.5 Delivery Server
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Figure 7-3: Delivery Server Architecture
(The numbers referred to in the diagram are described in the Services section below)
Messages:
a) The Delivery message is to be sent by both parties. It contains Transaction ID (T),
Item (I), Delivery Address (A) and the count ofItems (C): Delivery( T, I, A, C)
b) The confirmation message: this message is sent by the Delivery server to the party
who is delivering the item to confirm receipt of the item. It contains the Delivery
server ID (DS), Transaction ID (T), item (I), address it was delivered to (A), the
count of ltems(C), time of delivery (TD), and the Status of the delivery (Stat).
Everything except the Delivery server ID is encrypted by the Delivery server
private key. There are three types of status [Delivered, Invalid address, Not-
delivered]. Where the item is delivered correctly the status will be [Delivered], if
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the address supplied is not correct the status will be [Invalid address], and if the
server can not deliver the item for any reason other than the invalidity of the
supplied address, which means that this is not the mistake of the deliverer, the
status will be [Not delivered]: Confirm( DS, [T, I, A, C, TD, Stat]DS)
c) Evidence Request: This message is sent by one of the two parties asking for a
confirmation of the Delivery to submit to the dispute resolver. The Delivery
server could be "Locked" which means only people who participated in the
transaction can ask for evidence and that requires sending the message encrypted
by the private key of one of the two parties. Alternatively it could be "Open"
which means anyone who sends the evidence request message will get the reply.
As a privacy issue it is recommended that the default be Locked. The message
contains the requester ID (X) and the Transaction ID (T), the latter will be
encrypted by the requester's private key: EviReq(X, [T]x)
d) Evidence Supply: this message will reply to the EviReq with the archived delivery
that matches with the Transaction ID received. If no matching is found the reply
will be the Transaction number and the remaining fields are zeros. This message
will be encrypted by the Delivery server's private key: EviSup(DS,[T,I,C,A,TD,
StatJDS)
Services:
This server provides two services [20], the first of which is delivering an item to one of
its subscribers. This first process is described below:
(1) One party sends a Delivery request Delivery( T, I, A, C) to the server;
(2) The Receive Request process takes the request and time-stamps it and then sends
it to the Address Verifier process;
(3) The Address Verifier checks the validity of the supplied address and if it is valid
it will send every thing to the Deliver process. If the address is not valid it will
send an invalid status [Invalid address] reply to the Confirm process.
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(4) The Deliver process will try to deliver the item to the address supplied. If the
delivery was successful it will send a positive delivery status [Delivered] to the
Confirm process. If for any reason- for example mail box is full- it will forward a
negative status [Not-delivered] to the Confirm process.
(5) Confirm process will perform an archiving step before replying to the deliverer
with the result of the attempted delivery Confirm( DS, [ T, I, C, A, TD, Stat]ns).
This reply contains the time of delivery and status signed by the Delivery server's
private key.
The second service supplies evidence on Delivery as follows:
(6) One party sends a request for evidence by encrypting the transaction number with
a private key EviReq(X, [T]x).
(7) The Receive Request process forwards this request directly to the Confirm
process.
(8) Confirm process will check the archived database and if the delivery is found and
the requester was one of the parties participating in the delivery, a copy of the
delivery will be sent to the requester encrypted by the Delivery server's private
key EviSup( DS, [ T, I, C, A, TD, Deliveredlg, ).
(9) If no match is found in the archive an EviSup message will be sent back to the
requester with the transaction ID and all the other fields as zeros meaning that this
delivery was never attempted. EviSup( DS, [ T, 0, 0, 0, 0, O]ns )
Points to be considered
• There should be a way to generate IDs for the transaction or delivery so that no
two transactions can have the same ID;
• Every Delivery server must specify a time limit, e.g. 4 months, for archive
database so delivery evidences will be removed to save space on the server.
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7.6 Quality Server
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Figure 7-4: Quality Server Architecture
(The numbers referred to in the diagram are described in the Services section below)
Messages
The Quality server has four messages
a) The Quality Certify message to be sent by both parties, containing the Sender ID
(X) and the item to be qualified (I): QCertify( X, I)
b) The Quality Certified message: a confirmation message sent to the party
requesting it. It will contain the Quality server ID (QS), the Item (I) and the
Quality number (Q#). Everything except the Quality server ID is encrypted by the
Quality server's private key. There are two types of confirmation, 'certified and
'unable to certify'. In situations where an item is certified correctly the Quality
number will be assigned a unique positive integer number [INT] from this server.
In cases where, for any reason, the item could not be certified the Quality number
will be [-1]: QCertified( QS, [ I, Q#]Qs)
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c) Verify Quality: in this message one of the two parties or even the resolving party
sends the request asking for confirmation if the given item has the supplied
Quality number. The message contains the sender ID (X), the item (1), and the
Quality number (Q#): VerQty(X, I,Q#)
d) Quality verified: this message will reply with the result of comparing the actual
Quality number of the item with the Quality number supplied in the VerQty
message. It contains the Quality server ID, the item, the Quality number and the
status of the comparison. The status would have two values: [T] if the supplied
Quality number matches the actual one or [F] if they mismatch. This message
will be encrypted by the Quality server's private key: QtyVer(CS, [ I, Q#,
Stat]Qs)
Services:
This server provides two services, the first of which is Quality Certification of an item.
This first process is described below:
(I) One party sends an item QCertify( X, I) to the server;
(2) The server receives the item and sends it to the Quality Certification process
where an internal function will be applied. The outputs of this process are (i) the
quality description which gives as much detail about the item as possible, (ii) the
Quality number;
(3) When the Quality number is ready, the Quality Certification process sends the
Quality number and the item to the Confirm process;
(4) Confirmation QCertified( QS, [ I, Q#]QS ) will be sent to the requesting party
signed by the Quality server's private key. This confirmation could be a negative
confirmation if the server cannot qualify it.
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The second service verifies that a Quality number corresponds to a given item via the
following process:
(5) One party sends a request for quality evidence VerQty(X, I,Q#) by supplying the
item and the Quality number;
(6) The server receives the request and sends it to the Compare-Q# process;
(7) Compare-Q# process sends the item to the Quality Certification process;
(8) The Quality Certification process certifies the item and replies to the Compare-Q#
process with a Quality number;
(9) The Compare-Q# process compares the number received with the number from
the request and sends the result to the Confirm process;
(10) The Confirm process sends the result of comparison QtyVer(CS, [ I, Q#,
Stat]Qs) to the requesting party with the item, the supplied Quality number and
the status of the comparison signed by the Quality server's private key.
Each item that has been certified should be published by the Quality server, thus
providing a complete description of the item in question. The degree of detail regarding
the item is what will distinguish between levels of Quality servers. This is also what
potential customers will be interested in since it will provide a clear and comprehensive
(and therefore more trustworthy) description of the item under consideration. For hard
products, e.g. a Toshiba laptop, this could comprise merely the Model number and could
be built into the company's own website. For soft products, e.g. a piece of music
produced by Sony, a comprehensive specification could also be built into the company's
website, based on those features that are considered by consumers to be the most
important.
This Quality server idea is a new idea that will be discussed more in section 7.8 to
provide further insight into it and the benefits that can be derived from it.
150
7.7 E-Commerce Transaction Protocol
7.7.1 Notations
Px: Party x who wants to exchange something with the other party Pv.
Ix: Item x that Px has and wants to exchange.
Qx: Quality of the item Ix [Quality Number].
Cx: Number of Items Ix that Px wants to exchange in a single transaction.
Ax: Delivery Address of the other party where Px will deliver.
Tx: Time interval within which Px will deliver his Ix to the other party.
Sx: The Satisfaction level Px promises the other party [0 or 1].
Exv: The Exchange, transaction or order ID that should be unique in every exchange and
should be sent by both parties to the contact server.
Cxv: The Contract between Party x and Party Y and it contains the following (Px, Ix,
Qx, Cx, Ax, Tx) and (Pv, Iv, Qv, Cv, Ay, Tv)
7.7.2 Assumptions
AI. It is assumed that the channels between any of the TTP and the customer or the
merchant are resilient;
A2. The actual exchange of messages will be intense and will involve several rounds.
However to illustrate the point, for the sake of simplicity, high level business messaging
exchange illustrating only one message will be used. Many of the fair exchange and non
repudiation protocols discussed in Chapter 3 can be used when implementing these
exchanges;
A3. The Contract and Quality servers are trusted by both parties and the Delivery server
is trusted to the party who has used it as a Delivery server;
A4. Servers never crash or they have a crash recovery procedure;
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AS. In each server the operations or functions that have direct relation with the
transaction itself or the dispute case in question are mentioned. Other operations with no
relation to the transaction or the dispute case such as user management in the Delivery
server are not of concern here.
A6. Every party can choose a Delivery server that is trusted and from Ax it is possible to
find the Delivery server, where Px will deliver to. For example if the address of the other
party is Pv@deliverme.com then the Delivery server is Deliverme. Even though it looks
like an email address, it does not have to be. For example, where an address is P. O. Box
2425, London SWIBT3, this can be written as Pv@POBox2425LondonSWIBT3 so the
Delivery server in this case is Pv local post office.
A7. Quality server will provide the parties involved in the exchange with a certificate of
quality for item concerned.
Quality Server
C12 and C21 contains [ P ,I ,Q ,C,A,T,S] for both C1 and C2, st=Deliverv Stat, Jt=Justification
Figure 7-5: E-commerce Transaction Protocol Architecture
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7.7.3 Transaction Protocol
To illustrate Figure 7-5 and how the transaction protocol will work, the following is a
hypothetical exchange process involving parties (A) and (B) who want to exchange items
(lA) and (Is):
Stagel Involves negotiation and subsequent agreement on all the contract terms;
Stage 2 requires that both parties concerned send the contract which include the following
information to the Contract server: (EAB)(PA,lA, QA, CA, AA, TA, SA) and (Ps, Is, Qs,
Cs, AB, Ts, Ss)
Stage 3: The Contract server makes sure that the contracts sent to it match and then log
the information and ask the two parties to start the exchange.
Stage 4: Immediately after the party receives the confirmation from the Contract server,
they will send the item to the Delivery address of the other party.
Final Stage 5: The Delivery server sends a confirmation to the sender and notifies the
receiver to contact the Delivery server and 'consume' the item.
Figure 7-6 shows the time chart for the protocol.
Customer MerchantNegotiation
cs
C-OS M-OS
Deliver p pe\\ver \tel1\_...-----...----
aymen _ -...----_....__..--
Figure 7-6: Time Chart for the ETP
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7.8 Soft Product Quality Certification
The development of e-commerce has been very instrumental in changing the nature of
trade; face-to-face transactions are becoming obsolete since more exchanges are
conducted online. This new technology is also changing the nature of the products being
purchased, and has led to the introduction of soft products i.e. those that can be purchased
without shipment and its associated costs, into the marketplace. Items such as software,
music and phone calling cards (calling time) [16] are forming a major part of a growing
new market, but as a direct consequence, levels of fraud transactions for such products
have also increased, and at a faster level than those for tangible products [105]. One of
the most significant reasons [25] for this particular increase is that soft products often
lack precise description about what is being purchased. For example, whilst buying a
piece of music may sound simple enough, the sound quality or production might not be
up to expectation. Therefore this section describes a proposed new method of assigning a
quality endorsement in the form of a certificate to every possible soft-product via a
"Quality server" so that before any purchase is made the specification i.e. quality, can be
checked to ensure that this is the exact item required. Where disputes subsequently arise,
the party resolving the dispute will compare the actual item received with the quality
certificate in order to determine what kind of 'fair' resolution is warranted.
7.8.1 The Need for Quality Certification
Most hard, i.e. tangible, products are manufactured according to precise quality and
supplier specifications. In consequence, the place of purchase, whether website, printed
catalogue or retail outlet, will not affect the item being purchased, particularly where it
has been assigned some recognizable Model/Make number and/or a brand name. The
same system applies to books via the ISBN number.
However, in the case of soft products, no such mechanism exists [74], and although, for
example, in the case of purchasing music, the title of the song and the artist might be the
same for every purchase made, other intangible issues such as the location of the
recording, production and sound quality might differ considerably. As a result, many
potential purchasers are wary of entering into transactions on the Intemet and where
154
exchanges have taken place but have led to dissatisfaction, subsequent difficulties in
resolving disputes might be experienced. Invariably this is due to the inability of both
parties to agree predetermined and precise specifications before the purchase is made
[18].
7.8.2 The Quality Server
Thus the concept of a 'Quality Server' is proposed as a mechanism to try and resolve
these kinds of issues. In essence, the Server will receive the soft product, create precise
specifications for it and subsequently provide a Quality Certificate. At the same time, the
specifications of the item will be published on the Quality server website. Section 7.6
demonstrated how the Server works. In brief, the Quality servers would be designed to
provide two main services: Quality Certification of the Item and Verification that the
Quality Certificate corresponds to the item in question.
7.8.3 The Quality Certification Process
Having described the general architecture of the server In section 7.6, the actual
certification process is now discussed. The method described is only one of many and
could be changed according to the demands and nature of the product in question. Every
Quality server could have its own method but should still conform to the standard process
described above.
Any soft product being purchased will arrive at the server as a stream of bits. Taking as
an example 'Song.mp3', the quality certification process would run a hash function on
the file and generate a unique 128 Bit number. (This could be longer or shorter
depending on the server itself and the nature of the product). The generated number,
along with the id of the Quality server, will constitute the Quality Certificate, in the form
of(QS, Q#).
The quality certification process will also include writing a complete and comprehensive
description about the item and publishing it in a public place such as a website, Currently
the process is only likely to be done manually since an expert is needed to make decisions
about these factors, but future research will look into developing a framework where this
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process can also be automated, especially with known soft-products such as music and
software.
7.8.4 Benefits of Quality Certification
Many benefits will accrue from having a unique certificate for each soft product. Prior to
purchasing any item, the potential customer will be able to check its description and full
specification. From this, the buyer will have complete knowledge of the product they
intend purchasing. Searching for a soft-product should be very simple, implying that the
auction's automated bidders should benefit and could therefore bid in any of the five
hundred auction sites without fear of mismatching the type or item.
From the merchant's point of view, certification of soft products will encourage
customers to purchase from that particular point of sale since levels of trust will be raised.
In addition, it will facilitate having a trusted party who will be able to decide if two soft
products are identical or not, and whether the item being sold was as good as advertised.
In the case of a dispute, the resolving party should be able to make a judgment based on
specific product criteria rather than mere speculation as to the nature and content of the
item in question. As a result the outcome is likely to be deemed fair to both parties.
7.8.5 Commercial Application of Quality Certification
Having discussed the concept of the Quality server's architecture In the abstract,
describing its application in a commercial environment is now appropriate.
Soft products mainly come from two sources. The first is that of commercial suppliers
who use professional tools and methods, e.g. Sony Inc which produces thousands of soft
products annually. The second is the individual who will create their own product, e.g. a
budding artist of some kind who wishes to record and sell his own song, piece of poetry
or novel[ 18].
These two sources of supplies could lead to two kinds of Quality servers: those that are
'private' in the sense that they belong to professionals or large corporations, and those
considered 'public', i.e. that would be able to quality anything for the masses.
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Sony for example could use its own Quality server and release the certificate with every
soft product they create. The cost would be minimal and should not be added to the price
of the item. Public servers could provide this service for a small charge, so individuals
who create their own products and want to sell them could send their products to these
public servers together with the description. The server side could then ensure that the
product descriptions were comprehensive and accurate and then subsequently issue the
certificate. Even though there would be a charge for this certificate, it would increase the
sales of the product since people would now know exactly what they were buying and
endorsement by the Quality servers would further increase their level of trust.
Sony would then be able to publish a clear description of the item in its website. Using a
song as an example, the title, artist, date, location, sound quality, length, etc. should be
specified. If a dispute arises due to a piece of information knowledge that was not clearly
mentioned in the description, this omission should then be incorporated into all current
and future certification to eliminate future potential disputes. In the long term this should
result in a comprehensive description being provided that will eliminate almost all
dispute possibilities. There should also be an international standard description for each
type of soft product, so that newly created servers could benefit from such knowledge.
This standard should provide a comprehensive framework for the item's specifiction and
description.
The issue of Digital Rights Management (DRM) is currently very topical, given the huge
number of soft products being created every day. In most existing DRM systems
architecture, and in accordance with industry practise, customers use relevant
consuming applications that enable them to transact with the licensing and reference
services. The licensing service provides a valid source of reference for the correct soft
product and its distribution sources. Licenses are generated using the packaging service.
Customers also interact with download services designed for the acquisition of soft
products that are protected by these licenses. Usually the license must contains the usage
rights, meaning that the devices that will eventually play or run the soft-products being
purchased are able to check the authenticity of the file and answer the question as to
whether or not it is allowed to be played on the device in question.
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Adding a Quality Certificate to the DRM architecture as part of the license, or
incorporating it as a separate piece of information, will enhance DRM. Devices
themselves may prevent files from playing (even if both the device and the soft-product
have the correct permission), if the item ordered is deemed not to correspond to that
ordered or purchased. Having a quality certificate embedded inside the license of the
product itself will ensure that the product license has the correct identity. In this way
Quality Certification will provide the best means of identifying the soft product; at the
same time the certificate itself can incorporate other information and ensure that the
DRM functions correctly.
7.8.6 Quality Certification's Further Research
Soft products suffer from the lack of clear description or quality. This problem affects the
development of the soft-product industry and makes customers feel reluctant to buy such
items. This section proposed a method of assigning a quality certificate to every single
soft product. In reality this is akin to the ISBN numbering system for books and digital
certification systems for web sites [77].
One problem could be the difficulty of doing such things in real life, however, the answer
to such claim is that most soft products are created by commercial firms that if they felt
the need for such service, they could adopted it very easily and smoothly. In addition,
implementing such architecture is easy due to the maturity of digital certification [64].
It is felt that further research could be directed to this area of e-commerce, and in
particular in trying to find electronic methods to eliminate or resolve reasons for disputes
in e-commerce transactions.
7.9 Conclusion
Since, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, research has proven that the only truly
effective way to lower the cost of resolution is to automate the entire process, the
intention of this chapter was to describe a new e-commerce transaction protocol that
would be needed to facilitate this kind of development. The current infrastructure was
deemed inappropriate due to the fact that even though the Internet was originally built on
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trust, this has almost been lost due to cross border transactions and the financial benefits
that have been derived from these fraudulent transactions and the influx of soft-products
and their associated problems.
This thesis proposed a complete solution in order to solve this problem. This solution
consists of two parts: (i) an E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) that was practical
and expandable to accommodate any new improvements in the future, and (ii) an
Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system that would automatically resolve
any dispute happening within the proposed e-commerce protocol.
This chapter discussed e-commerce transaction protocol in general, its components and
how it works. The terminology used was already well-known and the intention was not
to create a new technology, rather its intention was to build upon existing knowledge by
modifying and suggesting improvements to better satisfy technical needs. At the same
time it proposed the need to assign quality certification to soft-products in order to
provide purchasers with a precise specification of the item they were purchasing. It
would also allow them to refer to the descriptive framework if there was any need for
redress.
The next chapter will discuss the Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system
in more detail and show how using the ETP will make it possible to resolve disputes
automatically and with minimal cost.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Automated Online Dispute Resolution
(AODR)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR)
8.1 Introduction
Most Online Dispute Resolution Systems are not strictly 'online' as discussed in chapter
6 because of the need for human involvement in each process. This is time consuming
and costly and now, having explained in the previous chapter how the E-commerce
Transaction Protocol (ETP) works, the existence of an effective Automated Online
Dispute Resolution (AODR) system, its dependence on an effective ETP, and how the
system itself actually functions, is discussed in this chapter.
The AODR is a basic system that, in its own right, is not able to resolve any dispute.
Nevertheless the process itself should be able to provide a resolution regardless of the
product type and payment method used if it is configured correctly. In order for the
AODR to resolve any dispute, a product/payment specific plug-in (add-on) should be
incorporated into the system since different product/payment combination result in
different dispute types.
Since the focus of this thesis is about disputes regarding soft products and in order to
demonstrate how the AODR will work in practice, one of the most common payment
methods used in e-comrnerce, that of using credit cards, has been selected. Therefore the
appropriate plug-in specification for soft products and credit cards will be proposed.
The system specification that will be outlined is designed to resolve any type of dispute
that could happen in the online transaction system (assuming that the dispute Initiator
follows the guidelines accompanying the specification).
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8.2 What is AODR
AODR is a system that is claimed to be able to 'automatically' resolve any dispute that
happens in soft-product transactions given that, if needed, the following data can be
provided:
• Order details: obtained from the Contract server by supplying the exchange ID,
either or both of the two parties can supply this;
• Delivery certificate: both parties must be able to provide their delivery certificate
showing that they did deliver the item as promised.
• Quality certificate: the party being accused of not providing the correct quality
should provide this certificate. In certain cases both parties may need to provide
this.
AODR has two roles, one is giving advice to exchange participants in order to provide
protection from any possible dispute. This advice will come in the form of suggesting
good reputation Contract, Quality and Delivery servers and is designed to give protection
from fraud when using them in the transaction process. In order for a TTP server to be
qualified with the AODR, it must have already shown certification capability and be
considered reputable. The second role of the AODR is obviously resolving the disputes.
8.3 Motivation for AODR
8.3.1 Fairness
Fairness is an important feature and actually the most important feature in any dispute
resolution system. Most systems that have human involvement cannot guarantee fairness
since human feelings and prejudices are not the same in every individual and, as such,
cannot be controlled.
The automatic nature of the dispute resolution process will enhance the fairness since
machines will work strictly according to the facts and evidence available. Even if
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someone who is not guilty is deemed to be so due to a lack of appropriate contradictory
evidence, this will be considered fair since an opportunity for them to prove otherwise
will have been provided.
8.3.2 Personal privacy
Personal privacy is now a big concern to many people. If the data involved is regarding a
payment method or any financial matter, then the concern is higher. As stated earlier
dispute resolution that involves the human element usually has many privacy problems,
since it is very hard to control. AODR is completely automated, which means no one ever
will look into the information provided, and most of the time the AODR will require
evidence of only some certification, therefore access to unneeded information is
protected.
8.4 How AODR works
AODRS
Submit Dispute Evidence
Initializer Requester
m 0° m< <0: 0~ 0:(J) .~ (J)
::J 0/ :Jn o(J) ~o (1)
Result Decision Invalid Evidence
Maker Evidence Validater
~-; l'~. ~ 0"~ s-"S
~~ .o~~ ss
Evidence ~f/j
Evaluator
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Figure 8-1: The AODR System Architecture
8.4.1 AODR Processes
The following is an explanation of the AODR processes shown in Figure 8-1
Dispute Initializer: this is the process responsible for receiving the dispute from the
Initiator and will then provide the interface between the system and the users when
evidence is required;
Evidence Requester: this process gets a dispute and subsequently extracts and requests
the evidence required;
Evidence Valida tor: this process ensures that this evidence is valid and correct·,
Evidence Evaluator: this process receives the valid evidence from the Validator and
analyzes it;
Decision Maker: this process receives all the analysis and decides the outcome of the
dispute accordingly.
8.4.2 Messages
(l) The Submit message to initiate a dispute can be sent by any of the two parties, it
contains the Initiator ID (lID) and the Dispute type (D#): Submit (110, 0#)
(2) Evidence Request, in this message the system sends a request to one of the two
parties asking for specific evidence which will assist in resolving the dispute. This
message contains the ID of the party who should supply the evidence and the list
of evidence required with a minimum of one piece of evidence: EviReq (ID, Es)
(3) Evidence supply, this message will be the reply by the party to the EviReq
message with the required evidence: EviSup (ID, Es)
(4) The Result message, this message is sent twice, once to each of the two parties
telling them the outcome of the dispute. It contains the ID, the status for the
outcome of the dispute (S), and an optional justification field that can be used to
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give more details about the outcome of the dispute or it could be just left for
future use (J). The status of the dispute has three possibilities of [Success,
Neutral, Failure]. In the case where the dispute outcome was to the favor of any of
the two parties the one who wins will get a status [Success] and the other will get
[Failure] and if the outcome was neutral and no action should be taken, both
parties will get [Neutral] in the status field: Result (ID, S, J)
(5) The advice request message, this message is sent by anybody who wants to
participate in an e-commerce transaction. It could be sent by a merchant asking
what precautions to take to protect his business from fraud, or by a customer
asking for advice on how he should complete the transaction without any
problem. It contains the ID of the advice requester, the type of product in the
transaction (Prod), the payment method which will be used in this transaction
(Pym), and the role of this party in the transaction, Buyer or Seller, (Role). The
types of products available so far are either Soft-product or Hard-product but
more classifications might come in the future: AdvReq (ID, Prod, Pym, Role)
(6) The Advice supply, this message is sent from the AODR to the sender of the
AdvReq message. It contains the recipient ID and a list of tuples, each of which
contains the required evidence and the relevant provider if one is available. For
example it should return a message saying that a contract certificate is needed for
such transaction and contract.com is a trusted party who can provide such
certificate: AdvSup (ID, [certificate, provider(s)))
8.4.3 Services
The AODR system provides two main services. The first service is to resolve a dispute
and the second one is to provide recommendations to the participant before the
transaction. The type of the first message sent will specify which service is requested.
8.4.3.1 The Dispute Resolution Service
This is the most important service offered by the AODR. How it works, is by assuming
that there are only two parties in the dispute: the Initiator and the Responder. (Future
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research can look into the possibility of their being more than two parties involved in the
dispute).
(I) The Initiator - who is the one claiming that he was cheated- would submit a new
case with the AODR Submit (lID, D#).
(2) If the Initiator does not know the dispute type, he/she will complete a dispute
form answering a series of 'yes/no' type questions in accordance with the dispute
possibilities mentioned earlier in the taxonomy. For example, it may query
whether any item had actually been received.
(3) After submitting the dispute type or the dispute form, the Dispute Initializer
processes it then sends it to the Evidence Requester process.
(4) The Evidence Requester process produces the required certificate(s). The process
is selective and will not ask for every piece of evidence since some may not be
available or relevant to the dispute case in question. For example, a quality
certificate will not help in a dispute regarding a delivery problem. So the AODR
will require only those certificates needed according to the input EviReq (ID, Es).
(5) After the required evidence received EviSup (ID, Es) it will be forwarded to the
Evidence Validator process to make sure that these pieces of evidence are
genuine.
(6) If the required evidence is not supplied within the time set by the AODR or the
evidence is fake, the information will be forwarded to the decision maker process
that will tell the Initiator that the dispute has been rejected.
(7) If the pieces of evidence are genuine, they will be forwarded to the Evidence
Evaluator to review the certificate(s) and make sure that the claims are valid and
check if any further pieces of evidence are required from the Responder who is
being accused of cheating.
(8) If evidence is required from the Responder then it will go through the same
process as the evidence from the Initiator and then it will be analyzed by the
Evidence Evaluator process.
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(9) The analysis of the evidence by the Evaluator will be sent to the Decision Maker
process to come up with the decision.
(10) The Decision Maker process makes the decision and prepares the messages to
be sent to the two parties as a result of the dispute Result (ID, S, J).
Figure 8-2 shows the time chart for this service
Customer Merchant
Ne otiation
--.--:....::......~..,'JJute AODRS
} Evidence Req uester
valid~te & Evaluate
eq. EVidence(s)
Ev'dencel~_-----
Figure 8-2: Time Chart for AODR Dispute Resolution Service
8.4.3.2 The Advising Service
The second service offered by AODR is advising the e-commerce party, whether
customer or merchant, of what precautions should be taken to guarantee a fair dispute
resolution. This service operates as follows:
1) One party sends a request for advice AdvReq (ID, Prod, Pym, Role) by
supplying the type of product to be exchanged plus the type of payment method
used and the nature of his role in the transaction
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2) The system replies to the advice requester with all the possible required evidence
and some recommendations of who could provide such evidence AdvSup (ID,
[certificate, provider(s)]).
The idea of this service is that it will tell Internet users what to look for when they want
to do any transaction on the Internet. It is also designed to help users protect themselves
in their choice of trusted services.
8.5 AODR Plug-in
Having explained AODR process, the rules of the system when making decisions
according to each situation will now be outlined.
As previously stated, this system is product/payment specific, therefore every
combination will have different resolution. An Add-on or Plug-in for each of these
possibilities will need to be created. This plug-in, when compiled, will allow the AODR
to resolve any dispute regarding these types of cases.
There are two things to do to create a plug-in for the system. First, all the possible
disputes should be analyzed and counted by running the payment method over the E-
commerce dispute taxonomy which was introduced earlier in chapter 5 to come up with a
set of feasible dispute cases. Second, the associated evidence required to resolve each
valid dispute will be identified.
The following are the steps required to create the plug-in for the credit card payment
method (see chapter 2,2.9.3.3 for the credit card transaction cycle).
It starts by listing every dispute possibility, making sure it is possible and could exist
using this particular method of payment. It is assumed that Party1 is the customer (Px)
and Party2 is the merchant (Pv), so Iteml (Ix) is the money and Item2 (Iv) is the soft
product needed.
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1- Delivery
a. Iteml delivered but ltem2 not delivered (DX & -,DY)
This is the case when partyl pays but receives nothing and this case requires
proof of delivery [Delivery Certificate]
b. Item 2 delivered but Iteml not delivered (DY & -,DX)
This case does not happen since credit card transactions are almost always a ' pay
before' transaction, which means you pay first then you get what you want.
c. Iteml not delivered on time (-'Ty)
This case does not happen since there is no such late credit cards payment
d. Item2 not delivered on time (-,TX)
The above case requires proof of delivery time stamped and also a proof of the
agreed delivery time [Contract Certificate + Delivery Certificate]
e. Iteml cannot be delivered (-,Ay)
This case also does not happen since the merchant is the one who will be charging
the credit card so it is a pull transaction for him (rather than a push one). If the
merchant cannot charge for an item, then it will not be delivered ('pay before'
situation)
f. Item2 cannot be delivered (-'AX)
The above case is more complicated than the earlier ones and it requires proof of
attempt to deliver [Delivery Certificate].
2- Order:
a. Partyl claims never agreeing to an exchange (-'Px)
This case requires proof of participation in the ETP protocol. This proof can be
derived from the proof of agreed terms [Contract Certificate]
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b. Party2 claims never agreeing to an exchange (-'PY)
This case also requires proof of participation in the ETP protocol. This proof can
also be derived from the proof of agreed terms [Contract Certificate]
c. Item! quantity is not correct (-,CX)
This case requires proof of delivery to show how many were delivered and also
proof of agreed terms [Contract Certificate and Delivery Certificate]
d. Item2 quantity is not correct (-,CY)
This case also requires proof of delivery to show how many were delivered and
also proof of agreed terms [Contract Certificate and Delivery Certificate]
3- Item
a. Item! not Received as agreed (-'IX)
This case cannot happen if credit cards are used as the method of payment since it
is a 'pay before' method, allowing the merchant time to check the validity of the
card before sending the item.
b. Item2 Received not as agreedr-Iv)
This case requires proof of delivery and agreed terms concerning the item being
delivered. [Contract Certificate, Delivery Certificate]
c. Quality of Item! Received not as promised (-,QX)
This case cannot happen in a credit card situation due to the aforementioned 'pay
before' method. Again the merchant can check card validity before sending the
item.
d. Quality of Item2 Received not as promised (-'QY)
This case requires proof of delivery to show what was delivered, proof of quality
to demonstrate unacceptability, and also proof of the original terms of agreement
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regarding quality etc. [Contract Certificate, Quality Certificate and Delivery
Certificate]
e. ItemI received not as expected (--'Sx)
This case cannot happen with the credit card method for the 'pay before' reasons
described earlier. .
f. Item2 Received not as expected (--,SY)
This case requires proof of delivery of the item in question, and also proof of
agreed terms confirming pre-agreed satisfaction level [Contract Certificate, and
Delivery Certificate]
The level of satisfaction should be agreed on before the transaction and can vary
from [0-1], where 0 = no satisfaction guaranteed at all and I= satisfaction is fully
guaranteed and the guarantor will pay all expenses if required.
g. ItemI consumed more than once (--'MX)
This could happen easily in with credit card transactions since the merchant will
still have the credit card number even after the transaction has been completed
and could charge the card an unlimited number of times as long as it has not
reached its upper limit. This case requires proof of delivery showing that the
credit card has been charged more than once for the same order and the agreed
terms [Contract Certificate, and Delivery Certificate]
h. Item2 consumed more than once (--'My)
This case requires proof of delivery showing that Item2 was delivered more than
once for the same order and the proof of agreed terms [Contract Certificate, and
Delivery Certificate]
Having analysed alternative outcomes of using the credit card as a method of payment for
a soft-product, with the dispute taxonomy previously described, a list of possible
disputes has now been compiled using the following format
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(D#) {(Dispute reason, [Evidence required]}:
(DI) {ItemI delivered but Item2 not delivered (Dx & -'Dv) [Delivery Certificate]}
(D2) {Item2 not delivered on time (-.Tx) [Contract Certificate + Delivery Certificate]}
(D3) {ltem2 cannot be delivered (-.Ax) [Delivery Certificate]}
(D4) {Partyl claims never agreeing to an exchange (-.Px) [Contract Certificate]}
(D5) {Party2 claims never agreeing to an exchange (r=Pv) [Contract Certificate]}
(D6) {Iteml quantity is not correct (-'Cx) [Contract Certificate and Delivery Certificate]}
(D7) {Item2 quantity is not correct (-'Cv) [Contract Certificate and Delivery Certificate]}
(D8) {Item2 Received not as agreed (-.Iv) [Contract Certificate, Delivery Certificate] }
(D9) {Quality ofItem2 Received not as promised (-'Qv) [Contract Certificate, Quality
Certificate and Delivery Certificate]}
(DIO) {Item2 Received not as expected (-'Sv) [Contract Certificate, and Delivery
Certificate]}
(DU) {Iteml consumed more than once (-.Mx) [Contract Certificate, and Delivery
Certificate]}
(D12) {ltem2 consumed more than once (-.Mv) [Contract Certificate, and Delivery
Certificate] }
After generating the dispute IDs as above, the Resolution Procedures will be added to
each case. So the plug-in created will have the following format
(D#) {(Dispute reason, [Evidence required], Resolution procedure}.
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This plug-in can then be fed into the AODR and should then be able to resolve all dispute
cases if the item is a soft products and the payment method used is a credit card.
It should be stressed that this plug-in is only designed to show those dispute cases that
can be resolved by the AODR system. System providers, when implementing it, should
write the code for the Resolution Procedures to resolve each case according to the given
dispute type.
This plug-in will be used in the dispute resolution service. The type of certificates used in
this plug-in are those that should be used in the second service in supplying advice to the
participants. Trusted Third Parties in the ETP should register with the AODR providers to
be recommended to customers.
It has not been within the scope of this thesis to go into great detail about coding the
Resolution Procedures: future research should look into this in more detail. For
simplicity and because of time constraints, it has been enough to confirm that the
certificates are genuine and compatible in order to be able to come up with the
appropriate resolution. For example the Resolution Procedure for Dispute!
(Dl) {Iteml delivered but Item2 not delivered (Dx & =Dv), [Delivery Certificate]
[If Party! submits a genuine delivery certificate and party2 could not provide one, then
Party! should win the dispute, but if Party2 submits a genuine counter delivery
certificate, then the dispute is rejected]} and so on for all the rest of the disputes.
8.6 Reasons for the Success of AODR
8.6.1 Implementation Independent
The concept of AODR is merely abstract at the moment; no implementation has yet been
available. In the future every AODR provider will be able to implement their own version
but should follow the guidelines to be able to offer at least the services described above.
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Different providers could subsequently offer more services to attract customers to use
their system. Providers should aim to gain a good reputation in order to persuade
merchants to participate with them since this maybe optional.
8.6.2 Protection Against Organized Crimes [Professional Hackers]
Organized crimes usually are the most difficult to fight, since hackers know almost
everything about the systems in use and their drawbacks. AODR will provide protection
from this kind of crime because it uses the ETP which follows a very systematic
transaction procedure and also provides the parties involved with the essential evidence.
AODR, when used with ETP, will verify the evidence and make sure that both parties
will get a fair resolution. Professional hackers will not benefit much if ETP and AODR
are used together and merchants insist that they are used. This is because ETP with
AODR provides a strong authentication scheme and many trusted third parties servers are
involved, resulting in fair distribution of the responsibilities in the case of fraud.
8.6.3 Time and Resources Optimization:
Usually the ODR systems will contact the Responder as soon as it receives the dispute
from the Initiator. This means that some merchants will get many queries to participate in
resolving disputes that are not really valid where the Initiator has just simply not read the
rules or wants to try and claim compensation from the merchant even where he is at fault.
However, the AODR is designed not to contact the Responder unless the claim from the
Initiator is valid and the evidence is proved to be correct.
8.7 Enforcing the Result
Enforcing the result is a very difficult and important process m dispute resolution,
however what really governs the difficulty and the importance is the party that is
implementing the AODR. One good example of such a party might be dispute
departments in credit card companies. Currently they make their decisions through
manual investigation and phone and mail communications [22]. However their
174
investigation results are always enforceable on both parties because they have the right to
credit and debit both accounts.
8.8 AODR Providers
Funding of the service provider is a general problem with any dispute resolution system.
If customers have to pay for the service, it might prevent them from initiating the dispute;
if merchants fund it then they will only fund the one who will be in their side in case of a
dispute. AODR does not have this kind of problem since the cost is not high due to a lack
of human involvement.
There are many good candidates to fund the AODR provider, whether customers paying a
minimal charge of e.g. $1, or merchants paying the same nominal amount for every case
filed and heard. Governments should also support the AODR since it will encourage
more customers and merchants to benefit from e-commerce without having any
reservations.
The choice of the provider should be based on two things, the ability to fund the
infrastructure and the ability to enforce the result.
8.9 Enhancing AODR
8.9.1 Limitation of AODR
Current AODR design means that the number of dispute cases that can be resolved is
limited. This limitation comes from the fact that each payment and goods type
combination will have a different set of cases. This limitation of the cases covered could
be removed by either coming up with all the possibilities for the payment and goods type
combinations and then trying to generate all the cases, or by trying to abstract the cases
into a more generic analysis and then be able to cover all current scenarios.
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AODR should be able to compare the dispute case even if the exact payment and goods
type does not yet feature in the scenario analysis framework. In this way it should be
able to presume the same case and therefore be able to come up with a resolution. Even
though the resolution will not be binding since it has made this presumption to come up
with the result, it should still be able to give a good indication as to who is right and who
is wrong. Therefore the type of products and payments supported should be mentioned
clearly on the AODR provider's website.
Hard products face one important problem of comparing the item ordered to the one
delivered: AODR systems will not be able to make this comparison and so will not be
able to resolve the dispute. However, this problem could be solved by funding private or
government agencies that would make offline comparisons and then send evidence
electronically to the AODR which will then make a decision as a result of the inputs it
has received.
These agencies would compare the item and note the comparison result in the same way
that banks would make photocopies of e.g. passport originals and it will substitute the
Quality server in the ETP.
AODR providers may ask for different evidence and also the trusted third parties may
offer the evidence in different formats, as a result this inconsistency may jeopardize the
AODR form being able to resolve the dispute correctly. There should be a standard body
that will issue a clear specification of the type of evidence needed and the content
required from each piece of evidence.
ISO would be an ideal body to undertake this function but it will probably takes quite a
long time to come up with a standard - by which time many providers are likely to
working to their own proprietary systems, making any modifications required for
standardization difficult to implement.
The suggestion here would be to submit to the ISO a complete draft with all possible
certificates and contents in order to expedite the process and make the draft available to
the public so all the providers would have a common base from which to start.
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8.9.2 Reducing the Involvement of TTPs
As discussed in chapter 7, the ETP needs three TTPs to be involved in the transaction to
make sure that both parties will get a fair resolution where disputes arise. The
involvement of the TTPs depends heavily on the current technologies available to
authenticate and verify the information agreed and exchanged.
For example, if the asymmetric cryptography infrastructure is available and if both parties
have private and public keys then a good improvement to the ETP would include
removing the Contract server completely. Both parties would sign the contract by their
private keys and send it to the other. When received they would use the other party's
public key to read the contract and make sure it corresponded to what was being agreed.
When a party decrypts the contract by the other party's public key and subsequently finds
that the contract matches what is being agreed with, the delivery can be immediate since
this will be enough evidence of participation and agree terms.
Future technologies may allow the ETP to get rid of all the TTPs in the future; this is
something worth more investigation and future study.
8.9.3 Reducing Storage Requirements for the Users
The cost of resolving a dispute using the AODR should be minimal since this is the major
aim of such a system and no human element is involved. The hardware cost will affect
the overall cost significantly. Some dispute cases will involve evidence where the item
itself is a soft-product, or some parts of the item are embedded in it which implies that a
great amount of storage space is needed, resulting in higher hardware cost and an even
higher resolution fee.
The AODR will sometimes request more evidence from both parties during the resolution
period. Parties may not respond immediately, in consequence the whole case will need to
be saved until the evidence arrives. The time of arrival of the evidence will usually be
unknown, meaning that even more storage space will be needed to store cases still being
processed.
177
Resolved cases will sometimes be needed at a later stage, especially if the enforcement is
done though a different body. Archiving the resolved cases will also require more disk
space.
Some actions can be taken to try and minimize the need for disk space. For those cases
currently being processed the evidence size could be minimized by using the hash of the
item rather than the actual one. This could be generated by the TTP. If not, then the
AODR can take the item, hash it and then delete the original to save space
For those cases pending and waiting for evidence, there should be a reasonable enough
timeout before the AODR considers that the party is not willing to submit the evidence or
it is not available. This amount of time should not be too short, it should give parties
adequate time to submit their evidence; it should also not be too long, so that the system
does not need to store too many cases. The party that is required to submit evidence
should also be allowed to ask for an extension or be able to reply saying that the evidence
is not available.
A timeout period should also be specified for resolved cases. This period should be long
enough so that the enforcement is able to take place within it. Parties involved in the
resolved dispute case should have the ability to ask for an extension of storage before it is
deleted. They should also be able to confirm to the AODR that the result has been
enforced and that the case can be deleted.
8.9.4 Support for Users with No Evidence
In the current configuration of the AODR, if the evidence is not presented, the case will
be closed. An improvement on this would be to try to resolve the case by asking for the
required evidence and, if not available, requiring that the other party rejects the claim or
comes up with counter evidence.
For example in the case of a customer having ordered four items, receiving only three and
subsequently claiming that the delivery evidence has been lost, the AODR should try to
contact the merchant and explain the situation. The merchant would then be required to
check internal records and, on finding the mistake, send the remaining item to the
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customer. Although the merchant could not be forced into doing this, it is unlikely that
he would want to take advantage of the customer's situation and not comply with the
request.
8.9.5 Resolution Outcome
Usually the outcome from the system will involve decisions regarding whether or not to
reimburse the customer. However, it could be that the actual amount to be returned is
also questionable, in which case some value should be included in the contract stipulating
that in the event of a dispute, this is what each party would be required to pay.
Penalty clauses could also be included, e.g. if goods were not delivered on time a nominal
amount should be paid, likewise for an under-delivery or failure to comply with other,
previously agreed, contract conditions such as quality of service.
8.10 Conclusion
To re-iterate, most Online Dispute Resolution Systems are not strictly 'online' because of
the need for human involvement in each process, making them time consuming and
costly. However, the proposed AODR in this thesis is verifiably 'online' in its
execution, since it is able to resolve any dispute without human involvement. It is
designed to work in conjunction with real online transactions where everything is
automated, although there could be some exceptions to this if the parties involved in the
transaction were able to comply with the requirements and generate the required evidence
themselves.
The AODR should provide results for the dispute and, although the concern here has not
been about result enforcement, it should make this aspect of the process easier by
ensuring the decision making stage is more efficient and effective.
Although the AODR system is only a basic and not able to resolve any dispute per se, it
should as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, be able to provide a resolution,
regardless of the product type and payment method used if configured correctly.
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Therefore the chapter has described the product/payment specific plug-in (add-on) that
would need to be incorporated into the system. The system specification that has been
described is designed to resolve any type of dispute that could happen in the online
transaction system (assuming that the dispute Initiator follows the guidelines
accompanying the specification).
The next chapter will talk about a case study of e-commerce in Saudi Arabia which has
been used to test the viability of both the e-commerce dispute taxonomy and the proposed
model. The case study shows the suitability of using ETP with AODR in order to resolve
soft-product disputes automatically.
180
CHAPTER NINE
E-commerce and E-commerce Fraud in
Saudi Arabia: A Case Study
181
CHAPTER NINE
E-commerce and E-commerce Fraud in Saudi Arabia:
A Case Study
9.1 Introduction
This chapter will discusses the potential market for e-commerce in Saudi Arabia, the
current infrastructure available and plans for future infrastructure developments to better
support the growing e-commerce marketplace.
During a field trip to Saudi Arabia the following information was collected to describe
the current situation of e-commerce in Saudi and to help determine its future. The choice
of Saudi Arabia for this study arose from three factors, first: Saudi is a growing market
for e-commerce and disputes; second: some important information was needed to be
collected to test the proposed protocols in this thesis, and Saudi has less strict privacy
rules than the U.K, and finally, the first implementation of these ideas is most likely to be
in Saudi Arabia.
The case study was conducted in Saudi Arabia over a 3 month period, between April and
June of2005. The study had 3 main objectives:
1) To find out more about the nature of e-commerce and e-commerce fraud in Saudi
Arabia;
2) To verify that the e-commerce dispute taxonomy generated in chapter 5 of this
work was complete and therefore appropriate;
3) To study some complex fraud cases and ensure that if the ETP and AODR are
used the cases in question would have been easily resolved.
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9.2 The Potential Of The Saudi Arabian Market
Despite having 23 million inhabitants and an estimated IT product market of $6.3 billion
in 2004 (with computer sales representing $850 million), the growth potential for e-
commerce has been constrained by the absence of a regulatory environment, slow
penetration of the Internet and advanced, i.e. broadband, telecommunications. In 2001
Saudi Arabia represented the Arab world's largest market for IT products with over 33%
of its total PC sales. The estimated number of installed bases PCs is over 800 000, ,
however Madar Research [86] puts that figure at nearer 1.5 million [13, 39, 129].
Whilst this number may seem large in volume it is still small in terms of penetration
compared to most other countries in the Gulf [13]. With more than $7.0 billion invested,
plans are now being developed to tum Riyadh, the capital, into a major IT and
telecommunications centre in keeping with the demands of a growing information
conscious society. Whilst the Saudi Arabian government concedes that the country may
be considered behind its smaller Gulf neighbours in terms of speed of Internet-related
achievements, relative to its size it is still making fast progress towards its goal of
universal access to telephony and the Internet [129].
9.3 Current Infrastructure
Universally, E-commerce has three main 'pillars': communication and Internet, payment,
and delivery services. These are now described in the context of Saudi Arabia.
9.3.1 Telecommunication and the Internet:
In terms of an infrastructure for e-commerce, telecommunication is the most important.
This sector was liberalised by the Saudi government in 2001, opening up the market to
foreign investment and therefore competition.
Use of the Internet has been available in Saudi through domestic servers since 1998. In
2001 there were 350,000 users, today that figure exceeds 2.2 million, representing a
penetration rate of around 10% of the population [50].
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Internet connection fees are considered high although recently the Saudi
Telecommunication Company (STC) announced a 25% cut. At the same time new
pricing models are being considered by the government and ISPs in an effort to make
connection more affordable for users. At the present time, individuals, companies,
organisations and government agencies other than universities must subscribe to Internet
services through one of only 21 currently licensed ISPs in the kingdom. Universities are
allowed to have their own Internet service [50].
9.3.2 Payment Methods:
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) is the central monetary authority. In
mid-1980s it established the Saudi Payments Network (SPAN), a "neutral" national
transaction switch that linked the ATMs of all the commercial banks on a reciprocal basis
so that all bank customers could withdraw cash at any ATM in the kingdom. This led to a
national ATM service coverage with 2,577 ATM terminals in online daily operation in
SPAN.
Currently around 19 million transactions are processed every month with a total value of
around SAR 12 billion. SPAN terminals accept Visa and MasterCard transactions (and in
the near future they will also accept American Express).
Cheques are cleared at local clearing houses that are maintained at each SAMA branch.
The Automated Clearing House (ACH) accounts for the bulk of cheques cleared at the
SAMA three main centres, while remaining cheques are cleared through manual
clearings at the other seven SAMA branches [39].
The use of credit cards as a means of payment is not widely used in Saudi Arabia for
three reasons. First, Islam prohibits people to take or give (financial) interest and most
credit cards work on this basis. Second, most consumers use debit cards (ATM cards),
removing the need for credit cards (unless there is a need to be able to access cash
internationally). Third, disputes in Saudi involving credit cards usually mean that the
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customer will have to put forward the cost of the transaction first and only then will the
dispute be investigated and hopefully be resolved in their favour.
In consequence, the number of credit cards as a ratio to debit (or ATM) cards in the
country is currently only 1:10 according to a recent interview with a SAMA official.
With specific regard to the focus of the thesis, there are currently no e-payment schemes
in operation in Saudi Arabia [39].
9.3.3 Delivery
The Saudi Arabia postal service is still very inefficient. Only one government
establishment is responsible for distributing mail to central post office boxes and at the
same time sending national and international mail. From a situation in 1998 where there
were only 4 P.O. outlets in Riyadh, there are now 400 after it was approved that small
private post offices could offer their services [110].
However, even now mail cannot be delivered directly to homes or offices (and can only
be delivered to mail boxes). Nevertheless infrastructure improvements are intended to
change this situation.
9.4 Future Infrastructure
The Saudi Government is now taking vital steps towards reviewing regulations for e-
commerce and planning for e-govemment. Many banking institutions and large
companies have also set up infrastructures for e-commerce in order to maximize the
advantages of online business [50]. The following describes how these steps for the
future are being developed, again using the e-commerce 'three pillars' concept.
9.4.1 Communication and Internet
Saudi Arabia represents the largest and fastest growing telecoms products and services
market in the Middle East. Total expenditure within the sector is expected to reach
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$4.7billion by the end of 2005, and increase to $60billion by 2020. The Government's
latest Telecom Development Plan for the period 2000-2005 aims to increase line density
rates to 25 lines per 100 people by the end of2005 (a huge increase from the 10 lines per
100 in 1996) [50].
Whilst the country has not yet reached a point where voice traffic has been surpassed by
data traffic, as with most of the world, its future appears to belong to data and broadband
wireless systems. The number of leased lines is expected to grow annually at around
18%, with a further increase to 40,000 by 2006 according to the Telecommunications and
Information Technology Commission (CITC). More than $lObillion is expected to be
invested in new data information technologies in the country between 2005 and 2020
[50].
Saudi Arabia's e-commerce market is expected to grow from $1.5billion in 2002 to
$8billion by 2005 according to the latest Madar Research results [86]. There is also a
growing demand for network management, data warehousing and web hosting services,
along with increasing opportunities in more the traditional areas such as communications
analysis, design, control and training subsectors [50].
9.4.2 Payment
Research results from interviews with SAMA officials indicate that the only new
development in the payment sector will be that of using the smart card instead of the
usual PIN debit card. Their opinion is that this will help boost the portability of payment
and lead to further market penetration in card use. At the same time it is hoped that use
of smart card readers will further facilitate and help increase e-commerce transactions
due to increased levels of trust in security.
Credit cards should also have more acceptability since SPAN terminals now accept Visa
and MasterCard transactions (and in the near future will also accept American Express).
In the first quarter of 2005 there was a substantial growth in online purchases by online
domestic and international Visa cardholders using the Internet, transaction business was
valued at over $100,000 during the period [138].
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Early 2004, the Samba Financial Group became the first e-commerce acquirer in Saudi
Arabia and was closely followed by the launch of their Internet payment service
'SambaConnect' (e-commerce 6) [138].
The CEO& MD of SAMBA (and also Visa CEMEA board member), is quoted as saying:
'With SAMBA providing the solutions for online transactions as the only e-commerce
acquirer in the Kingdom, we have witnessed increasing acceptance of online purchases.
We expect greater online activity in the coming months as more merchants in Saudi
Arabia begin to take advantage of this delivery channel and offer online purchase
facilities, which are fully protected by Visa International's latest e-security programme,
'Verified by Visa', in addition to the security benefits offered by SambaConnect. With
large acquirers such as Saudi Arabian Airlines now offering online payments through
SambaConnect, there will be a further deepening of the market' [24].
9.4.3 Delivery
In 2005 the Saudi Post approved a project to begin delivering mail to houses and
expected to distribute around 5 million boxes in this project. The intention is to deliver
mail in a timely manner direct to houses using latest technology smart P.o. boxes linked
to satellites and postal trucks, and using the GPS to find addresses correctly.
E-comrnerce merchants will, as a result of this project, be able to deliver goods directly to
houses, increasing levels of trust in the transaction system as a whole and ensuring that
the items ordered will go directly to the payee's registered address rather than the
previous PO Box number used previously.
This will facilitate using some verification systems similar to those used in the USA or
Europe to make sure that the payment method used belongs to a specific address, an
example of such a system is the Address Verification System (AVS).
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9.5 E-commerce and Fraud
To re-iterate, Saudi e-commerce is only conducted via the use of credit cards and the next
section will examine fraud cases in this area. SAMA officials rely on information from
the major credit card companies about the security of their cards.
The General Manager of Saudi Arabia Visa International commented that: 'The rising
number of transactions is an indication of the growing comfort level of Visa cardholders
when they make online payments. At Visa, we are committed to providing a secure
online payment environment to consumers through constant innovation of new
technologies. Our e-security program, 'Verified by Visa' is one such example that is
promoting peace of mind and trust of cardholders when they shop from the comfort of
their home or office at anytime' [24].
The appropriateness of the program 'Verified by Visa' as a security precaution has
already been criticised in section 4.6.3 of this thesis. These criticisms were raised
subsequently as part of the project's research with Mr. Ian Hudson, GM of Visa CEMEA
who, unfortunately, was not able to answer the shortcomings about the system that had
been raised.
9.6 Verification of the E-commerce Dispute Taxonomy
The e-commerce dispute taxonomy generated in chapter 5 is the first of its kind. The
intention in generating it was to help those parties involved in the field of dispute
resolution to better understand the associated problems and therefore better facilitate the
resolution process
Completeness in the taxonomy was verified using the Truth Table method. However, for
further confirmation the taxonomy was then tested in several live e-cornmerce dispute
cases in Saudi Arabia over a period of one month in one of its major banks. The results
are analysed below.
188
520 dispute cases were monitored during the month, at an average of 18 disputes per day.
257 cases involved use of the VISA card, 263 regarding MasterCard. Customers
provided many reasons regarding the nature of the dispute, for consistency these have
been summarized in groups according to the nature of the dispute. Table 9-1 shows how
the dispute initiators' reasons have been grouped, and the number of disputes related to
each type of credit card.
Table 9-1: Saudi Fraud Cases and Reasons
Reason Visa MasterCard Total
1 Merchant has no authorization 96 160 256
2 Authorization canceled 14 24 38
3 Charged my expired card 6 11 17
4 Transaction not recognized 19 32 51
5 Canceled recurring transaction 3 3 6
6 Paid by other mean 46 46
7 Charged twice 25 19 44
8 Service not rendered 25 8 33
9 Goods returned but not money 5 6 11
10 Item received late 14 14
11 Amount not correct 3 3
Incorrect currency 1 112
Although at first sight these reasons may appear to be different from the taxonomy
presented earlier in the thesis, the following shows that in fact, all of the cases can be
analysed using the suggested framework.
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• Reasons 1 to 5 are similar to dispute [2-a] in the taxonomy which is "Customer
claims never placing the order (-'Px)" since without proof of authorization there is
no proof of participation;
• Reasons 6 and 7 are similar to dispute [3-g] in the taxonomy which is "Multiple
Payment consumption (-'MX)" since all these cases mean that the merchant
charges the customer more than once;
• Reasons 8 and 9 are similar to dispute [I-a] in the taxonomy which is "Payment
received but goods not delivered (Dx & -'DY)";
• ReasoniO is similar to dispute [l-e] in the taxonomy which IS "Goods not
delivered on time (-'TX)";
• Reason 11 is similar to dispute [2-d] in the taxonomy which is "Amount paid
incorrect (-'Cx)";
• Reason 12 is similar to dispute [3-b] in the taxonomy which is "Received money
not as sold (-'Ix)".
Therefore from the above analysis it is clear that all 520 reasons for the dispute cases are
covered by the taxonomy, providing further assurance that the taxonomy is robust and
therefore able to cover all dispute case possibilities.
9.7 Validity of the Use ofETP and AODR
The main theme of the thesis has been to develop an automated system to resolve
disputes occurring online. The case study found that the major cause of dispute was
where customers claimed they did not recognize the transaction, i.e. claiming that they
did not place the order. This form of dispute is also the most costly. Table 9-2 analyses
dispute reasons, the number of cases involved, together with their total monetary values.
Figure 9-1 shows the results as percentages.
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The statistics show that 52.8% of all cases and 70.2% of all monetary values related to
only one type of dispute, the nature of which is a major problem in all soft-products
transactions. To re-iterate, this type of dispute is based on claims by the customer that
the order was never placed.
The second source of dispute arises from the situation where the item is claimed not to
have been received. Together these two sources of dispute amount to 73% of all cases
and 79% of all monetary value in the case study. These figures are highly significant
and together the two causes of dispute indicate major problems in these areas.
During the period of the case study the resolution process and its outcome was
monitored closely. At the end of the period it found that 100% of dispute outcomes
favoured the customer since merchants had no proof of any contract or delivery. As a
result merchants were forced to return the money back to the customers' accounts.
However, in reality around only 18% of these cases provided a fair resolution, since
only 18% of the merchants admitted a mistake had been made in charging the
customer. In the remaining 82% of cases the merchants rejected the disputes but,
since they lacked the necessary evidence, they inevitably lost the case.
Each one of these disputes took around 5 weeks to be resolved. Interviews with
merchants, customers and third party dispute resolvers resulted in an agreement that if
the Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system had been available, the
resolution time would have been substantially reduced to only 10% of the time
currently being wasted on the process. At the same time it was acknowledged that the
outcome was not likely to be fairer using the AODR process.
However, all parties also agreed that if the AODR process was used within the e-
commerce infrastructure, the E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) also proposed
in this work, it would improve the resolution time even further and lead to 100% fair
resolution outcomes since every single exchange is monitored and both parties have
the required evidence. For example, the dispute case {[2-a] Customer claims never
placing the order (-'Px)} will take only one message from the AODR asking the
merchant to supply the contract for the transaction, if the time given to the merchant is
3days, then this dispute will be resolved in maximum of 4days instead of the normal 5
weeks procedure. Moreover, if the ETP is also used the result will be fair since the
merchant has the contract evidence.
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9.8 Conclusion
The case study examined the nature of e-commerce and e-commerce fraud in Saudi
Arabia and tested the completeness of the taxonomy and the capability of the ETP and
AODR models as a means of providing automatic solutions to the dispute resolution
problem.
A series of complex fraud cases were analysed in order to confirm their
appropriateness. Saudi Arabia, one of the most significant countries in the world at
the moment in terms of Internet and e-commerce growth (and therefore deemed
appropriate to test the potential for this new dispute resolution technology) was
chosen as the focus for the research.
The nature of e-commerce and e-commerce fraud in Saudi Arabia as one of the
leading market with potential expansion were studied. It also verified that the e-
commerce dispute taxonomy generated in chapter 5 of this work was complete and
therefore appropriate to be used in any design for a dispute resolution system. Finally,
the case study some complex fraud cases and confirmed that if the ETP and AODR
were used, the cases in question would have been easily resolved.
The next chapter will provide a conclusion to the thesis by summarizing its original
objectives, subsequent research and findings that led to proposals for a new solution,
contributions to the current field of academic study and suggestions for future
research.
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Conclusion
10.1 Introduction
Despite a growing e-commerce market that still has huge potential for the future, the
issue of dispute resolution is beginning to be a major deterrent to its expansion [42].
The increasing number of transactions is also leading to higher rates of dispute and
reluctance on the part of many customers and merchants to conduct business in this
way. The major concern on both sides is that contractual rights will not be protected
appropriately because the dispute resolution system is perceived to neither be robust
nor fair.
With regard to soft-products this issue is even more complicated and even further
behind in dispute resolution development than that of hard-products since these
products are usually small in value, difficult to trace and as a result confirmation of
delivery is usually difficult to obtain.
Therefore the objective of this thesis was to develop a system whereby purchasers
buying soft-products online and using any e-payment method would also have access
to a speedy, inexpensive and equitable dispute resolution system should the need
anse.
This was achieved by constructing enough evidence before, during and after the
transaction. The result led to the proposal of a solution to this major issue of fraud in
soft-products through technical rather than more traditional means, i.e., laws and
regulations in a court environment, since it was argued in the thesis that this more
traditional approach would not be capable of being enforced in the electronic world
and would have no authority in the global Internet environment as a result.
Dispute scenarios from many different perspectives were analyzed, viz. computer
science, business, legal and that of the participants themselves. The analysis then led
to the design of a comprehensive taxonomy framework for dispute in e-commerce.
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The new solution that was proposed was intended to overcome all previous
alternatives that still incorporated a human element in the process, since this led to
higher, unnecessary additional costs regarding time and eventual redress. This factor
was seen as crucial to its success in terms of improving confidence levels in e-
commerce since previously the costs of dispute resolution were often higher than the
value of the original item under dispute.
The outcome of the research proposed that the online dispute resolution process could
be completely automated the in two stages as follows:
1) an E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) forming the infrastructure where
the transaction would take place and be able to accommodate any new
improvements in the future,
2) an Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which would
automatically resolve any dispute occurring within the proposed e-commerce
model.
The AODR system required a product/payment specific plug-in (add-on). This plug-in
would be incorporated into the system to resolve all dispute cases specific to this
product/payment type. For illustration purposes, credit cards as a payment method
were selected, since this was the method of payment used for approx. 90% of all e-
commerce transactions, and an appropriate plug-in specification for payment of soft
products by credit card was designed and tested.
The research findings in the thesis should help the whole e-commerce community
since they give a whole picture of the solutions without going into details. However,
the actual implementation and coding of these protocols is out of the scope of this
thesis and could be completed in the future as part of the ongoing research in this
field.
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10.2 Contributions
The thesis makes the following contribution to the general field of computer science,
and e-commerce security in particular:
• It has studied the features of current payment methods in general and then
used this general framework to analyse the features of new payment methods;
• Provided suggestions as to how the current state-of-the-art fraud detection and
prevention technique, the Address Verification Service (AVS) could be
upgraded to a Full Address Verification Service (FAVS) which would be able
to detect and prevent fraud that occurs when soft-products are the items being
purchased;
• Generated the first e-commerce dispute taxonomy in order to provide an
adequate basis for dispute resolution system designers and others dealing with
resolutions per se in order to better understand the nature of the online
environment;
• Proposed an E-commerce Transaction Protocol (ETP) as an infrastructure for
e-commerce which would guarantee that both parties involved in the
transaction would have enough evidence in the case of a dispute;
• Described an Automated Online Dispute Resolution (AODR) system which
should be able to resolve all disputes cases automatically online. The existence
of such a system should be able to help in lowering the cost of the dispute
resolution process and the time taken to resolve any issue;
• Proposed a system for Quality certification for each soft-product which would
have great benefit to the soft-products market and facilitate the use of new
technologies in searching and acquiring such products;
• Studied some of the obstacles that currently preventing Saudi Arabia of
benefiting from the e-commerce explosion, since it was identified as one of
several countries with immense growth potential in the near future.
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10.3 Future Research
The problem of resolving disputes regarding soft-products is complicated and difficult
in terms of resolution. The work that has been undertaken in thesis is only a start, and
directions for future research are suggested as follows:
• The potential for implementing the FAVS and possible problems;
• Studying the possibility of standardizing the certificates (Quality, Order, and
Delivery) in order to expedite it before proprietary implementation is written.
• Trying to minimize the involvement of the TIPs in the ETP and study more
the level of trust in every one.
• Looking in to the new contract languages like BeL [94] and the possibility if
using it in writing the contract to expedite the contract processing and also to
use the current standards.
• Studying the possibility of incorporating the TTP servers into the contract so
the system can contact these servers directly without going back to the users.
• Automating the generation of the plug-ins by running the payment method
through the taxonomy is something worth more investigation and study.
(currently the dispute Plug-in is generated manually).
• Looking into having the AODR support new and more product types and
payment methods.
• Study the possibility of given every payment method some properties which
according to, evidence required can be specified. Therefore, if a new payment
method is established, it should possible to run this method on a list of
questions and come up with the required evidences to solve such disputes.
Some research is being started looking into the possibility of qualifying
services [98], and this still needs more look in to standardization.
Finally, the problem of dispute resolution is a major one. Whilst it should be
considered from several different perspectives, sight should not be lost of the need for
practicality in any solution being proposed. Research into this whole area will
continue; this thesis should stand as a thorough piece of reference work for any
subsequent activity in this field.
•
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